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GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDtlE 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Ph D Dissertation 
i 
KEN JUBBER 
Depart~ent of Sociology 
University of Cape Town 
This study originates in certain shortcomings in the 
sociology of knowledge and in sociological ~heory generally. 
' 
Among ~ucb shortcomings are: an unnecessar1ly restricted 
' 
conception of knowledge, the neglect of contemporary find-
ings in biology and psychology, and the oversocialized 
conception of humankind and knowledge. Tb.ej study aims to 
I 
I 
correct certain of these shortcomings through (1) redefining 
knowledge and (2) developing part of a comprehensive theory I . 
of knowledge which unites the biology of kn'owledge, the 
psychology of knowledge and the sociology of knowledge. 
: 
Piaget's genetic epistemology and Popper's and Lorc.nzts 
evolutionary epistemology provide much of the material which 
inspired this study and which is developed !in it. It is 
argueO. that th~ sociology of knowledge has not yet seriously 
encountered these disciplines and would ben!efit from such an 
encounter. Ethology, developmental psychology, cybernetics, 
and anthropology are other sources of infor1mation used. 
Knowledge is defined as assimilated information. It is 
argued that knowledge is assimilated in thrjee basic contexts: 
; 
that of the specie~, the individual organism, and the collec-
tivity. These yield, respectively, innate fknowledge, learnt 
I 
knowledge, and social knowledge. Knowledge, thus, is viewed 
socio-as evolving phylogenetically, ontogenetica];ly, and 
I genetically. 
various theses are proposed and arguments and facts 
supporting them presented in the course of !developing the 
theory of knowledge. The following are among the theses 
proposed: Life is a knowledge process. Hwnan knowledge and 
knowledge processes can be illwninated by studying the 
intellectual development of animals and children. Human 
knowledge and reality are biologically, psychologically, and 
sociologically constructed. All humans are born with an 
innate learning schema. This schema is responsible for 
human life and culture. It plays an important part in 
determining the pattern and content o:f culture. Truth is, 
in part, biologically determined. Society depends on many 
:forms o:f non-social knowledge. The W1.derstanding of culture 
requires an W1.derstanding of the varieties and forms of non-
social knowledge which make culture possible. 
The study constitutes a contribution to knowledge in 
various ways. Rather than considering the relationship 
between biology and behaviour as is customary, this study 
considers the relationship between biology and knowledge. 
Certain new concepts are introduced and a theory of knowlcdc-e 
is outlined which integrates the biology of knowledge, the 
psychology of knowledge and the sociology of knowledge. The 
study demonstrates that humankind's biological nature plays 
a vital role in socialization and in the production of 
culture. It thus serves to correct oversocialized views of 
humankindo The study reveals that reality is phylogenetic-
ally, ontogenetically and sociogenetically constructed; it 
is the result of the evolution and operation of biological, 
psychological and sociological factors. 
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THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
Introduction 
... l.Ulderlying the. veneer of 
cultural differences there is 
a primordial hwnanity that 
must be accollllted for as well 
as respected. 
Robert Murphy (1972:v) 
1 
This study originates in certain problems I encolllltered 
in trying to develop a sociological theory of religious 
knowledge. My reading led me to the realization that there 
were certain shortcomings in the sociology of knowledge and 
in sociological theory g~nerally that seriously hindered the 
formulation of a naturalistic theory of religious knowledge, 
such as the one I was aiming at. The general deprecation of 
the search for "origins" was one such matter. Another was 
conceptual. Various definitions of knowledge are employed 
by sociologists of knowledge, some of these, following logi-
cal positivism,, render the phrase "religious knowledge" sel:f 
contradicting. Other definitions, such as that proposed by 
Berger and Luckmann (1967), are imprecise because only 
certain religious "beliefs" -- those that "pass" for kn.owl-
edge in society -- qualify as religious "knowledge". Other 
shortcomings stem :from such things as the neglect of biology 
and psychology, a seriously flawed theory of socialization 
and learning, and a seemingly l.Ulbridgeable gap between the 
micro and macro approaches in the sociology of knowledge. 
These and other ~hortcornings indicated that in order to 
write the kind o:f sociology of religious knowledge I wished 
to write, it would first be necessary to investigate and 
hopefully correct certain of these shortcomings. 
2 
The overphilosophized conception of' knowledge 
Since philosophy is the parent of' the sciences, it is 
to philosophy that one must turn if' one is to W1derstand 
something of' the peculiar nature of' the actual subject matter 
of' the sociology of' knowledge as widely practised. As one 
soon, discovers, the sociology of' knowledge is not concerned 
with all that operates as knowledge in society. Rather, it 
concerns itself' with an unnecessarily restricted range of' 
knowledge and in this way actually hinders the proper under-
standing of' the relationship between knowledge and society. 
Philosophy is partly responsible f'or this state of' affairs. 
It can be said of' philosophy that as a result initially 
of ignorance and more lately of neglect of the biological, 
psychological and sociological aspects of knowledge it bas 
produced and for a long time been hamstrung by an over-
philosophized conception of' knowledge. Probably the most 
overphilosophized conception of' all is the Platonic one which 
views knowledge as something beyond human existence, society 
and history. According·to Stark (1971:328) this conception 
maintains that, "Truths are not found and fashioned by human 
societies, but subsist, forever wictangeable, in a super-
natural realm of their own. They are, as it were, laid up 
in heaven, and to lay hold on truth here below means to par-
ticipate in the truths that lie above. 11 Narrow as this 
conception is, it has been given an even narrower focus in 
most philosophy. In the main, only a relatively small number 
of' the things which have served, or which serve, as 
justified, or justifiable, true belief in the lives of 
individuals, in society or in history have received the 
attention of philosophers. 
It was dissatisfaction within philosophy with its over-
philosophized conception of knowledge which gave rise to the 
sociology of knowledge. It is possible to appreciate the 
somewhat peculiar development and subject matter of the 
sociology of knowledge if one bears in mind, ,as Berger and 
Luckmann (1967:15-16) suggest, that the study emerged at a 
particular time in a particular place and academic context. 
The time was 1920, the place was Germany, and the context was 
philosophy. (Appreciating these details is itself an 
J 
exercise in the sociology of knowledge.) What arose in this 
context was a tradition of thought with deep roots in German 
philosophy and early theoretical sociology. It marked an 
important stage in the philosophical discovery of the pro-
found inf'luence which society has on knowledge. The 
discovery of this inf'luence dates back to the ancient Greeks 
(at least). That is, to such sociological insights as that 
arrived at by Zenophones who, in the sixth century BC 
cynically remarked that if horses and cattle could sculpt 
they would represent their Gods in bovine and equestrian 
forms. Despite the early discovery of the impact of society 
on knowledge, however, it was only in the nineteenth century 
AD that philosophy began to reorientate itself in order to 
accommodate the massive significance of the social factor in 
thought and knowledge. So significant did this factor appear 
to scholars such as Wilhelm Jerusalem, Max Scheler and Karl 
Mannheim that they helped establish cmd nurture a discipline 
whose central task was to investigate it. Of the early 
sociology theorists it is Marx who has remained most central 
to the sociology of knowledge. He, together with_ Scbcler 
and Mannheim are still the key figures of the subject. 
Others who have had an inf'luence are Nax Weber and such 
French thinkers as Emile Durkheim, Gustav Le Bon and Lucien 
Levy-Bruhl. The thought of Americans such as John Dewey; 
Charles Horton Cooley, William James, George Herbert Mead 
and Florian Znaniecki have also had some influence but in 
the main their ·thought has remained peripheral and poorly 
integrated. Of all these writers, as Abercrombie (1980:1) 
has stated, it is undoubtedly f.lannheim who has been and 
remains the most central figure. 
Since the sociology of knowledge emerged out of philos-
ophy it was inevitable that it inherited'the overphilos-
ophized conceptions of knowledge of its parent discipline. 
It was not inevitable that it would remain tied to this 
conception. Unfortunately, it hc..s. Gn the p.o si ti ve side, 
the sociology of knowledge has, at least, achieved some 
measure of "socialization" of this narrow and elitist 
conception and its influence has spread to cultural studies 
and the history of' ideas in general so that _paths are open 
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for it to fulfill its proper mandate. 
The sociology of knowledge 
The central and traditional argument of the sociology 
of knowledge is that cultural phenomena, which naturally 
includes knowledge, are interconnected with social phenomena. 
It propagates the doctrine, in the words of Grunwald (1970: 
187) of the "connectedness of knowledge and social being", 
or, as Mannheim (1952:237) expresses it, "the sociology of 
knowledge seeks to analyse the relationship between knowledge 
and existence". The exact nature of the relationship between 
knowledge and social phenomena is a matter of considerable 
dispute despite its centrality to the sociology of knowledge. 
The polar positions are occupied by Max Scheler on the one 
hand and certain Marxists on the other. Scheler held the 
view that thought determined social structure (stark 1971:34) 
while some Marxists, though not Marx himself, see the 
relationship between social structure and knowledge as deter-
ministic and largely uni-directional. For the later group, 
social factors, especially economic factors, are largely 
respor.sible for the development and the content of human 
thought. Their arguments hark back to Marx's famous formula, 
"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, b.ut, on the contrary, their social existence 
which determines their consciousr..ess." (Marx 1904:12.) 
The bulk of writers on the sociology of knowledge, 
however, both Marxist and non-Marxist, view the relationship 
more in terms of a dialectical process. Among the non-
Marxist Vs just referred to are Max Weber and his followers, 
who prefer to view the relationship between knowledge and 
social factors as a reciproca~ interactive process. 
According to Gerth and Mills ( 1970: 62), "Weber refused to 
conceive of ideas as being Vmere' reflections of social 
interests." His studies led him to the view that the 
constituents of reality, material and ideational, were to 
some extent autonomous. Weber took pains to show that ideas 
have a profound effect on the course of history and the 
structure of society. He did this in order to counter the 
arguments of those, like the Marxists referred to, who saw 
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the correspondence between ideas and social factors as 
overly deterministic and neatly isomorphic. In cases where 
material ir-terests, social formations, and ideas happened to 
coincide, Weber chose to speak of "elective affinities" 
(Weber 1970:284-285). The idea of elective affinities 
reveals his predilection for a non-deterministic view of the 
relationship between social structure and knowledge and at 
the same time avoids the difficulties which lead Marxist 
theorists to speak of "false consciousness" in cases in 
which there occurs a disjuncture between ideas and social 
structure. The notion of "elective affinities" as it is 
used in dealing with the issue of social determinism asserts, 
according to Stark (1971:328), "that societies and social 
movements do not create their own philosophical traditions, 
but select them from a range of pre-existent and independent 
'ideas'". 
It is by now axiomatic in the sociology of knowledge 
that those things which pass for knowledge in society do not 
remain the same. And, what is more significant, the criteria 
according to which truth and falsity are socially determined 
do not remain constant. As Mannheim (1952:259) states: 
The concept truth has not remained constant 
through time, but has been involved in the 
process of historical change ••• The very 
principles, in the light of which knowledge 
is to be criticized, are themselves found 
to be socially and historically conditioned. 
Hence, their application appears to be 
limite~ to given periods and the particular 
type of knowledge then present. 
According to the dominant view in the sociology of 
knowledge, no proposition concerning social reality is true 
in the absolute sense of the word. There are thus those 
~ 
like Mannheim (1972) who prefer to regard all notions of 
social reality as "ideological" since truth or knowledge of 
such matters is impossible. The role of social factors in 
determining the "truth" of propositions about natural and 
physical phenomena have in recent years been'extensively 
debated (see, for example, Kuhn 1970; Lakatos and Musgrave 
1970; Sklair 1973; Barnes 1977). These and earlier debates 
co~vincingly propagate the view that knowledge is a 
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collective human enterprise. Knowledge is socially deter-
mined; what passes for_ knowledge is, in the final analysis, 
what humans permit to pass for knowledge. This applies as 
much to the knowledge of the natural and physical as to the 
knowledge of humankind, society and history. 
Berger and Luckmann, two important exponents of the 
phenomenological variant of the sociology of knowledge define 
knowledge as "everything that passes for 'knowledge' in 
society" (1967:26). Knowledge, they write implies the 
"certainty" that the objects knmm "are real and that they 
possess specific characteristics" (1967:13). Berger and 
Luckmann see their conceptualization as falling somewhere 
between that of the man in the street and that of the philos-
opher. If we hold in mind the epistemological position of 
the positivist on the one hand and the solopsistic one of the 
man in the street on the other, we can appreciate the senti-
mer..t behind this conceptualization. The philosopher's 
conception omits too much which genuinely passes for and 
operates as knowledge in society while the idiosyncratic 
nature of the facts and truths of the man in the street, if 
taken seriously, would produce a conception of knowledge 
which would have to incJ.ude even the deluded musings of a 
madman. For Berger and Luckmann, and for sociologists of 
knowledge generally, for anything to pass for knowledge in 
society it must enjoy a modicum of collective support. But 
exactly how extensive this collective support must be, and 
who or what can be used to arbitrate as to what exactly 
qualifies as knowledge in any instance is a question which 
Berger and Luckmann avoid dealing with. They are primarily 
concerned with how human knowledge, as they understand the 
term, is developed, transmitted and maintained in social 
situations (Berger and Luckmann 1967:15). 
Unlike Berger and Luckmann, however, a number of 
sociologists of knowledge have dealt with this question. 
Stark (1971:316), as one example, defined knowledge as 
thought which is judged to be realistic, fact-determined, 
and truthful in terms of the societal axiological system. 
In other words, the ideas encountered in. a group, society or 
historical period may be classified as knowledge or not in 
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terms o:f the axiological system operative in that group, 
society or historical period. According to Stark and others 
who adopt this approach, each group, society or historical 
period has its own axiological system by means o:f which it 
is able to distinguish knowledge :from that which is not 
knowledge. The axiological system may be defined as a 
complex evaluative and interpretative schema developed by 
society in the course o:f time and used, amongst other things, 
:for ascribing an epistemological status to ideas to which 
this is applicable. The axiological system constitutes a 
social A PRIORI and is the "vaJ.ue system", as Stark ( 1971: 
107) sees it, "of the society in which the historian, the 
seeker after human knowledge, lives". The axiological system, 
so to speak, lives in the collective consciousness and is 
always prior and external to the individual. Those who wish 
to determine what constitutes knowledge in their own or any 
other society can only do so through the appropriate 
axiological system. This implies, :for historical and :foreign 
societies, that the investigator has to construct or re-
construct the societal axiological system before he can state 
whether a particular idea or set o:f ideas qualifies as 
knowledge in that society. Insofar as the world is viewed 
objectively through the relevant societal axiological system 
it is possible to speak o:f truth, that is, knowledge. Each 
society and each age has, as a consequence o:f this approach, 
its own truths no matter how inconsistent and contradictory 
these may appear when viewed cross-culturally and trans-
historically. As paradigms shift, as axiological systems 
undergo change, different truths become manifest and 
correspond to reality. Stark (1971:323) swns up this 
approach with the words, "Wha-tever operates or functions as 
the truth within a certain social order at a given time, 
that is the truth." 
Within the sociology of knowledge there exists a split 
between those who accept both axiomatically harmonious 
cognitive thought as well as axiomatically harmonious 
evaluative thought as knowledge, and those who accept only 
axiomatically harmonious cognitive thought as knowledge., 
This latter group is thus concerned in separating "knowledge" 
8 
and "belief" (in the more traditional sense 
1
of these words) 
whereas the former conf.late these two concepts, erecting in 
their steads the dichotomy "knowledge" and 11 ideology". 
According to Hamilton (1974:VIII), positivism has played an 
important role in the development of the approach within the 
sociology of knowledge and sociology generally which 
separates "knowledge" and "belief". This "approach assumes," 
as Hamilton (1974:VIII) expresses it, "that ia complete 
distinction can be made between that which is to count as 
valid knowledge (according to the empiricist model), on the 
one hand, and that which is to be col.lllted as value judgements, 
normative statements, or simply beliefs, on the other." 
The sociology of knowledge, since it argues that the 
ideas of every individual in society are to' some extent 
distorted by their social position, createsiby this funda-
mental insight a further obstacle in the path to the attain-
ment of its own objective. For if no-'one is able to 
truthfully judge what qualifies for knowledge in society, a 
sociology of knowledge is not possibJ_e but only a sociology 
of belief or ideology. This obstacle has been dealt with in 
various ways. Some scholars do actually acbopt the obstacle 
as insurmountable and are thus content to r~gard their 
activity as the sociology of belief or the sociology of 
ideology. Others, like many Marxists, regard a particulo.r 
class of individuals and their enlightened spokesmen as 
competent to determine what qualifies as knm\rledge and what 
does not. This class is usually the proletariat and the 
spokesmen those intellectuals who identify i:m.d align them-
i 
selves with the proletariat. The reason fo~ this is that 
only through adopting in imagination the social relations 
and the perspective of the proletariat can an undistorted 
view of social reality be achieved. 
:Mannheim (1972), while accepting the thesis that every 
individualts perspective on social reality is socially and 
situationally determined and would thus distort their view 
I 
of the whole, argued nevertheless in favou~ of the capacity 
of certain individuals to rise above tl::.eir limiting and 
socially given positions. As Mannheim argues, a cadre of 
free floating intellectuals by adopting a detached but 
extremely enlightened perspective is able to synthesize 
"ideological" perspectives, and via this process achieve 
objective knowledge. (See also Simonds 19/8.) 
Arguing from within a different theoretical frameKork 
I 
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to that of Mannheim, Goldmann (1969) nevertheless presents a 
similar point of view on this issue. Goldmann feels that it 
is possible for some individuals to transcend the influences 
of their class and even go beyond the boLUldaries of the 
classes existing in their time. These individuals achieve 
knowledge throug·b their eclecticism and ability to synthesize 
the partial truths which the limited perspective of each 
I 
class possesses at any time. In this way they produce new 
and more extensive elements of understanding and come a.s 
close to the production of knowledge as is humanly poE.sible. 
Max Scheler employed two 2.lmost cor.tradictory 
conceptions of knowledge& The first reflecting his religious 
tendencies, was Platonic in that it posited an absolute and 
deistic realm of truth. ·The seccnd, focusing on the mundane 
. I 
world, and reflecting his philosophical and sociological 
tendencies, identified the thought of the educated elite as 
knoKledge. N'aturally, the latter being grounded in this 
world was regarded by him as inferior, pari:ial, variable, 
and a limited image of the truths of the transcendent realm 
beyond (see Stark 1971; Hamilton 1974; Remrnling 1973; Scbeler 
1980). SchelerYs tterrestialt conception oif knowleG.ge as 
the thought of the educated elite locates him within the 
above group of·think.ers. Taken together, the claims of 
these thinkers have, as Stark (1971:318) sue;gests, "•o• a 
rather aristocratic complexion: truth is not for all, but 
only for some, not for the weak, but. only for the· strong --
according to Kietzche for the- superman, according to Pareto 
for the super-scientist". And, we m.ight a~d in summary, 
according to Mannheim and GoJ.dmann, knowledge is only for 
the free-floating intellectual; according to the Marxists 
it is only for the spokesmen of the proletariat; and 
according to Scheler it is only for the educated elite. 
The foregoing resume is intended to convey some 
impression of the major concerns and ideas found in 
traditional sociology of knowledge. It also, hopefully, 
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conveys an impression of what is neglected or distorted as a 
result of the theories developed in this field. It is to 
sucb shortcomings that we now turn. 
Some shortcomings of the sociology of knm·;ledge 
In the infancy of the discipline he helped establish, 
Max Scheler (1874-1928) urged that the sociology of knowledge 
develop and maintain an intimate link with developmental 
psychology. This was necessary if the sociology of knowledge 
was to provide any understanding of how it was that knowledge 
evolved from·"brutes to man, from child to aduJ.t, from 
primitive to civilized man, from stage to stage within mature 
cultures" (Scheler 1980:JJ). He also urged that the socio-
lo5y of knowledge take account of biological discoveries and 
insights because, as he argued, "an instinct:drive theory of 
man is a necessary presupposition for the sociology of real 
factors"(Scheler 1980:35). Among the other tasks which 
Scheler set the sociology of knowledge was that of concerning 
itself with a broad rather than a narrow co~ception. of 
knowledge. According to him, "The sociology of knowledge has 
as its subject matter the sociology of truth and also the 
sociology of social phantasms and superstition and socially 
conditioned errors and forms of deception" (Scheler 1980:75). 
Despite the vast canvas which Scheler bequeathed 
sociologists of knowledge, they have selected to paint only 
one part of its surface, reworking this over and over. The 
part so condentrated on, it m~st be conceded, was the most 
central part, that concerned with the social nature of human 
knowledge. But so fixated has the discipline become on a 
few issues that, as Abercromcie (1980:1) notes, it is still 
largely dominated by a loosely organized set of principles 
largely derived from Karl Mannheim's works of the 1920s and 
19JOs. According to Abercrombie, theoretical debates have 
tended not to go beyond programmatic statements about the 
relationship of society and knowledge, too mu.ch attention has 
been devoted to the manner in which the sociological account 
of knowledge challenges the validity of some or all truth 
claims. Empirical studies conducted under the rubric of the 
sociology of knowledge have not significantly inf luer:ced the 
11 
nature or direction of theoretical reasoning in the discip-
line. The discipline h~s not kept track and assimilated 
significa.r;tt developments taking place in related fields. 
As regards the parts of Schelerts bequest to the 
sociology of knowledge noted above, these have been even 
more neglected than the aspects highlighted by Abercrombie. 
Close links with developmental psychology have not been 
established, let alone maintained or developed. The biolo-
gical dimensions of knowledge have received little attention. 
What passes for knowledge in the discipline is very restric-
ted indeed. ·The attempt by Berger and Luckmann (1967:26) to 
extend this to "everything that passes for knowledge in 
society" has not been widely taken up. The attention given 
by ethnomethodologists and phcnomenologists to corrunon-sense 
and taken-for-granted knowledge has, as yet, had little 
influence on the conventional sociology of knowledge. 
Though individuals are the originators and bearers of 
knowledge, the sociology of knowledge .tells· us little 
regarding the relationship between individuals and knowledge. 
The so-called micro-sociology of knowledge is a largely 
undeveloped field. Looking to sociology in general, sociali-
zation theory should be able to make a cor.tribution here, 
but, unfortunately, the socialization theory available is 
largely unsatisfactory. Socialization theory overemphasizes 
the role of society in the individualts acquisition of 
knowledge. Such theory also has little to say regarding the 
origin of knowledge. Socialization is generally presented as 
a one-sided process involving a static body of knowledge. 
Because the sociology of knowledge focu:::es primarily on the 
relationship between social structure and knowledge it tends 
to emphasize the differences ~n knowledge between one group 
and another. In fact, in terms of its central thesis, people 
in different situations ~ have different knowledge. While 
this thesis has great merit and validity, it serves to 
obscure that knowledge which is widely, if not universally 
shared, the knowledge which is predominantly biologically 
and psychologically determined, rather than sociologically. 
This widely shared common knowledge, is,· as this study will 
attempt to demonstrate, of socj_ological importance and 
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deserves to be part of the sociology of know,ledge. 
The problem of subject matter 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary lists eleven 
separate meanings of the word "knowledge". Given the arbi-
trary nature of language it would be absurd to expect the 
sociology of knowledge to deal with everything reprE!lsented 
by this word. It would be absurd since some of these 
meanings. may refer to objects, processes or ,states which are 
of no concern to sociology or which refer td contradictory 
or different·orders of phenomena~ (One could not expect the 
zoology of bats, for example, to include the study of the 
mammalian order or CHEIROPTERA, the study of wooden imple-
ments used in ball games, and the study of winking.) Though 
it is the case that the word "knowledge" does refer to dif-
ferent orders of phenomena it is a fortunate accident of 
English that at least some of these orders stand in such a 
relation to each other and to sociology that it is poEsible, 
and in fact theoretically advantageous, to treat them 
together in a comprehensive sociology of knowledge. 
It is one of the disappointments in the sociology of 
knowledge that if this field is approached with a general 
understanding of the everyday usage of the word "knowledge" 
that one soo.n discovers that the bulk of the sociology of 
knowledge is devoted to a narrow range of specific categories 
of knowledge and that many others are seriously if not 
totally neglected even though a case can be/ made for their 
i 
being social categories of knowledge. The dominant 
conceptualization implies that the sociology of knowledge is 
simply another title for the sociology of science. This 
conceptualization identifies -knowledge with the most advanced 
and tobjectively valid' theoretical thought as this exists 
in all the sciences: physical, natural and social. Sucb. an 
approach defines as out of court sucb socially and hence 
sociologically important varieties of k:now~ed,ge as religious 
knowledge, artistic knowledge, magical knmJledge, and the 
1. 
knowledge "how". By identifying knowledge with science and 
advanced theoretical thought, the sociology of knowledge was 
led, until recently, to seriously neglect the pre-scientific 
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common-sense knowledge of the ordinary citizen. A form of 
knowledge which is probably more fundamental to the under-
standing of society than any other form because it is a 
prime determiner of the day-to-day activities of all members 
of society. What is more, and as will be emphasized in this 
study, the pre-scientific common-sense knowledge of children 
and ordinary people is the birth-place and sustainer of the 
highest forms of theoretical and scientific knowledge. The 
proper understanding of the latter presupposes the under~ 
standing of the former. The sociology of knowledge, like 
much of philosophy, overlooks the personal nature of all 
knowledge and hence espouses a faulty epistemology (see 
Polanyi 1969). 
The major reason for the narrow and peculiar focus of 
the sociology of knowledge stems from the fact, noted above, 
that it inherited the concept~alization of its subject matter 
from German philosophy. The title "sociology of knowledge" 
and the major orientation of the discipline were taken frorr. 
the German WISSENSSOZIOLOGIE. Because the words "WISSEN" 
and "knowledge" do not cover the same range and dimensions 
of meanings, the title "Sociology of knowledge" is para-
doxically both an accurate and an inaccurate description of 
the discipline as it exists. The first is the case if it is 
viewed from .the perspective of philosophy. The Eecond is the 
case if it is viewed in terms of broader sociological con-
ceptions. Because they regard it as an inaccnrate descrip-
tion, some sociologists have proposed alternatives such as 
11 Sociology of cogni tion11 , 11 Sociology of thought" , 11 Gnosio-
sociology", "Sociology of ideas" and "Sociology of culture" 
(see Simonds 1978:24). While I share the latter group's 
view that the so-called 11 Soci--0logy of knowledge" should 
concern itself with more than the philosopher's idea of 
knowledge, I nevertheless feel that the title "Sociology of 
knowledge" should be maintained. The "Sociology of knowl-
edge" should concern itself with what exists .as knowledge in 
society. It should be concern£d with everything that people 
can be said to know. The many forms of knowledge which 
exist, when viewed in their interrelationships, point the 
way towards a more comprehensive and satisfactory theory of 
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knowledge in which the sociology of knowledge would occupy a 
central position. It is this idea which partly motivated 
this study. Re-defining "knowledge" can serve not only to 
get the sociology of knowledge out of the rut it has been in 
since Mannheim's major contributions, it can also serve to 
link the sociology of knowledge with the biology and psycho-
logy of knowledge and in this way correct its oversocialized 
conception of knowledge. 
The oversocialized conception of knowledge 
It is understandable and inevitable that different 
disciplines studying aspects of the same phenomena will tend 
to stress the aspects studied while neglecting the others. 
However, if they ar~ not to distort our understanding of the 
phenomena in question, it is necessary for them to show where 
I 
the work of related disciplines fits in and.how their own 
discoveries and theories dovetail with those of the related 
disciplines. Despite this necessity, few sbciologists have 
done this. The cursory treatment of sociology's relation to 
the other social and natural sciences and the brief references 
(if any) to the biological nature of man in most textbooks is 
one indicator of the tendency to oversocialize social pheno-
men.a. 
In his article, "The oversocialized conception of man in 
modern sociology" (which suggested the terms oversocialized 
and overpbilosophized), Wrong (1961) provid~s a good example 
of the error of oversocialization in sociolbgical theory. 
In response to the wellknown Hobbesian question of how humans 
become tractable to social controls, the twofold answer o1' 
conventional American sociology has been that they "inter-
nalize" social norms and seek-favourable self-images by con-
forming to the "expectations" of others. Wrong points out 
that such a model of man denies the very possibility of man 
being anything but a thoroughly socialized being. It thus, 
in answering the Hobbesian question, actually turns it into 
a non-question. Such sociology produces the image of people 
as social puppets or dupes. How then can ~heir conformity 
or social order be viewed as problematic? 
Wrong cites the Freudian view of man as an example of' a 
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more satisfactory view. For Freud man was a social though 
never a fully socialized creature. It is just such quali-
fications that one misses in oversocialized_social thought. 
As a word of advice to sociologists seeking
1
to correct over-
' socialized views of man, Wrong (1961:19) suggests that they 
"•••must start with the recognition that in the beginning 
there is the body". 
Among others who have criticized the oversocialized 
views in sociology is Bidney (1970:120) who refers to the 
"sociologistic fallacy" which is cmrmi tted by theories that 
regard society as the ultimate ontological entity SUI GENERIS 
and use it to explain all social and cultural phenomena. As 
he states (p 135), 
Culture and society ••• are regarded by super-
organicists as if they were superpsychic 
entities that follow independent laws of their 
own and require no reference to the psycho-
biological nature of the individuals who 
participate in· them. In this way a super-
organic fatalism is substituted for, the 
equally objectionable 6rganic fatalism which 
they oppose. 
Oversocialized as much of mainstream sociology may be, 
it is probably in the sociology of knowledge where this error 
has been most widely and consistently perpetrated. How more 
oversocialized can an argument be than the Durkheimian argu-
ment that the categories of thought are the; product of 
social factors or the :Marxian argument that! it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on 
the contrary, it is their social being that determines their 
consciousness? (See Durkheim and Mauss 1965; Harx 1904, 
1973.) 
Even writers as disparate as Mannheim and Berger and 
-
Luckmann, though they made concerted attempts to avoid an 
' oversocialized view of knowledge did not quite succeed. 
Mannheim is accused by some of his critics of arguing that 
knowledge is socially determined and thus de-valuing knowl-
edge. (This accusation is strongly denied by Simonds 1978 .. ) 
T.b.e very title of Berger and Luckmannrs (1967) book, "The 
social construction of reality", can be read as an over-
socj_alized statement. Fortunately, the cor+tents of this 
I 
! • 
book go a long way towards exonerating them from such a 
charge. Berger and Luck.mann have achieved this by means of 
their electicism which combines important insights gleaned 
from various disciplines into a successful synthesis. Using 
Scbutzian phenomenology as their point of departure and main 
conceptual font, they have combined ideas of sociologists· of 
knowledge such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Mannheim and 
Scheler with the social psychology of Mead, Cooley, James 
and Simmel. Also woven into this work, albeit less success-
fully, are ideas from ethologists, such as Von Uexkull and 
Partmann, and anthropologists such as Plessner, Gehlen, 
:Malinowski, Levy-Bru.hl and KluckhoJn. There are also 
references to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and to the 
ethnomethodol.ogy of Goffman. This work is not exegetical, 
as so many recent sociological works tend to be, nor is it 
synthesis for the sake of synthesis. It is, as the authors 
state, an exercise in systematic theoretical reasoning aimed 
I 
at a redefinition of the nature and scope of the sociology 
of knowledg·e which they intend should move this subject from 
the periphery to the centre of sociological theory (Berger 
and Luckma.nn 1967:29). 
By helping to draw attention to the work of Alfred 
Schutz and by providing an alternative conceptualization of 
knowledge to the more common oversocialized. one, Berger and 
I 
Luckmann have helped in the development of a sounder socio-
logy of knowledge. They have, however, not entirely escaped 
the oversocial:ized charge. Though they pay son:e attention 
to biological and psychological factors as these relate to 
"reality" and "knowledge" they fail to take into account the 
fact that these factors are reflected in the social world 
and in culture and thus in "reality" and "knowledge". It is 
I 
consequently an overstatement to say, as thby do (p 67), 
"While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is 
more significant to say that mar_ constructs his own nature, 
or more simply, that man produces himself." .Out of what 
does man produce himself and by what means? In their dis-· 
cu.ssions of society as objective reality and as subjective 
reality, Berger and Luckmann fall into the 'over socialized 
I 
I 
mould of thought referred to by Wrong above". Such 11 consenslis 
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model" concepts as "ins ti t'utionalization11 , 11 legi timation11 , 
"role s 11 , 11 norms11 , and 11 _socializa tion11 , are used in a way 
that betrays some of their mfn references to man's plasticity 
and creativeness and to the fundamental problematic and 
multifaceted nature of human existence and l;:nowledge. 
Hamilton (1974:139) rightly criticizes them for their Durk-
heimian viewpoint which cuts right across the Marxian 
tanthropology' they claim to accept 
For to posit that man is free to reproduce 
his social and natural conditions in limit-
less fashion, and then to limit that re-
production. in terms of a system of external 
and internal constraints -- institutional-
ization, legitimation and socialization 
presents a contradiction that can only 
fatuously be called "dialectical". 
Meadts (1972) work on the genesis of the 11 self 11 has 
gradually filtered into parts of the sociology of knowledge. 
As important a contribution. as this is generally judged to 
be, it is not without its weaknesses. The virtually closed 
system of explanation Khich Mead offers of personality, 
self and social activity is a further example of an over-
socialized conception.. One illustration of this is his 
claim that significant gestures are gestures which have the 
~ effect on the individual ma.king them as they do on the 
individu2.l to whom they are addressed (Nead 1972:158). Both 
MeadYs notion of the 11 generalized other" and a "unified self" 
do not stand up well in relation to the fragmented nature of 
contemporary life nor the fundamental dialectical and 
creative nature of life and knowledge. It is the dynamic 
role accorded· the "I11 that partially saves his theory. The 
"I" is responsible for everything that cannot be explained 
by socialization, but, writes Kolb (in Coulter 1979:109), 
Where creative conduct is concerned, the 
explanatory power of the "I" concept is 
transparently restricted; indeed, with 
this notion Mead effectively explains 
away creative con.duct which, in his 
scheme, is quite residual and is handled 
in a residual and vague way. 
One characteristic of oversocialized thought is its 
neglect and even blindness to ideas and data which might help 
to curb such a tendency. It is one of the perennial calls in 
recent sociology that more attention be paid to related 
disciplines. Van den Berghe (1978:18) has urged that 
sociologists "strive for a realistic conception of human 
nature, realistic in the sense that it is consistent with 
observable behaviour not.with what we hope our behaviour 
might be". One· of the roots of sociological ignorance he 
notes is "our reluctance to take human biology seriously" 
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(p 15). An important reason for sociology to strive towards 
a more accurate view of human nature is that current views 
are incorporated into official thinking and social programmes. 
The use of inadequate models of man, as Gordon (1979:5) 
I 
states, "••• is to build on sand and invite the unanticipated 
consequences of purposive social action -- a recipe for 
failure". He argues that unless sociologists are willing to 
accept the extreme version of cultural determinism, closer 
links must be forged with psychology and the role of biology 
and genetic factors in social phenomena explored. Even the 
question of language, which, thanks to Sapir and Whorf, has 
so easily encouraged oversocialized views, needs to be 
reconsidered. In this connection, Flavell (in Hischel 1971: 
122) has written,. "increasing attention will b.ave to bf3 paid 
in the future to the possible biological-orE;;anic as con-
trasted with environmental contributions to, and constraints 
on, human cognitive development ••• :My own suspicion is that 
the role of language in thinking is generally overestimated." 
The work of Furth (1966) with deaf children possessing little 
language who aJ?e nevertheless capable of solving complex 
operational problems is cited as an example of work which 
might lead to a more accurate appreciation of the role of 
language in thinking. 
Socialization theory generally, because it views 
individuals as socialized by society rather than as active 
self socializers and the socializers of their supposed 
socializers, may be accused of operating in terms of a 
"bucket theory of mind" (Popper 1973:63). Tqe usual approach 
fails to deal with the fact that social knowledge has to be 
assimilated by individuals in terms of existing cognitive 
structures. What is assimilated always bears the stamp of 
individual and society. Socialization theory distorts and 
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oversimplifies the complex relationship between socially 
available knowledge and. the knowledge acquired by 
individuals.· The oversocialized notion of socialization is 
I 
mirrored in psychology by its overpsychologized notions of 
learning. Both could benefit from a closer look at biology 
and the dialectics of knowledge acquisition. 
The neglect of biology 
Of the mainstream of sociological thou.ht ts sins of 
I 
omission, none is probably greater than its'neglect of 
biology. Indeed, much sociology seems to be in cahoot with 
the wife of the Bishop of Worcester who is reported to have 
exclaimed, "Descended from monkeys? My dear, .let us hope 
that it isn't truel But if it is true, let: us hope that it 
doesn't become widely known!" (quoted in,Batash 1979:xiii). 
The sociology of knowledge, though a chief sinner in this 
regard, nonetheless he_lps in appreciating the reasons for 
this neglect. The neglect of biology is both the manifes-
tation of an older and diffuse set of factors and a more 
recent and direct set. i 
! . 
As regards the former, sociology and the sociology of 
knowledge.are latter day developments of.a line of thought 
which has in the past strongly repressed the body and which 
still has an influence in this regard. Host Westerners have 
experience of the repression of the body i~ one way or 
another. This repression is deeply embeddep. in the fabric 
of Western culture since it is in large part the product of 
the West's particular theological and philosophical tradi-
tions. "The dominant ethos of Christianity has been one of 
repression of the body," asserts Benthall (1976:70). 
Platonic philosophy and Christianity not only separated body 
I 
and soul but sanctified the soul and prof a_n,ed the body. The 
denial of the body also bas roots in the Greek and Roman 
disdain for manual labour. An attitude which, reinforced by 
Christianity and idealistic philosophy helps .account for the 
prevailing antipathy towards manual labour in modern 
capitalist societies. To work with one's hands or to enjoy 
onets body are denigrated by the deeper values of Western 
soc.iety. It is possible to view the oversocialized conception 
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of man as an outgrowth of earlier theological conceptions. 
In the oversocialized conception, the human body and 
individuality are devalued, as is the biological connection 
between man and beast, and society takes the place of God as 
the author of mants destiny and being {see Bawnan 1976:32). 
(It is not possible to speak of an overtheologized conception 
of man because if God exists and He is responsible for all 
that is and happens, as some religions claim, then it could 
not be a distortion or exaggeratio~ to say that man is 
totally determined by Him.) 
Illuminating as the older and diffuse factors are, it 
is the more recent and direct factors which are the most 
important for understanding the current position of biology 
in relation to the social sciences. It is ironical that 
sociology is still struggling with partial views of man 
because, after all, modern sociology originated as a protest 
against the partial views of man propagated by such doctrines 
as utilitarianism, classical economics, social Darwinism and 
vulgar Marxism (Wrong 1961:190). It may be that a "proper 
model of man" is a positivistic phantom and that each age 
will produce its particular model. While this is no doubt 
true to some extent, I still believe that, to the extent 
th2.t the scientific enterprise is a worthwhile one, it is 
possible to improve on current views of man whi:ch, though 
they may be closer to the mark than those of the past, may 
still be judged wanting. It is, in particular, the 
biological dimension that has not yet been adequately 
assimilated into our contemporary view of man and we are 
here concerned with the factors responsible for this before 
proceeding to attempt to remedy it. 
One of the major reasons-for the neglect of biology in 
modern sociology is, paradoxically, the considerable impact 
which nineteenth century biology had on, the then, embryonic 
science of society. Darwin's evolutionary theory and his 
vision of the unity of life processes influenced all the 
founding fathers of sociology. Unfortunately, neither the 
biology nor the sociology of the last century was sufficiently 
mature for the latter to truly benefit from the formero What 
resulted from this premature cross-fertiliza.tion were the 
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monstrosities of social Darwinism and the organic view of 
society. These ideas found fertile ground in the imagin-
ations of the ruling elites of the time. The biosociology 
of the turn of the century was used to legitimate racism, 
imperialism, sexism and LAISSEZ FAIRE capitalism. As Allen 
(1978:260) comments, "Historically, powerful countries or 
ruling groups within them have drawn support for the main-
tenance or extension of their power from these products of 
the scientific community." By way of example she cites 
John D Rockefeller's words, "The growth of a large business 
is merely a survival of the fittest ••• It is merely the 
working out of a law of nature and a law of God." She notes 
too that such theories provided an important basis for the 
enactment of sterilization laws and restrictive immigration 
laws in the United States between 1910 and 1930. To the 
extent that ideas are responsible for human brutality and 
suffering, these ideas were probably part of the tragedies 
of Nazi Germany, two World Wars, the colonial era, the 
Great Depression and the oppression of racial minorities. 
It is thus small wonder that much modern social science seeks 
to distance itself from the stigma which still adheres to 
biological reasoning when applied to people and society. It 
had been German social science which had most emphasized 
biological factors. The demise of Nazi Germany had the · 
effect of significantly obliterating both the positive and 
negative influences of biology on social scienceo This was 
true in America, and to a lesser extent Britain, in partic-
ular. The effect of the above factors was that from the 
1930s into the 1970s the dominant current in sociology was 
one of dogmatic environmentalism, extreme cultural relativism, 
antireductionism, and anti-evolutionism (Van den Bergh 1978: 
34). Social science became characterized in the main by an 
almost complete oblivion of the organic basis of behaviour. 
What developed after the Second World War, especially 
in America, was a mythology which held that all people were 
born equal and which believed that :human nature and society 
were infinitely malleable. The poor could be made comfort-
able. The oppressed could be liberated •. No hill could not 
be climbed. All that was required was the will and the 
material resources. And, for three decades, America had 
these in abundance. In. commenting on the adverse response 
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by many social scientists to his "Sociobiology: The new 
synthesis", Wilson (1978:2) remarks that he was unprepared 
for a largely ideological response. "It is now clear to me", 
he writes, "that I was tampering with something fundamental: 
mythology." Morin (quoted by Holton 1978:82) sees the 
adverse response to sociobiology in a similtr light. It is 
not a scientific response to evidence but a doctrinal 
response to heresy. Sociobiology is guilty of three 
heresies: (1) It denies two essential elem~nts of tho Greco-
Judaic/Christian tradition: body mind dualism and the 
special creation of man. (2) It violates Durkheim's injunc-
tion that social phenomena be explained in terms of
0 
social 
variables. (3) It has implications that contradict the 
notion of the perfectability of man. Wilson had supposed 
that his sociobiology 'vould be received by social scientists 
in the spirit of the scientific enterprise: as data, 
theories and hypotheses to be treated with respect and to be 
evaluated according to accepted scientific ~riteria. It 
becrune obvious in the course of the sociobiblogy debate that 
many social scientists are still not ready to admit tho 
shortcomings of their ideas and even less ready to.admit the 
need for a b.iological input. Their stance is a major 
impediment to the advancement of scientific knowledge. van 
denBerghe (1978:35) regards the neglect of biology in such a 
serious light that he has urged the social sciences to return 
to their biological roots lest their claims to scientific 
status become increasingly tenuous. 
It is not simply that the past still weighs heavily on 
the present that accounts for- the largely negative receipt 
of sociobiology, it is also the fact that vital socio-
i 
poli tica.l and ideological struggles of the 'present, such as 
those against racism, sexism, aggr~ssion, capitalism and 
political oppression, see in it arguments whi.ch can be used 
to legitimate the evils against which these struggles are 
directed. The nefarious uses to which scientific ideas have 
been put in the recent past gives them adequate cause for 
alarm. In America it has been primarily members of the 
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Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People that have 
most vehemently condenmed sociobiology. In their attacks, 
however, they have often con:fused scientific matters with 
ethics and have committed, what Wilson (1978b:J02) calls, the 
Fallacy of the Political Consequent, which results from the 
asswnption that political ideologies can be matched one-to-
one with scientific theories. On the contrary, the same 
scientific theory can be used to support two or more opposed 
political ideologies, as, for example, extreme forms of 
environmentalism are used to support both :Marxist and Liberal 
thought. Environmentalism can also be used to support the 
most reactionary social doctrines as Chomsky (1975:132) has 
noted. If we are largely culturally determined then sexism, 
racism, aggression, exploitation, and so forth can just as 
easily and morally justifiably be supported as they can be 
condenmed. 
Attacks on sociobiology have led to the question posed 
by David Hull (1978:151), "Should a scientific theory be 
suppressed because it is dangerous, even though it might be 
true?" A sticky question indeed. But, as just noted, a 
scientific theory in itself is not dangerous, it only becomes 
dangerous in a particular social context and when given a 
particular reality status in that context. This study pro-
ceeds in the spirit that would reply "No 1" to the above · 
question. Though the uses to which we put our knowledge may 
sometimes take us closer to destruction and evil than ever 
did our ignorance, the hope that knowledge will itself lead 
to wisdom and the increasing use of kncwledge for exclusively 
noble ends inspires this study. Science has in the past 
revealed dangerous truths to humanity and humanity has met 
their challenge, though never wholly satisfactorily. It is 
to be hoped that in the future it will show even greater 
maturity and adaptive capacity. 
The purpose of this study 
This study is intended to make a contribution to 
sociology and the sociology of knowledge by attending to 
some of the shortcomings 01~ conventional· sociology and socio-
logy of knowledge. It seems :to me that since certain of the 
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shortcomings noted stern from a fixation on a conception of 
knowledge ill-suited to_ the nature and purpose of socio-
logical study, certain of the shortcomings of the sociology 
of knowledge can be overcome through a re-definition of 
knowledge and the development of a conceptual framework which 
includes everything that functions as knowledge in the lives 
of individuals and society. Because many of the shortcomings 
of sociology and the sociology of knowledge are a result of 
"oversocialized" concepts and theories it seems to me too 
that the conception of knowledge proposed and the conceptual 
framework developed should be such as to facilitate the 
integration of biological and psychological approaches to 
knowledge with those of sociology. These ideas underly the 
first main objective of this study, which is to develop the 
kind of conceptual framework ju:::t referred to• 
The second objective of this study is to correct certain 
oversocialized sociological theories by developing part of 
what I consider to be a more satisfactory theory of knowledge. 
It is a thesis of. this dissertation that certain key concepts 
and theories in socj_ology are indeed oversocialized and thus 
reality distorting and even false. Along· with Van den Bcrghe, 
Piaget, Popper, Lorenz, Wilson, Barash and others I feel 
that the road ahead for sociology should lead to a more 
serious encounter with biology and developmental psychology. 
FortunateJ_y, despite contrary attempts, the road to such an 
encounter has been partially prepared. This has been done 
·not only by sociobiology but, as I try to indicate in the 
following chapter, by genetic epistemology and evolutionary 
epistemology in particular. Other fields such as ethology, 
natural philosophy, and developmental psychology have also 
helped pave the way towards a.- closer integration of the 
sociology of knowledge with the biology and psychology of 
knowledge. Though a comprehensive theory of knowledge will 
be outlined, it will not be fully developed in this study. 
What will be developed in some detail are ide.as and data 
which help to illuminate the relationship between biology 
and cultural knowledge. This is one of the ways in which 
this study can help correct aspects of the oversocialized 
concept.ion of knowledge forn1d in sociology. 
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In the course of developing the theory just referred 
to, various theses will. be propoioed and arguments and facts 
supporting them presented. The following are among the 
central theses to be proposed: 
( 1 ) Life is a knowledge process. Life and knowledge are 
inseparable. Every life form is a representation of 
its knowledge. Adaptation implies the continual use 
and modification of knm\Tledge. 
(2) The intellectual development of humankind can be 
illuminated by studying the intellectual development of 
childrer. and animals. Animals and children, as much as 
adults and scientists are concerned an<f must be con-
i 
cerned with "that which is the case". iLife depends on 
the successful adjustment to a reality,which includes 
organism and environment in an indivisible unityo All 
living creatures can be supposed to have some valid 
knowledge of reality. Human knowledge and human reality 
are biologically constructed as well as being psycho-
logically and socially constructed. 
(J) All organisms capable of learning do so by virtue of an 
innate learning schema. Human life and culture is made 
possible by humankind's innate learning schema. This 
schema plays an important part in determining not only 
the pattern but also the content of human culture. · 
(4) The complexity of humankind's innate learning schema 
I 
implies that, rather than being endowe!:i with less 
genetic structuration, humans are in f?-ct endowed with 
more. Cultural life presupposes a greater degree of 
genetic structuration than does more instinctual life. 
(5) All humans share essentially the same innate· learning 
schema. This schema has- changed relatively little in 
historical time. Because of this, individuals in all 
societies and at all times have been prompted through 
similar circumstances to produce similar items of 
cultural knowledge. Humans every>vhere make sense of 
their world in many similar ways and have many items 
of non-social, social and cultural knowledge in common. 
(6) The acquisition of knowledg-e is a creative act. Humans 
are constitutionally creative. Socia~ization implies 
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the creation of knowledge out of the information made 
available by society and self-generated. information. 
CHAPTER TWO 
GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY 
All our progress is an l.mfolding, like 
the vegetable bud. You have first an 
instinct, then an opinion, then a know-
ledge. Trust the instinct to the end, 
though you can render no reason ••• by 




In this chapter attention will be devoted to tbo related 
theories of knowledge -- genetic epistemology and evolution-
ary epistemology. My purpose in doing this is because 
Piaget's genetic epistemology and Popper's evolutionary 
epistemology offer the sociology of knowledge a theoretically 
sowi.d way of attending to some of its cu.rrent conceptual· and 
theoretical weaknesseso That is, genetic epistemology and 
evolutionary epistemology suggest ways in which the 
biological and ·psychological dimensions of knowledge can be 
integrated with the sociological to produce not only a 
sounder sociology of knowledge but also the beginnings of a 
more general theory of knowledge. They also suggest ways in 
which the concept "knowledge"·- might be broadened so as to 
embrace the intelligence possessed by life in general. As 
will be obvious, this study owes much to other subjects 
concerned with "knowledge" in one way or another as well as 
those i.·.rhich focus on "behaviour" instead of "knoKledge". 




The name of Jean Piaget is tod.ay most generally 
associated with the study known as "genetic epistemology". 
This is due in no small measure to his own efforts to promote 
this study through his writing and the activities of the 
International Center for Genetic Epistemology at the Univer-
sity of Geneva which he founded in 1955 and of which he was 
the director until his death last year. out though the name 
"Piaget" springs automatically to mind at the mention of 
"genetic epistemology", the phrase is not Piaget's exclusive 
property nor·does he lay any claim to its invention. James 
Mark Bald,vin is credited as having coined the phrase in his 
work "Tbought and Things" published in 1901 (see Kaplan 1971: 
63). Among the precur:::ors of the approach now known as 
Genetic Epistemology, some of '"'horn are acknowledged as such 
by Piaget himself, are Baldwin, Wundt, Sigwart, Bosanquet, 
Hobhous.e and Cassirer _(see Kaplan 1971: 63; Russell 1978: 1 ; 
Piaget 1950:18 and 1957:14). Piaget devoted his life to the 
study of genetic epistemology. Of the more thon fifty books 
ond monographs and hundreds of articles he published during 
his long and productive life, by far the most deal with this 
abiding concern. 
The phrase "genetic epistemology" is, to the uninitiated, 
doubly ambiguous. This is so because, firstly, the '\ord · 
"epistemology" as used in the phrase refers to a different 
kind of theory of knowledge to that common in philosophy, 
although not so different as to be exclusive or contradictory. 
Secondly, the term "genetic" is a homonym which, as used by 
Piaget, is generally intended to mean 11 origin and develop-
ment", but its other meaning refers to "gene", the active 
material of life, and is also·- often implied by Piaget because 
of his emphasis on biology in his approach to knowledge. In 
American and British psychology "genetic epistemology" is 
commonly referred to as "developmental psychology" but since 
the latter lacks the rationalistic and philos.ophical orien-
tations of the former they can hardly be considered as 
identical pursuits. In recent years, however, these pursuits 
have shown ~dgns of merging, a development which can only be 
of mutual benefit. 
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Though Piaget makes occasional references to other kinds 
of knowledge, he sees the task of epistemology to be the 
explication of analytic and scientific knowledge. The 
central problem of this explication is, for Piaget, the 
emergence of "novel" forms and items of knowledge as a 
function and as the embodiment of its development (Piaget 
1970:77). He writes of this study, "Genetic epistemology 
attempts to explain knowledge and in particuJ.ar scientific 
knowledge, on the basis of its history, its socioger.esis, and 
especially the psychological origins of the notions and 
operations upon which it is based" (Piaget 1970:1). Fiaget 
has taken pains to point out that legitimate epistemological 
concerns exist outside of those which philosophers take as 
constituting epistemology. And, what is more, that the 
narrow epistemological concerns of philosophers cannot be 
separated sharply from the epistemic concerns of biology, 
psychology and sociology. 
For Piaget, the "verified_ true belief" with which 
philosophers most often concern themselves is not a fixed 
object nor, indeed, are the criteria employed to delineate 
this object. All k.r'-owledge is in a state of flux and has 
evolved, even 'ivhat is now regarded as axiomatic. "Scientific 
thought, then, is not momentary; it is not a static instance; 
it is a process" (Piaget 1970:2). Eecause of this, the · 
philosophical claim that there exists on the one hand the 
study of the genesis of knowledge and on the other the study 
of existing knowledge, is untenable. In addition, as Piaget 
asserts, all epistemology entails factual a~ well as formal 
problems. The implication of all this is that philosophical 
questions are inextricably bound to biological, psychological 
and sociological ones. "The first principle of genetic 
epistemology, then is this -- to take psychology seriously" 
(Piaget 1970:9). To this can be added, "as well as biology 
and sociology", to which Piaget would no doubt agree. It is 
reasoning along the above lines which has led. Piaget to doubt 
the correctness of the radical distinction many philosophers 
make between "analytic" and "synthetic" truths. But here, as 
Kaplan (1971:75) points out, Piaget is in good company even 
in philosophical circles since he shares this misgiving with 
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the likes of Quine (1951), White (1950), Rudner (1949) and 
Waismann (1949/51). "In epistemology", writes Piaget (1970: 
12), "both logic and psychology should be taken into account, 
since it is important to deal with both the formal aspects 
and the empirical aspects of human knowledge." 
The problem posed by genetic epistemology 0 •• 
is accounting for the transition from knowl-
edge judged to be inferior to knowledge 
judged to be superior and the nature of these 
transitions is a factual question to be 
explained in terms of historical, psycholo-
gical or even biological factors. 
(Piaget 1970:13). 
Piaget (1970:13) states that the fundamental hypothesis 
of genetic epistemology is that there is a parallelism 
between the progress made in the logical and rational organi-
zation of knowledge and the corresponding formative psycho-
logical processes. To demonstrate this isomorphism one 
could, according to Pi~get consider the evolution of the 
human brain in relation to the evolution of human knowledge, 
but this is a difficult if not impossible undertaking. 
Hence, in terms of the biological principle that, in some 
ways, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, Piaget (1972:11) 
turned to the study of the ontogenesis of knowledge rather 
than its phylogenesis. In particular, be concentrated on 
studying the development of logico-mathematical and scien-
tific knowledge in children. For Piaget, developmental 
psychology part of bis genetic epistemology is the 
embryology of human knowledge and intelligence in general 
(Boden 1979:13). The intellectual development of children 
is, for Piaget, a fundamental part of the general intellec-
tual development of humanity. If children did not construct 
for themselves the basic knowledge required to continue the 
scientific enterprise such a.ri enterprise could not be 
continued. This enterprise embraces children as well as 
Nobel prize winners. Everyone is, to some extent, engaged 
and must be engaged in the pursuit of "that w.hich is the 
case". By thus bridging the gap between child psychology and 
epistemology, "Piaget liberates analytic epistemology from 
the narrower constraints of formalism, and from the dogmas 
of analytic self-sufficiency" (wartofsky 1971: 1J9). 
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As a result of his ingenious studies, Piaget was led to 
the discovery that the .development of knowledge in normal 
children passes through distinct stages and that this occurs 
invariably and trans-culturally. The basic impetus and 
structures of cognitive development are, for Piaget, provided 
by genetically inherited tendencies and structures as these 
operate and develop. These inherited tendencies and struc-
tures, which include what Piaget calls 'innate knowledge', 
are the result of, and remain subject to, phylogenetic 
development. 
The developmental stages Piaget established are them-
selves illustrative of the basic isomorphism between the 
development of knowledge and physical developmento Though 
the demarcation of ontogenesis into developmental stages is 
to some extent an arbitrary undertaking, there do nevertheless 
appear to be more distinctive cognitive changes in tbe early 
weeks, months and years of life than in the later years. 
Piaget's stage theory is grounded in this fact and his dis-
covery that the younger child passes through more qualitat-
ively different cognitive stages than does the older child 
parallels in a most suggestive way the types and qualities 
of physical changes which are known to constitute the child's 
morphogenesis. 
In discussing the ontogenesis of logico-mathematical and 
scientific knowledge, Piaget came to distinguish sensory-
motor knowledge, pre-operational knowledge, concrete 
operational knowledge and formal operational knowledge. 
Embodied in these knowledge categories, which correspond to 
the major 8tages of cognitive development he identified, is 
his more general categorization of knowledge: innate knowl-
edge, the knowledge structured by hereditary programming; 
acquired knowledge, the knowledge acquired from physical 
experience; logico-mathematical knowledge, the knowledge 
abstracted, formalized and equilibrated from acquired knowl-
edge but which, in its development, achieves .independence 
from experience (see Piaget 1971:266). 
Innate knowledge, acquired knowledge and logico-
mathematical knowledge will all receive further attention 
later in this study. Hence., in this brief general overview, 
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we can pass to Piaget's theory of the processes by which 
knowledge develops. This theory, as Piaget recognizes, can 
be applied to lUlderstanding both the phylogenesis and the 
ontogenesis of knowledge. But it is even more general than 
this because it can also be used to accolUlt for social 
epistemogenesis, as is to be indicated. According to Piaget, 
knowledge develops in the species or in the individual (or 
the society) as a result of three very general and llllited 
processes, accommodation/assimilation and equilibration~ 
(These processes are more fully dealt with later.) Knowledge 
is for Piaget something which results from activity on the 
part of an organism, it is constructed and reconstructed on 
the basis, at each moment of construction, of existing knowl-
edge and knowledge. structures (Piaget 1968: 77) • 
Piaget's treatment of the social 
It is no simple matter to comment on PiagetYs treatment 
of the social aspects of human intelligence. Though he did 
devote some attention to these aspects, it is nevertheless 
true, as Harnlyn (1971:18) notes, that in his work there is 
"••• a considerable lUlderestimation of the social". Piaget's 
treatment of the social is not only slight, but it is also 
ambiguous and contradictory. During his long and distin-
guished academic career, Piaget held a number of joint 
psychology/sociology posts and even held the post of pro-
fessor of sociology at the University of Geneva from 1939 to 
1951 (Gruber and Voneche 1977:xiii). These appointments were 
made, it can be :::upposed, partly on the basis of the 
attention he paid to the social factors in the genesis of 
human intelligence in his ez.rly works. 
At the beginning of his adult life, Piaget clearly 
recognized .the basic dialectic between the psychological and 
sociological aspects of life. In a philosophical novel 
published in 1918, Piaget (then 22 years old) briefly intro-
duced the idea of equilibration between socie.ty and the 
individual and anticipated by half a century the development 
of general systems theory when he wrote of Durkheim and 
Tarde that the former only sees the action of the whole on 
itself and on the parts while the latter sees only the 
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inverse, the action of the part on itself and on the whole. 
To understand society or the individual, Piaget asserted, 
these two schools had to be reconciled (Piaget 1977:49). In 
retrospect, now that Piaget is dead, it can be asserted that 
he did not achieve this reconciliation (he might not even 
have tried to do so) and that his scanty sociological work 
is in the tradition of Tarde, that is, he is primarily con-
cerned with the action of the individual on himself and on 
society. 
Fundamental to Piaget's early thought seems to have been 
the idea that children develop from a pre-social to a social 
stage of knowledge. He argued that the earliest stage of a 
child's thinking was "autistic"-- totally individualistic 
and asocial. From this the child developed through "ego-
centric" to "directed" thoug·ht. Egocentric thought, because 
it is developed from the child's own actions on the environ-
ment, leads to thoughts which revolve around the active ego 
and is impregnated with its subjectivity. As Light (1979:2) 
explains, "The essence of egocentrism is thQ child's 
embeddedness in his own point of view; only his own point 
of view, his schemas, bis perceptions etc. really figure in 
his activities, and he is unaware that others see things 
differently." By "directed" though Piaget meant thought 
which is not only largely controlled by the individual but 
which was accommodated to the vi.ews of others and to accepted 
notions of reality. Directed thought is properly socialized 
thought. Egocentric thinking is transcended and becomes 
directed through the buf'fetings which the developing child 
suffers in the course of interaction with others (see Piaget 
1926). 
It is worth pausing to no.te here that thoug;h he has not 
provided a systematic discussion of the concept "egocentrism", 
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the concept has nevertheless remained central to Piaget's 
work. Furthermore, because of his thesis that the onto-
genesis of thought provides clues as regards .its phylogenesis, 
the concept "egocentrism" and its characteristics are of 
relevance to the sociology of knowledge. J..s Piaget dis-
covered, egocentric thinking leads children to make certain 
"mistakes" about reality. Three of the most common a.re: 
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(1) The tendency to regard certain psychological experiences 
(names, dreams, thoughts, stories, etc.) as real things 
(realism). (2) The converse tendency to endow physical 
things and non-human forms of' lif'e with human motives, 
thoughts, and feelings (animism). (J) The tendency to see 
everything as intended to serve some human purpose (arti-
f'icialism) (Piaget and Inhelder 1969). Piaget has himself' 
occasionally noted how these characteristic 11 errors 11 of' child 
thought are reflected in the magical, religious and, even, 
scientific thinking of' adults at various times and in dif'f'er-
ent places. 'It would seem that 11 egocentrism11 provides an 
important clue as regards the origin and nature of' certain 
cultural i terns. 
Despite his obvious sensitivity to social factors, a 
weakness in Piaget's writing has been his tendency to 
separate "impersonal" knowledge (e.g., logical, mathematical, 
scientific) f'rom "interpersoI}.al11 knowledge (e.g., ethical, 
religious, artistic) and to neglect the latter (see Light 
1979:6). Piaget's more recent work cor.veys a strong 
impression that certain basic logical, mathematical and 
scientific structures and items of knowledge arc arrived at 
by the de:veloping person virtually independent of social 
influences. Such items and structures may be judged to be 
not social at all even ttough they are elements of the knowl-
edge repertoire of' every normal adult and a fundamental part 
of' all social transactions. They are the result of indivi-
dtial constructions which every normal person accomplishes 
during the early years of cognitive development. 
Because of' such views, Piaget probably feels that to 
some extent his "isolated individual" approach to· cognitive 
development is justified (see·- Light 1979: 6). Piaget accepts 
that man is social, but, as he has taken pains to point out, 
man is not simply the product of hj.s social existence. He 
is also the product of his own actions and of' the non-social 
environment. Whereas, as Light (1979:14) notes, Mead chose 
to deal with the dialectic between the developing individual 
and society, Piaget chose to deal with the dialectic between 
.'!;he developing child and the non-social environment. It is 
for this reason that Piaget can serve. as a b.ea1thy corrective 
to oversocialized conceptions of man while his own studies 
can benefit from a closer association with sociology. 
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The relative neglect of social knowledge and the social 
processes of knowledge by genetic epistemology contrasts 
rather sharply with the treatment which these have received 
in 11 evolutionary epistemology'', an approach to knowledge 
which has much in common with genetic epistemology and which 
offers a convenient avenue for the extension of Piaget's work 
into the social realm. Stated differently, evolutionary 
epistemol.ogy may be used as a means of syn the sizing genetic 
epistemology· and the sociology of knowledge into a more com-
prehensive account of human knowledge than presently exists. 
Evolutionary epistemology 
Though Karl Popper is the chief current exponent of the 
approach knov.-n as 'evolutionary epistemolot;y', he is not the 
inventor of the term. He remarks himself that as far as he 
is aware, the term was originated by his friend Donald T 
Campbell (see Popper 1973 and Campbell 1974). He also notes 
that the idea of an evolutionary epistemology is post-
Da:rwinian and goes back to the end of the nincteentll century 
-- to the work of such individuals as Baldwin, Morgan and 
Jennings. As an approach to the study of knowledge, 
evolutionary epistemology is at pre~ent something of a minor-
ity movement and, besides Popper, Konrad Lorenz can be 
counted as an influential contemporary member. 
As in the ·case of genetic epistemology, evolutionary 
epistemology constitutes a valuable contribution and exten-
sion to the sociology of knowledge. But it is a contribution 
which has, as yet, not received the appreciation it deserves. 
Part of the responsibility for this neglect lies with Popper 
himself since, apart from a number of tantalizing suggestions, 
he does not go very far towards integrating his epistemology 
with the sociology of knowledge nor deviate appreciably from 
his concentration on scientific knowledge. One of the 
purposes of this section is to highlight some of Popper's 
ideas which appear to me to be ideas from which the sociology 
of knowledge could benefit. 
Both genetic epistemology and evolutionary epistemology 
take the growth of knowledge as the fundamental problem of 
epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology, as its name 
suggests and like its genetic cousin, aims at producing a 
theory of knowledge which, according to Campbell (1974:413), 
takes cognizance of and is compatible with "man's status as 
a product of biological and social evolution". ·It has an 
interest in the "primitive fundamentals of knowledge {which) 
does not begin or end with the conscious content or sense-
data of the philosopher himself" (Campbell 1974:418). 
Evolutionary epistemology holds that evolution is a knowledge 
process; that the natural selection paradigm can be applied 
to understanding the evolution of knowledge just as it has 
been to behaviour and morphology. "The growth of knowledge", 
explains Popper (1973: 144), "is not a repetitive or cumu-
lative process but one of error-elimination. It is Darwinian 
selection rather than Lamackian instruction." 
Both Popper and Piaget are centrally concerned with 
analyzing the development of scientific knowledge though 
their levels of analysis differ. Popper is concerned 
primarily with the objective and social dimension of the 
growth of science while Piaget concentrates on the subjective 
and psychological dimension. For both these writers, science 
is one of the greatest, if not the paramount, creations of 
the human mind. One of the central tenets of evolutionary 
epistemology is that the trial and error strategies of 
learning responsible for the evolution of the species and the 
growth of inteJ:ligence in animals and humans are analogous 
to the strategy of conjecture and refutation of the scien-
tific method. As Popper writes (1963:51): 
Assume that we have deliberately made it 
our task to live in t[lis unknown world of 
ours; to adjust to it as well as we can; 
to take advantage of the opportunities we 
can find in it; and to explain it, if 
possible (we need not assume that it is), 
and as far as possible, with the help of 
laws and explanatory theories. If we have 
madL!.his out task. then there is !J;Q._inore 
rational procedure than tbc metho<i,_£[ 




...,. TT - EE - P2 conveys the kernel 
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of his theory (see Popper 1973; 1974; 1977). He argues that 
living things (humans, _animals and plants) always begin the 
knowledge acquisition process with some problem P
1
• In 
seeking to solve this problem some tentative solution or 
theory TT is proposed in the form of ideas, actions or 
behaviour. This may or may not solve the problem but what-
ever it does, it does produce some sort of feedback as 
regards the efficacy of the tentative solution. It thus 
constitutes a moment in the process of error-elimination EE. 
In the course of the attempts at eliminating the errors EE 
of the tentative theory TT which was proposed as a possible 
solution to the initial problem P
1 
the next point on the 
road to knowledge is reached. Tbis point is designated P2 
and it consists of a new problem which incorporates and 
emerges out of the preceding epistemic activity. And so the 
cycle begins again. 
Popper notes of P
2 
that these problems arising out of 
our attempts at problem solving are not entirely of our 
making. We wish to solve P
1 
ancl P2 is the result of this 
activity. Hence, many of the problems we come to deal with 
are the result of our activities but they are not of our 
making. "New problems, P2 arise from our own creative 
activity; and these new problems are not in general inten-
tionally created by us, they emerge autonomously from the 
field of new relationships which we cannot help bringing into 
existence with every action, .however little we intend doing 
so" (Popper 1973:119). 
Popper's notion that each stage in the evolution of 
knowledge begins with problems is consistent with PiagetYs 
idea that it begins with existing structureso A structure-
less organism could not have a problem. It is the structure 
of the organism as much as any extraneous feature that con-
stitutes the problem. "Organic structures and problems arise 
together ••• organic structures are theory-incorporating as 
well as problem-solving structures", is how Popper (1974:106) 
expresses this unity. 
The proces-s of knowledge acquisition just outlined 
applies according to Popper to all forms· of life. It was 
employed by Einstein and is employed, in a more dogmatic 
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fashion, by the amoeba (Popper 1963:52; 1973:261). For 
evolutionary epistemologists, knowledge and life are insep-
arable. The lowest forms of life as much as the highest 
forms possess knowledge and are capable through the process 
of trial and error, conjecture and refutation, of acquiring 
more knowledge or modifying that which they have. 
This approach leads both Popper and Lorenz to view an 
organism's physiology and behaviour as constituting theories, 
hypotheses or solutions (TT) proposed by the species in res-
ponse to the problems of adaptation and survival. A fish's 
form is a solution to the problem of the fish being a bcing-
in-water and hence may be regarded as a form of knowledge. 
Tbe octopus's form is also a respon8e to the problem of life 
living in water. Tbat its form is different to that of a 
fish demonstrates graphically the fundamental relativity of 
knowledge. For Lorenz (1977) life is synthesized and 
systematized knowledge. The evolution of life and (among 
the higher forms of life) the development of the individual 
organism implies a progressive increment in knowledge. 
"Life itself", Lorenz (1969:13) has written, "is a knowledge 
process." In his writings Lorenz has attempted to validate 
the argwr.ents of Popper and Cal!lpbell by revealing the ways 
in which the more primitive levels, forms and processes of 
knowledge are related to the more advanced. 
Objective knowledge 
In developing his evolutionary epistemology, Popper came 
to formulate an "epistemology without a knowing subject" (as 
he titled one of his famous lectures Popper 1973:126). He 
' was led to this, as he acknowledges, by following· the lead 
given by such writers as Balzano and Frege. Their lea.O. 
suggested that a distinction could be drawn between the 
contents of thought and the various psychological dimensions 
of thought, such as consciousness, attitude, feeling, puzzle-
ment, belief, doubt, atL"'Ciety, and so :forth. .In other words, 
thoughts have a su~jective and an objective dimensio~. 
Popper (1974:144) explains: 
One man's th.ought processes cannot contra-
dict those of another man, or his own thousht 
processes at some other time; but the con-
tents of his thoughts -- that is, the -
statements in themselves -- can of course 
contradict the contents of other thoughts. 
Gn the other hand, contents or statements 
in themselves, cannot stand in psychologi-
cal relations: thoughts in the sense of 
contents or statements in themselves and 
thoughts in the sense of thoug·ht proceE.ses 
belong to two entirely different "worlds 11 • 
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The subjective dimension of knowledge is, for Popper, 
the concern of the psychology of knowledge. This branch of 
epistemology deals with the empirical facts of kn.m,·ledge, 
with the origin and development of knuKledge, as well as 
with the subjective features which, in con:::ciousness, 
generally accompany the objective ones. The psychological 
approach is limited in that it cannot pronounce a thought 
true or false or one theory better than another in any 
objective way but only in terms of feelings of conviction or 
certainty or some other emotional intelligence. 
The objective dimension of tt.otJght is the provinc.e of 
the logic of knm\ledg•e. The logical approach is unconcerr_ed 
with the feelings which may accompany a proposition; it is 
concerned solely with the logical relationship between a 
proposition and other relevant propositions. In other words, 
the logical approach can lead, because it is based on logical 
inference rather than psychological evaluation, to objective 
judgements regarding the truth content of propo:::itions and 
theories. "Popper's Ylogic of knowledge' is concerned, then, 
with logical or objective features like truth and falsehood, 
deducibility, contradictoriness, deductive explanation, 
explanatory power or empirical content, simplicity, verisim-
ilitude" (Musgrave 1974:573). 
The objective nature of thought lies firstly in its 
being the object or content of our individual consciousness 
and,- :::econdly, and more importantly, in its being a subjective 
object which we are able to make an object for others through 
the use of language. The objective nature of. our thoughts is 
commonly experienced in the surprise evoked in us by our own 
thoughts or the shock experienced when reading something we 
have written. 
By distinguishing the objective (or logical) dimension 
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of knowledge from the subjective (or psychological) Popper 
was able to formulate his pluralistic philosophy which 
proposes that the world consists of at least three onto-
logically distinct sub-worlds:' 
The first is the physical world or the 
world of physical states; the second is 
the mental world or the world of mental 
states, and the third is the world of 
intelligibles, or of ideas in the objec-
tive sense .• 
(Popper 1973:154). 
For Popper, the third world consists of all possible 
objects of thought: the world of theories in themselves, and 
their logical relations; of arguments in themselves; and of 
problem situations in themselves (1973:151+). It is suf-
ficient for something to qualify as objective knowledge that 
it has the potential of being grasped or known by a human 
mind. "I do admit", writes Popper (1973:116), "that in order 
to belong to the third world of objective knowledge, a book 
should -- in principle, or ·virtually -- be capable of being 
grasped (or deciphered, or lA.Ilderstood, or 'known') by some-
body. But I do not admit more." In his discussion of the 
third world, Popper describes some of its "inmates". These 
include the contents, in the logical sense, of statements, 
thoughts, problems and arguments as well as books, journals, 
letters, films, etc. Though he restricts his discussion of 
the third world to its scientific con.tents, Popper in various 
places acknowledges that this world has other contents and 
that his ideas can be extended to discussions of artistic 
knowledge, religious knowledge, common-sense knowledge, and 
so forth. Following Popper's lead it can be argued that 
truths, judgements, propositions, criticisms, interpretations, 
evaluations, meanings,, and so forth, can also be objectively 
determined in non-scientific knowledge domains. This is an 
idea which the sociology of knowledge could profitably 
explore. The idea indicates that to some extent at least, 
the social determination argument has to be diluted if it is 
to be valid. 
One of the fundamental problems raised by his pluralis-
tic philosophy of mind, as Popper recognizes, is the 
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relationship between the three worlds. In exploring this 
relationship Popper makes an important contribution to both 
the psychology and the sociology of knowledge. He argues in 
terms of the relative autonomy of each of these worlds and 
conjectures that the only connection between the world of 
physical objects (w1) and the world of intelligibles (W3) is 
through the world of mental states (w2). But though World 2 
is the mediator between World 1 and World 3~ all these 
I 
worlds have an effect on each other. For example, techno-
logical knowledge (wJ) lies behind many physical changes in 
World 1 and the technological knowledge is itself a reflec-
tion of World 1 mediated by World 2 (see Popper 1973:154-
156). The effects of World 1 and World J on the world of 
mental processes (W2) is something readily ?-ckn.owledged 
though the exact relationships are the subject of much debate. 
An interesting feature of the third world is that it 
can be considered to possess structures, properties and 
relationships -- even contents -- independently of any sub-
ject ts awareness of them (Musgrave 1974:5~5; Popper 1974:147 
-149). From this it follows that to the extent that an 
individual gives himself over to this world, as intellectuals 
do to a great extent, this world becomes responsible for 
their thoughts. In other words, the world of objectivated 
know ledge imposes certain necessary lines of reasoning on 
the individual and may even be regarded as responsible for 
the conclusions which are reached. Levi-Strauss, who seems 
to have been particularly sensitive .to this relation between 
the third and second worlds, has described his experience of 
it thus: 
••• my work· gets thought in me unbeknown to 
me. I never had, and still do not have, the 
perception of feeling my personal identity. 
I appear to myself as the place where some-
thing is going on, but there is no "I", no 
"me". Each of us is a kind of crossroads 
where things happen. The crossroads is 
purely passive; something happens there. 
A different thing, equally valid, happens 
elsewhere. There is no choice, it is just a 
matter of chance. 
(Levi-Strauss 1978:3-4). 
The autonomy of the first world is generally acknowledged 
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and the relative autonomy of the second world is recognized 
in many philosophies. It is the existence and degree of 
autonomy of the third world that is problematic and explains 
why Popper has devoted so much energy to discussing it. 
Popper considers the third world to be partially autonomous. 
This is so, because, as just noted, the thoughts of an 
individual may be experienced as following a logic of their 
own and, once expressed, may have "unintended and Wlforeseen 
consequences" (Popper 1974:14). Among the examples Popper 
cites of ideas with unintended and unforeseen, even infinite, 
consequences· is that of natural numbers and the problems 
these have given rise to and, no doubt, will give rise to in 
the future; problems which can only be discovered by us, 
which are not made by us (Popper 1973:160). He asserts, 
almost contradictorily, that even though the world of 
objective knowledge is a human product, there are many 
theories, arguments and problem situations in this realm 
which have not as yet come into the ambit of human cognition 
and which might never come into it or ever be understood by 
men (Popper 1973:116). "The third world is largely autono-
mous though created by us" (Popper 1973:118). 
Popper's argument in favour of the relative autonomy of 
the third world and its power as a semi-independent source 
of knowledge and determiner of judgements supports certain 
ideas of Mannheim as well as :Marx. :Mannheim's "free floating 
intelligentsia" and Marx's "spokesmen for the proletariat" 
all achieve obJective insights because they, as Popper would 
argue, have been able by virtue of their privileged positions 
and knowledge to give their thoughts over largely to the 
dictates of the third world. Along with Marx and·Mannheim, 
Popper maintains that through permitting the free interplay 
of ideas under the guidance of the accepted rules of logic, 
science, criticism, interpretation, etc.~ certain privileged 
individuals are able to achieve the only kind of truth of 
which humankind is capable. 
Besides complementing the thought of· f'.Iannheim and Marx 
in the way just indicated and challenging over-relativistic 
theories of knowledge, Popper's evolutionary epistemology 
leads to a further contribution to the sociology and 
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psychology of knowledge. This is his outright rejection of, 
what he calls, the "bucket theory of mind" or the "common-
sense theory of knowledge". (Represented in sociology by 
references to the child's "TABULA RASA11 at birth.) This 
theory still exerts a powerful influence in philosophy, 
psychology and sociology. It maintains~ according to Popper 
(1973:62), that knowledge consists of things such as ideas, 
impressions, sense data, and so forth, which are in us and 
which we have assimilated from the pure, unadulterated 
elements of information which we have received. This theory 
holds that knowledge grows as a result of information received 
through the senses. This "bucket theory" of mind is, accord-
ing to Popper (1973:61) "utterly naive and completely mis-
taken in all its versions". Proposed in its stead is the 
"searchlight theory" of knowledge which holds that all life 
forms, from amoeba to Einstein (a coupling much favoured by 
Popper), proceed by first having some expectatjon, theory, 
proposition, hunch and then seeking the information relevant 
to that. Every item of information we 'receiver is theory 
impregnated, which implies that it was not so much received 
as sought and expected. Our present knowledge is the result 
of searches prompted by yesterday's knowledge. Our oldest 
scientific theories emerged out of the searches encouraged by 
our pre-scientific myths which arose from even more primitive 
theories and expectations. 
Ontogenetically ••• we thus regress to the 
expectations of the newborn child; phylo-
geneti~ally ••• we get to the state of 
expectations of unicellular organisms ••• 
every organism is born with ~ horizon 
of expectations. 
(Popper 1973:347). 
This regressive line of reasoning leads Popper to the 
same conclusion reached by Piaget, Lorenz and others. He 
phrases the conclusion as follows: 
••• at every stage of the evolution' of 
life and of the development of an org.anism, 
we have to assume the existence of some 
knowledge in the form of dispositions and 
expectations. 
(Popper 1973:71). Elsewhere he states: 
I assert that every animal is born with 
expectations or anticipations, which could 
be framed as hypotheses; a kind of hypo-
thetical knowledge. And I assert that we 
have, in this sense, some degree of inborn 
knowledge from which we may begin, even 
though it may be quite unreliable. 
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(Popper 1973:258). These assertions imply, if correct, not 
only that the highest forms of bwnan knowledge developed in 
some way out of the more primitive forms going back even-
tually to innate dispositions, but also, and importantly, 
that these forms co-exist in the present and that a 
diachronic as well as a syncbronic analysis of knowledge is 
possible. 
The assertion that each level of knowledge adlieved 
presupposes a prior level leads to the inevitable discovery, 
as Popper (1973:34) phrases it, that "all science, and all 
philosophy, are enlightened common sense". This discovery 
not only establishes a connection between social knowledge 
and individual knowledge but also between these forms of 
knowledge and genetically inherited dispositions. In short, 
scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge and common-
sense knowledge are socially, psychologically and biologically 
structured. 
The ineradicable link which evolutionary epistemology 
discovers between scientific knowledge and common-sense 
knowledge echoes the link between scientific knowledge and 
operational thought discovered by genetic epistemology. 
These linkages and the unity they imply between science and 
common-sense suggest that the sociology of knowledge, 
especially its phenomenological branch, could benefit from 
these epistemologies. In recent years it has been the 
phenomenological approach to knowledge which bas been 
stressing the close links and interdependencies between 
science and common-sense. 
The two epistemologies considered and the sociology of 
knowledge 
As rich as genetic epistemology and evolutionary epis-
temology are as fields for socio.l'Ogists of knowledge to 
explore, they are just two of nwr.erous fields which can 
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enrich the sociology of knowledge. The need to be brief has 
meant that not even the various representatives of even 
these two epistemologies have been given a fair hearing. 
Sociobiology, which applies evolutionary thinking very 
broadly, and ecosystemic epistemology, which concentrates on 
open yet bounded systems and recognizes paradox, contradic-
tion and the quantum leaps of sudden change, are both fields 
which could have been reviewed with benefits for the 
sociology of knowledge (see Wilson 1975; 1978; Wilden 1972; 
1976). Other fields and other writers could also have been 
reviewed with profit. As partial recoffipense for these 
necessary oversights, relevant aspects of these other theories 
of knowledge will be introduced where relevant in the 
following chapters. 
Incomplete as it is, I nevertheless feel that the ideas 
of Popper and Piaget presented do serve to pave the way for 
what is to follow. The epistemologies referred to suggest 
ways in ivhich the biological and psychological aspects of 
knowledge can be integrated into a more comprehensive socio-
logical account. Certain ideas in the epistemologies 
considered have already'been indicated as having some direct 
relevance to certain matters in the sociology of knowledge. 
It is worth noting a few more. For one, Piaget and Popper 
provide grounds for agreeing with Max Scheler that there· are 
no absolute, historically constant forms and principles of 
reason, that knowledge, as well as the criteria for 
evaluating knowledge and the procedure for its production, 
evolves in the course of time (see Becker and Dahlke 1973: 
202). For another, the naturalistic views of mind and 
knowledge found in the two epistemologies discussed concur 
with certain views expressed by Mead. As is apparent from 
his biography as well as from his recorded thought, Mead was 
deeply influenced by Darwin and the theory of biological 
evolution (see Coser 1977:348). Darwin's theory is the 
foundation of the pragmatism developed by Nead and his 
associa t.e s. For them, the mind and the knowledge it achieves 
are instruments for purposes of adaptation and survival. In 
statements which Popper as well as Piaget would no doubt 
endorse,, Mead has stated, "The test of intelligence' is found 
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in action" (1936:345). "Truth is ••• synonymous with the 
solution of' the problem" (1964:328). Science is "only the 
evolutionary process grown self'conscious" ( 1936: 364). "The 
animal is doing the same thing the scientist is doing (1964: 
346). (See Coser 1977:348-349 to whom I am indebted f'or 
drawing my attention to these important points of' agreement 
between a signif'icant f'igure in the sociology of' knowledge 
and Piaget and Popper.) One f'urther point of agreement 
between Mead and Piaget and Popper is his insistence on the 
indissoluble unity between the knowing subject and the object 
known. In extending the Romantic idealist argument that one 
cannot have an object without a subject, Nead argued that one 
similarly cannot have consciousness which is not conscious-
ness of something. Subject and object are inevitably inter-
twined. Coser (1977:349) notes, "l\Iead learned from the 
German tradition the insistence on the interplay between 
subject and object in the process of knowing and in the co11.-
struction of the self." 
.The biological notion of "mutation" finds its parallel 
in reflections on the development of knowledge ·Khicb lead to 
the discovery of sudden ruptures in the flow of thought. 
This discovery not only signals an isomorphism between 
biological evolution and epistemic evolution but it also 
serves to dr.aw the biology and the sociology of knowledge 
closer together, for both are confronted with the puzzle of 
novelty, of discontinuity, of creativity. As already noted, 
Piaget regards ·"novelty" as a key problem in his epistemology. 
It is al·so a problem in the sociology of knowledge. Le Court 
(1975:32) addresses this matter as follows, "One cannot get 
from the former (Newton's system) to the latter (Einstein's 
system) by collecting knowledges ••• on the contrary, an 
effort of novelty is required ••• there is not a development 
from the old doctrines towards the new ones, but far rather 
an envelopment of the old by the new ones." (See, also, 
.Foucault 1974a, 1974b.) In his detailed discussion of cul-
tural creation, Koestler (1969:227) wrote of mental evolution 
as being a continuation of biological evolution and stated 
(p J65), "The creative act itself has its evolutionary 
,precedent-s in the· phenomena of organi·c regeneration and in 
the •original adaptations• of which animals are capable in 
crisis." 
Writing about creativity brings the name of Lucien 
Goldmann immediately to mind for it is he who has begun the 
task of developing a sociology of creativity for the 
sociology of knowledge (see Goldmann 1972; 1977). Goldmann 
is one of the few sociologists of note who admits, and 
reflects in his work, the influence of Jean Piaget. 
According to Maryl (1978:23-24) Goldmann and Piaget were 
personal friends and Goldmann learned from his friend as 
much as from·Marx that man is neither an all.powerful creator 
nor a simple spectator, but an actor who transforms the world 
and modifies himself in the process. But, whereas Piaget 
emphasizes the dialectic between the individual and the 
environment, GoldmannWs approach is more thoroughly socio-
logical. For example, he writes that "the true subjects of 
cultural creation are, in fact, social groups and not 
.isolated individuals • ••" (Goldmann 1977:ix). Furthermore, 
Goldmann credits Piaget with the idea that social processes 
or cultural productions should be explained in terms of their 
functional contribution to the relationship between a subject 
and its environment. Goldmann maintains that Piaget, like 
Hegel, Marx and Lukacs before him, understood that the 
behaviour of living things involves a "cyclical process of 
adaptation". In this process of adaptation both the living 
things and the environment are transformed. The structures 
which result fr.om this drive to adapt, cognitive for Piaget 
and cultural/literary for Goldmann, constitute the structures 
to be investigated (Maryl 1978:23; Goldmann 1972:98). 
Besides Goldmann, Habermas is a further contemporary 
sociologist who admits to hav.ing been influenced by Piaget. 
Habermas (1972:36) writes that his basically evolutionist 
interpretation of Marx has been reinforced by insights from 
"cognitive-genetic" psychology, stemming primarily from the 
work of Piaget and Kohlberg. On the basis of their "empiri-
cally saturated model of cognitive learning and sociali-
zation", Habermas has.developed an evolutionary theory of 
societal learning. One of the chief strengths of Piaget's 
"genetic structuralism" for Habermas is, as he states (p 39), 
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that it is"••• an approach which surmounted the traditional 
structuralist opposition to evolutionism by way of assimila-
ting epistemological tenets from Kant and Peirce 11 • He goes 
on to say that Piaget's work is of crucial ~mportance for 
Marxist theory and he acknowledges Lucien Gdldmann for having 
been one of the first Marxists to make this discovery and to 
integrate Piagetian ideas into a basically Marxist approach 
to culture. 
Some differences betweer.. genetic epistemology and evolution-
ary epistemology 
In discussing genetic epistemology and evolutionary 
epistemology, the impression might have been created that 
these are almost identical. This is not the. case. Just as it 
is instructive to point to affinities, it is also instructive 
to point to differences. Consequently, as a conclusion to 
this chapter, it is wo~th noting a few of the differences. 
One of the main differences between genetic epistemology 
and evolutionary epistemology arises from the latter's 
judgement that genetic epistemological questions are not the 
most important. Popper (197J:68) distinguishes between 
questions and problems relating to the 11 production" of 
knowledge and those relating to the "produced structures 
themselves". In addition, he maintains that the study of the 
products is vastly more important than the study of the 
production processes. He malce s the rather dubious claim that 
we can lea.rn more about the heuristics and the methodology 
and even the psychology of research by studying theories, and 
the arguments offered for and against them, than by any 
direct behaviouristic or psychological or sociological 
approach. In short, as he says, "•••we epistemologists 
claim precedence over the geneticists •••" (Popper 1973:69). 
Piaget would take exception to such views. As has already 
been noted, he regards the rigid demarcation between the 
proJ.uction of k....YJ.owlcdge and the product k..."'1.owl.cdge as llllten-
able and argues that a proper epistemology should be informed 
by a dialectical study of both production and product. In 
his evolutionary theory of knowledge Popper.seems to have 
missed the important point so central to Pi~getts thinking 
that the canons of logic and the methods of science are 
themselves genetic products and subject to development. 
Popper's separation between his worlds is too rigid. In his 
eagerness to secure objective knowledge he simplifies and 
distorts the complex relationship that exists between his 
' 
three worlds. Piaget's epistemology demonstrates, more 
correctly I submit, that these worlds are inextricably inter-
woven. They cannot be strung out like three beads on a 
string. 
Another difference between evolutionary epistemology and 
genetic epistemology is the fact that the former relies on 
"trial and error" (or, for Lorenz 1977, "trial and success") 
and "conjecture and refutation" to explain the development of 
knowledge, the latter explains it in terms of "assimilation 
and accommodation". Though these processes are related in 
important ways, for example, they both imply action on the 
part of tl-:.e organi::m~ it is probably not too far off' the mLJ.rk 
to state that trial and error proce.sses are but special 
in t;tance s of the more inclusive ass1mi.la ti on/ accommoda tior.. 
processes. The idea of trial and error J.oarning focuses 
attention on the information. generating activities of' tl:.e 
organism while the idea of assimilation and acconunodation 
drawn attention to both information gener2.tion and the 
structural changes which result from this activity. It .is 
the difference between a behaviouristic and a cognitive 
orientation. While both genetic epistemology and evolutionary 
epistemology a.re concerned primarily with scientific knowl-
edge, the processes of trial and error serve better to 
explain the development of science than they do to explain 
the development of such other forms of hum2..:n knowledge as 
religious knowledge or artistic knowledge. This is another 
reason why, in this study, the processes of assimilation and 
acconunodation are preferred as the primary processes of 
intellectual and epistemic development • 
. As regards the driving force behind the .need to kno...-, 
evolutionary epistemology points to the negative consequences 
of error and tl:e resulting drive for "error elimination" 
(Campbell 1974:417) or "problem solving" (Popper 1974:143; 
1973:258). In this regard, genetic epistemol.ogy once more 
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proposes a more general process; that. of "equilibration" 
I • . 
(or "self regulation" as Piaget sometimes calls 1 t). And, 
again, because "error elimination" is not a process ivhich 
' 
takes us very far towards accounting for the development of 
I 
all varieties of knowledge, the more genera.l!. Piagetian 




DEFINITIONS, PROCESSES AND VARIETIES 
oo• it is impossible to speak 
in such a way that you cannot 
be misunderstood. 
Popper (1974:23) 
In Chapter One it was noted that the sociology of 
knowledge inherited its conception of its sul::ject matter 
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from German philosophy of the last century and this, togetl:.er 
with the discipline's tendency to oversocia.lize this narrow 
conception, has led to certain problems with its subject 
mattere In this chapter a conception of "knowledge" is 
proposed which is intended to assist in the solution of some 
of the problems of the conventional form of socioJ_ogy of 
knowledge as it presently exists. 
Sociologists who regard their discipline as a scier.ce, 
or 1vho are merely concerned with communicating their ideas, 
generally express their irritation at the fuzzy concepts so 
prevalent in their discipline. Clarity is not only a scien-
tif'ic requirement, it is a human one as well for it is the 
essence of communication. Vague and troublesome -definitions 
constitute a perennial lament and predictable critical 
comment in sociological writing. Such definitions are hard 
to avoid because sociology often deals with complex phenomena 
and uses common terms to describe them. The literature 
reveals that the list of concepts which cause sociologists 
grief increases rather than decreases as the discipline ages. 
This state of aff<:-irs permits the cynical assertion that 
sociology (if it is regarded as a science) appears to age 
without maturing. However plaintive the lament over the sins 
of omission and commission regarding definitions, the 
requirement remains that some terms must be defined if a 
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discussion is to be intelligible to more than the writer. 
The need for clarifying the meaning of a concept is 
especially crucial when a concept is put to a use which 
deviates from i;\·hat most regard as its accepted usage or in 
cases where the concept is widely used in a variety of ways. 
Both these apply'to the meaning attached to the work "knowl-
edge" in what follows. 
A number of specific meanings of the word "knowledge" 
have already been indicated. But even these, no matter how 
broad or inclusive they may be, still do not exhaust the 
range of things to which the word "knowledge" may be applied 
in the English language, let alone the privileged discourse 
of any discipline. As already noted, despite the philos-
ophers' claim that they are concerned with knowing and 
knowledge (Yolton 1965:1), they are in fact only cor..cerned 
with certain types of knowing and certain forms of knowledge. 
Philosophers recognize this fact. They often draw attention 
to certain annoying lexical difficulties in the English 
language which render the word "knowledge" especially prob-
lematic. In the idiom of English discourse we can equate 
knowledge as anything which can be said to be known. This 
obviously embraces a multitude of things. It is semar..tically 
correct to say that humankind knows how to go to the moon. 
In other words, humankind possesses the knowledge which 
makes flights to the moon possible. In the same manner of 
speaking it is also acceptable to say that people know how 
to breath, to i;'falk, to drive, to climb, and so forth. We 
may even say that humans know how to be human, just as apes 
knm\' how to be apes and fish, fish. In the spirit of' this 
mode of expression, Chomsky has said that children knoi;\· how 
to have two arms. The issue of consciously knowing how, or 
being able to report the method used, a criteria which some 
philosophers regard as essential if the claim to knowledge 
is to be allowed (see Hamlyn 1971:103), is obviously irrel-
evant to these examples which indicate that in ordinary 
English usage the domain covered by the word "knowledge" 
extends considerably beyond its philosophical boundary. 
Because of the word's lexical difficulties, many 
philosophers draw a distinction between the.knoKledge 11 that 11 
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and the knowledge "how". And, since they see the knowledge 
"that" as their prime concern, such philosophers generally, 
after a few perfunctory remarks about the knowledge "how" 
and the occasional recognition that it is somehow related to 
the knowledge "that", proceed to deal exclusively with the 
knowledge, 11 that 11 • This variety of knowledge is further sub-
divided and in this way the word's wide range of meanings is 
pared down and many lexical difficulties overcome. Over two 
thousand years of Western philosophy testifies to the fact 
that even though philosophers have dealt somewhat exclusively 
with one variety of knowledge, the variety focused on was 
worthy of the attention devoted to it. 
Philosophers are generally only interested in particular 
forms of the knowledge "that" and hence a further distinction 
is often made between two typ~s of knowledge "that". Russell 
(1959) terms these the knowledge "by acquaintance" and the 
knowledge "by description". The knowledge "by description" 
is taken by philosophers as the prime object of their study. 
It is also referred to as the knowledge "of facts" or the 
knowledge "of inf'ormation" (see, for example, Russell 1959; 
Harman 1972; Ryle 1973; Pears 1971; Hamlyn 1971; and Lehrer 
1974). 
Piaget, Polanyi and others have argued that many of the 
problems philosophers encounter in studying the knowledge 
11 that" stem from the imperm,eable boundary they construct 
aroLmd this variety of knowledge. By seeing it as related 
to other varieties of knowledge, especially the knowledge 
"how", some of these problems could be solved. It is for 
this reason that Piaget (1971 :215) has argued, "To know how 
to (SAVOIR FAIRE) is a kind of knowledge (CONKAISSANCE) or 
ability or knowing (SAVOIR) like any other". The philosopher 
Pears (1971) is an exception among philosophers in that he, 
like Piaget, emphasizes the importance of the knowledge "how" 
and argues, contrary to Hamlyn, for example, that this type 
of knowledge occurs in the animal kingdom as :well as the 
human one. What is more, life forms other than man not only 
know how to do things but can also be said, in certain 
instances, to know "that", to l:ave some knowledge of fact. 
Pears (1971) argues in favour of the extension of the 
knowledge "that" category to include.certain acts of animal 
knowing. 
The various usages to which the word "knowledge" has 
been put, some of which have been noted above and in the 
earlier parts of this study, have accumulated around this 
word a cloud of ambiguity, con.fusion and opacity •. One may 
be tempted to throw up one•s hands in despair and like the 
English philosophers Wilson and Pritchard to proclaim, even 
if for different reasons, that the word is indefinable. 
"Knowledge" and information theory 
In addition to the various usages of the word "knowl-
edge" discussed above, there remains a further usage to 
which attention will now be directed. This usage offers a 
way out of many of the difficulties associated with some of 
the above usages and, as will be indicated, leads directly 
to the particular usag~ adopted in this study. The usage in 
question is one which has been developed by certain communi-
cation theorists and subsequently been employed by some 
general systems theorists, ethologists, biologists and psy-
chologists. 
In the broad field of communication theory, cybernetic 
terminology developed to label the host of new artifacts, 
processes, relationships, qualities and ideas which resulted 
from the invention of servo-machines, automations, and com-
puters. This terminology and the visual, auditory and 
tactile imagery of its world offered the biolog;ical and 
human sciences a new language and set of symbols and images 
to replace the cliched mechanistic and organic languages 
which had been in service for so long. Just as eagles have 
been said to be good for "thinking with" by some tribal 
people, so computers have proven to be good for "thinking 
with" by modern industrial people. Many biological and 
social science texts are now replete with analogies, meta-
phors, models and concepts talcen from cyberne.tics. }'iany of 
these have proven valuable by providing new insights and 
approaches to old puzzles. For example, Pribram (1976:84) 
writes that it is now standard practice among neuro-
p.bysiologists to view the nervous system as.an information 
processing mechanism. According to Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram (1970:48), "The study of cog·nitive processes has 
made rapid strides by taking as its model brain mechanisms 
assumed to be similar to those of the digital computer." 
Cybernetics begins with the fundamental insight that 
information is the controlling mechanism of the universe. 
I 
This insight, as will become clear, bears an obvious 
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relationship to the notion central to this qissertation that 
knowledge forms a distinct order of things and that this 
order is, among other things, the controlling mechanism of 
living systems. In a lecture to the Internatior:.al Con£erence 
on Cybernetics held in 1969, David Foster (as reported by 
Wilson 1975:31-35) described the universe as an enormous data 
generating, data processing and data utilizing mechanism. 
According to this view, the universe is alive by virtue of 
its banlcs of coded information and its activity controlling 
programmes. In terms of the computorial mode of expression 
adopted by Foster, an acorn may be regarded as programmed to 
develop into an oak tree. In other words, the acorn contains 
the basic information necessary to develop into an oak tree, 
given suitable environmental factors. Anticipating the 
meaning to be attached to the word knowledge, it would not 
be incorrect to say the acorn knows how to be an oak. 
Cybernetics views the universe as composed of inter_,_ 
acting members who continually exchange information, assimi-
late information and react in terms of the information at 
their disposal.. Over time, informational exchanges have led 
under certain circumstances to the transformation of matter 
and life. Informational exchanges are even held to have been 
responsible for tr.ansforming inert matter into living form. 
Cybernetic theory asserts that the flow of information has 
produced in living organisms self-regulating controlling 
mechanisms. These are held to be not only the result of 
previous informational interactions between organism and 
environment, both in the course of phylogenesis and onto-
genesis, but they are also involved in the continual process 
of responding to incoming and self'-generated information. 
(see von Bertalanffy 1969; Campbell 1958; Buckley 1967; 
Shannon and Weaver 1949; MacKay 1969; Wiener 1968; and 
Wilden 1972.) 
"Knowledge" in evolutionary epistemology and genetic epis-
temology 
Konrad Lorenz, who regards himself primarily as an 
ethologist but who is also an evolutionary epistemologist, 
admits to having been significantly influenced by cyber-
netics. In an important article he states that information 
theorists, most notably Hassenstein, led him to define 
knowledge as a "kind of transinformation between an organism 
and its environment that is affected by the adaptation of 
the former to the latter" (Lorenz 1969:14). In the same 
article he provides amplificatory alternatives to this 
definition. Knowledge is, "relevant, teleonomically organ-
ised information that has meaning for the organism receiving 
or possession it" and "knowledge is organised, relevant 
information". For Lorenz there is no difference between the 
1vords "information" a:nd "knowledge" but in order to avoid 
confusion and misW1derstanding he selects to speak of 
"information" when dealing with the cognitive fW1ctions of' 
lower organisms and to s·pealc of "knowledge" when referring 
to human thought. This is done to avoid the reproach of 
ascribing to creatures of lower rank human conscious knowl-
edge process.es. The employment of the words "information" 
and "knowledge" as semantic equivalents is continued in 
Lorenz's recent and seminal work entitled, "Behind the 
Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge", 
published in English in 1977. In this book Lorenz argues 
that by acquiring knowledge an organism constructs for itself 
a progressively more detailed image of its environment and 
thereby enhances its chances of gaining energy and surviving. 
Lorenz's approach to epistemological problems via 
ethology bears a close resemblance to that deveJ.oped by 
Piaget via his biological and psychological investigations. 
This is particularly the case with their respective concep-
tualizations of knowledge, which are roughly similar. 
Despite agreement on some points, however, it should be 
pointed out that Fiaget sees his overall.theoretical approach 
as differing in important respects from that of Lorenz. 
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Piaget has taken pains to point this out (Piaget 1971:117, 
J1J). Lorenz, on the other hand, though a contemporary of 
Piaget's seems not to have taken much note of Paigetts work. 
For example, Lorenz's "Behind the Mirror" (1977) deals with 
many of the same issues and presents many of the same argu-
ments as Piaget's slightly earlier work "Biology and Knowl-
edge" (1971) yet Lorenz makes not a single reference to 
Piaget's work. It hardly seems possible that Lorenz is 
unfamiliar with Piaget's work. This might be an example of 
professional jealousy and corapetition over credit for similar 
ideas developed independently. 
Biologists have become interested in epistemological 
questions, as Piaget ( 1971: 1) explains, because, "Among 
leading ethologists today there is a realisation that the 
problems of knowledge, including higher forms of human knowl-
edge such as mathematics, can no longer remain outside the 
scope of biology". One of the main reasons for this 
involvement in epistemology is the fact, as Piaget (1971:2) 
explains, that "all knowledge presupposes a physical struc-
ture". This is hardly a new idea. What is new is the 
current attempts being made by many researchers in diverse 
fields to link. the various hierarchical levels of matter, 
life and knowledge and to see how these relate and how the 
study of one level can further the understanding of the other 
levels and also, via this detour, further the understanding 
of itself. 
That Piaget draws some inspiration from the field of 
cybernetics is apparent both in some of the terminology he 
uses and in the types of hypotheses he proposes. He says, 
for example (Piaget 1971:26), "The explanation of evolution-
ary mechanisms, so long shackled to the inescapable alter-
natives offered by Lamarchism and classical neo-Darwinism, 
seems set in the direction of a third solution, which is 
cybernetic and is, in effect, biased towards the theory of 
autoregulation". For Piaget (1971 :26), "Life. is essentially 
autoregulation". That is, life is grounded in the ability 
of organisms to acquire knowledge and to use this knowledge 
in the acquisition of even more knmvledge. Life implies 
knowledge and the ability to modify the kr:wwledge possessed 
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in response to environmental changes. The kernel of this 
idea dates back as far as Aristotle and features in various 
guises in the writings of many nineteenth and twentieth 
century writers, such as Mach, Rignano, Popper, Toulmin, 
Lorenz, Campbell and Capek. 
The impact of cybernetics on neurobiology and neuro-
psychology has been considerable and brings the terminology 
employed in these disciplines close to that of Piaget and 
Lorenz and close to that which is employed in this study. 
Those who are concerned with studying the brain are fond of 
speaking of the brain as processing "information" and nerves 
are regarded as transmitting "information" electrically 
(Rose 1976:72). The cybernetic notions of "memory banks" or 
simply "memory", and "stored information" when used in 
relation to living organisms constitute near equivalents of 
the term "knowledge" as used by Piaget and·Lorenz and as it 
is used in this study. 
The cybernetic notion of "memory" is obviov.sly derived 
from the older meaning of this word as it was and still is 
used to refer to the mind's (or brain's) storehouse of 
knowledge {or information). This older meaning of the word 
has not only been extended by analogy to the world of com-
puters but also, by analogy or because of more substantive 
similarities, to organic entities and processes beyond the 
brain. Geneticists occasionally refer to the property which 
directs a growing organism to resemble its parents as an 
example of genetic "memory" (Piaget and Lorenz, as shall be 
indicated, speak in this instance of "innate knowledge"). 
In a similar fashion (these examples are from Rose 1976:254), 
immunologists sometimes refer to the way in which·antibodies 
recognize antigens in tissues- as examples of immunological 
"memory". According to Rose a lot is now known about t.he 
mechanisms of genetic "memory" and immunological "memory". 
The former depends on the properties of the molecules DNA 
and RNA and the latter on.certain large prote.in molecules. 
He says of DNA, RNA and such protein molecules that they 
have become known as the "informational macromolecules"since 
they form specific information bearing codes (Rose 1976:254)0 
As good as cybernetic terminology is for 11 tbinking 
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with", the mistake of allowing metaphor to determine the 
nature of the object which it is used to describe, must be 
guarded against. Social science has learned the bitter way 
the error of allowing organic and mechanic metaphors to 
distort its theories. For similar reasons, cybernetic terms, 
and, especially, t.he computer analogy, must be employed with 
discretion. It may be that our current tendency to think. of 
the brain as a complex computer is due to the fact that we 
know more about computers than we do about the brain. ·"This 
analogy," writes Eccles, "rests on a superficial similarity 
with the process of input and output and may be disastrously 
misleading" (see Lausch 1975:159, from whom this quote is 
talcen and who outlines the similarities and differences 
between brains and computers). 
Knowledge defined 
In the light of the foregoing discussions and bearing 
in mind the objectives of this study, two compatible ways of 
defining "knowledge" suggest themselves. The first is to 
define "knowledge" substantively, as the name given to the 
"organizing force" or "structure" or "programme" of life;, 
The second is to define it genetically, in terms of its 
genesis. Obviously, as is true of all definitions, these 
definitions .are intended as an initial orientation. The· 
meaning of a concept can only emerge fully as it is used in 
discourse. 
It is axiomatic to this study that there is an order of 
things existent in the observable analysable world which 
operates as tbe "programme 11 ( 11 organizing fo~ce or structuring 
mechanism") of life, determining in its interactions with the 
envirorunent the modes of being of all living things and 
thereby, paradoxic2.lly, also playing a roJ.e in its own 
development. This order of things has been variously labeled. 
In fact, its importance may be seen to be reflected in the 
large nw:1ber of' terms u~.ed to refer t:o it or .to the things 
of which it consists. Among the more common ones are: 
"mind", "intelligence", t!kJ1.ffwledge 11 , "memory", 11 progranune 11 , 
"learning", 11 organization11 , 11 :::tructure", · 11 orier~ting system11 , 
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"action system", "plan", 11 behavioural abilities", 11 cognitive 
map", "neural network",. 11 engram" and 11 cognitions". Such a 
plethora of descriptive terms underlines the abstract and 
problematic nature of this order. It also suggests a need 
for conceptual housekeeping. understanding the order of 
things circmnscribed by this array of terms could well be 
bogged down by terminological conf'usion. 
In an attempt to bring some order into this terminology 
labyrinth, knm·rledge is defined in this study as the 
programme of life. It refers to that order of things res-
pon:-:>ible, as·a1:ready noted, for the forms, behaviours, 
actions, thoughts, experiences and objcctivations of living 
entities. This order of things can consequently be labeled 
the "knowledge order" or, alternatively, the "epistemic 
order". 
(The adjective "epistemic" is derived from tbe Gr.eek 
EPISTEME meaning knowledge 2nd EPISTASTIIAI moaning to know 
how to do. Hence, also, "epistemology" meaning tbeory or 
study of knowledge. Tbe English word "Knowledgett docs not 
work very satisfactorily as an adjective. It is for this 
reason that I have adopted ttepistemic" as the adjectival 
synon-y-m for "knowledge". This usage is encouraged by the 
widely accepted and used "epistemology". Though not yet in 
common use, .the word "epistemic" is beginning to be used·as 
it is here. Gruber and Vonecke (1977:.xv) speak, for example, 
of the "epistemic subject" and the 11 epistemic Piaget". 
Maclean (1978:J6) goes so far as to mClke a case for "epis-
temics" as a noun equivalent for epistemology and science.) 
The epistemic order may be regarded as constituted out 
of everything that qualifies as knowledge. Thus, ·the stock 
of knowledge -- meaning the t-otality of.that which can be 
said to be known -- constitutes the epistemic order. Though 
this study will sketch the outline of the epistemic order, a 
full discussion of it is obviously beyond its scope. The 
primary concern of this study, as has already been noted, is 
the:.t part of the epistemic order which forms what may be 
called the human stock of knowledge. It is by concentrating 
on this, and in particular upon certain biological and 
psychological aspects of this stock of knm\·ledge, that I. 
feel this work can make a contribution to the sociology of 
knowledge and to a comprehensive understanding of knowledge. 
The genetic approach provides a second way in which 
"knowledge" may be defined. Thus, most briefly, knm,rledge 
is assimilated information. This definition is compatible 
with the former one and hopefdlly the two together capture 
the essential meaning of the concept as it is here intended. 
(As is explained later, assimilation implies accommodation 
and equilibration. This genetic definition is just that --
it cannot convey its full implications.) 
Conceived in the above ways, the concept 11 knowledge 11 
does, admittedly, deviate considerably from many of. the more 
tradi tio:r::.al usages. Tbe merit of the concept as proposed 
should become clearer as the discussion unfolds. It can be 
noted at this point that, as defined, the concept subsumes 
many of tt.e more restricted meanings of the word "knowledge" 
already referred to. These subsumed meanings may thus be 
regarded as sub-categories or specific instances of kn°'·.11-
edge. This conceptual compatibility implies that the present 
formulation does not do violence to many of the academic and 
common English usages of the word. It should also become 
clear that the epistemic order ,.,rhich has now been defined is 
not a fiction created by language but a substantive order of 
things with observable, experienceable, even measurable,· 
correlates. 
Kriowledge as assimilated information 
The genetic definition of knowledge, th.at it is assimi-
lated information, is derived from the manner in ,v-hich. the 
terms "knowledge", 11 information" and 11 assimilatiort" have been 
used by certain writers in the fields of biology, cyber-
netics, ethology and, especially, genetic epistemology -- as 
earlier comments were intended to reveal. My formulation is 
particularly indebted to the work of Piaget who, early in 
his studies, reached the illuminating insight- that "all 
knowledge is an assimilation of a given external into the 
structures of the subject" (Gardner 1976:54). 
By defining knowledge as assimiJ.ated info:r:mation, a 
distinction between ".information" and "k.nm,·ledge'' is being 
drawn. This marks a deviation from, for example, Lorenz's 
(1969) definition of knowledge which, as was indicat~d 
previously, considers the two concepts as synonymous. 
Information and knowledge may be regarded as referring both 
to the poles of a process, and thus substantively different 
phenomena, as well as to the intermediate aspects of the 
process, and thus to phenomena which shade imperceptibly 
into each other. One may thus describe this process in 
both digital as well as analogal terms. Information is, 
thus, that which operates to "inform" an organism or a 
species. It determines the form of the organism's intelli-
gence. It is the conveyor of messages but, because it 
becomes meaningful as it is assimilated, it is also the 
message. Knowledge on the other hand, is the meaning, 
intelligence, or knowing which life extracts out of infor-
mation and which is to a greater or lesser extent 
incorporated into its structure and operation. Knowledge, 
referring to what a creature knows, contributes as much to 
inf'ormation as docs the "raw data" of that information. 
Hence, as the concepts are intended in the present cor._-
tcxt, information and knowledge are related and complementary 
con_cepts but they are not synonymous. They arc dialectically 
related. As regards life, knoKledge is the product of the 
assimilation of information but knowledge actively consti-
tutes the information it feeds on. Knowledge is a life 
possession, it is incorporated into the physiology of the 
organism and td some extent determines that physiology. 
Information and knowledge always imply each other. There is 
no knowledge unrelated to information and there can be no 
information outside the knowledge structures which construct 
information. The organism and the enviror...ment are as 
inextricably linl<.ed at the epistemic level as at the. 
physical. Though information is constituted by the knowing 
organism, it is not totally, as the idealists would have it, 
a product of the knowing organism. It relates to the 
external reality at two levels. The first is at the level 
of the structures which constitute information and wl'lich 
themselves are the result of organism/environment inter-
actions. The second is the stimuli which originate in the 
external world. 
According to Piaget (1971), life as we know it, however 
rudimentary or complex, implies certain undeniable associ-
ative characteristics. One such characteristic forms a 
flllldamental point of departure for the present theory of 
knowledge as it does for Piaget. This characteristic is 
that all life entails knoKledge and.the ability to assimilate 
further knowledge from the range of information to which it 
is sensitive. In other words, at every stage of existence 
and development all life forms already possess a flUld of 
previo~sly assimilated knowledge and are able to supplement 
this by further acts of assimilation. It is for this reason 
that Lorenz (1969), as has already been mentioned, states 
that life is a knowledge process and Piaget (1971) states 
that life is ~ssentially autoregulation, which is to say that 
life is an information assimilation process. Lorenz (1977:1) 
notes that it seems obvious to biologists but, for some 
reason, not to the philosopher or psychologist,"••• that 
all human knowledge derives from the process of interaction 
between man as a physical entity, an active, perceiving 
subject, and the realities of an equally physical external 
world, the object of man's perception". 
Life is the expression of knowledge. Life is made 
possible by .the kno:wledge which organisms possess and by· 
their ability to respond adaptively to the information they 
receive. All this implies a unity, an indissoluble commlllli-
cation link bet·ween organism and environment. It also 
implies a degree of plasticity in the face of communication. 
It should be noted that the responsiveness of the organism 
is not a passive and mechanical plasticity, such as the 
invariable expansion of gases-when heated or the shape of 
the imprint of a fist pressed into soft clay. Instead, it 
is an active dialectical process in which organism and 
efivironment fuse in creating the types of information assimi-
lable by the organism. The information which. matters to life 
cannot be thought as existing independently from life because 
the life forms determine for themselves as a result of past 
informational assimilations what shall constitute information 
for them.. Each species has its own range of species-specific 
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inf'ormation. Outside the range of inf'ormation which a life 
form constitutes for it~elf by virtue of its biological 
nature there is, as far as that life form is concerned, 
literally nothing else. Light and colour do not exist for 
life forms that cannot see, and as Lorenz (1977:6-7) remarks 
in the case of the human predicament, "We know nothing that 
can be made the object of scientific investigation but what 
we learn about ••• (via) our phylogenetically evolved 
mechanisms for acquiring inf'ormation ••• ". It is thus poss-
ible and accurate to consider the environment of every 
species to be totally composed of its range of inf'ormation. 
In other words, whatever can serve as inf'ormation for an 
organism constitutes the limits of its world. It delimits 
what Von Uexkull has called the m,HIBLT the perceptual 
universe of the organism. Von Uexk.ull defines the 
environment of any organism as the sum of the sensory stimuli 
affecting tt.e behaviour of that organism (see Blcibtreu 
1976:24; Piaget 1971:20J). In a similar vein, H Weber is 
reported by Piaget (1971:203) to have defined the environment 
as the overall sum of inf'luences, irrespective of their 
quality, to which a species or orgaill;sm is susceptiblcg 
Inf'ormation 
Since knowledge has been defined above as assimilated 
inf'ormation, it is appropriate to pay some attention to what 
is meant by inf'ormation and, as is done later, assimilation. 
One way of approaching the concept "inf'ormation" is to begin 
with the idea of variation. It does not talrn much thought 
to reach the conclusion that without variation there could be 
no · inf'ormation and. no~ k.11.owlcdge ~ In fact, there . could ,be .no 
such thing as life. From wha-t is known about the evolution 
of life it is inconceivable that it could have evolved in an 
unvarying environment. Variation in the environment is res-
ponsible for the origin and evolution of life. What is more, 
the rich variation of the Earth is responsibl.e for its 
abundance of living forms and intelligences. The variety of 
living forms is a product, reflection and part of the Earth's 
variability. The simple observation of the richness of life 
in the intertidal zones of' the sea and seashore provides 
some substantiation for the view that such abtllldant variety 
is related to the great physical and, consequently, organic 
variation fowid in these zones. It would seem that as far 
as life is concerned variation begets variation. 
The connection between variation and information lies in 
the fact that variation implies information. "Information 
may most simply and adequately be def.ined as tvarietyt 
imprinted on a matter-energy base," writes Wilden (1976:268). 
At this level of analysis, information, like variation, has 
no meaning or significance and is not intrinsically distinct 
from what information theorists call "noise" •
1 
However, as 
Wilden adds, for a living creature information represents 
"structured or coded variety" and noise "wistructured or 
uncoded variety". As a general rule, according to Wilden, 
more complex organisms employ a wider range and more types 
of var~ety as information than do simpler organisms. He 
concludes by stating that, "The distinction between energy 
and information is thus neither objective nor subjective as 
such, it is systemic." Information refers to any occurrence 
or variation in the environment or the organism which 
excites, irritates, stimulates, or in some other way mal~es 
an impression on the organism. In short, information is 
anything that makes a difference {see Shannon 1951: MacKay 
1969). 
While variation is the source of life, it is also its 
nemesis. Because of this, organisms have evolved not only 
to fill specific niches in the environment, but they_ have 
also developed the capacity to collect, process and use the 
available information. By using information regarding 
enviroP..JIIental change, organisms strive, through movement, 
bodily changes, intelligent b-ehaviour, reproduction, and so 
forth, to make the necessary adjustments to ensure that the 
environment remains relatively benign. In this way adap-
tation and survival are secured. Thus it is that life 
cannot exist without utilizing information and acquiring 
knowledge. It is for this reason that Lorenz (1977:23) 
regards information as being the "root of all processes of 
adaptation". 
Just as living forms have evolved to occupy different 
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environmental niches, so too have they evolved to occupy 
different positions in epistemic space. That is, each 
species is sensitive to and uses a particular range and 
variety of types of information and so achieves a species-
specific stock of knowledge. Not all variation within an 
environment makes a difference to all life forms within it. 
Presidential elections matter not a jot to American cock-
roaches. For variation to make a difference, that is to 
serve as information for a particular organism, it must be 
possible for that organism to detect that variation in some 
way. Hence, ·the features of the organism which are sensi-
tive to particular external and internal variation combine 
with selected physical attributes of such variation to con-
stitute what is here referred to as information. It is only 
by means of its ability to make external and internal 
emanations subjectively meaningful that an organism can 
acquire any knowledge of its surroundings or its internal 
state. (A complex organism consists of interconnected parts 
and the :function of the organism as a whole is dcper_dcnt on 
informational exchanges between its various parts.) Inf'or-
mation, as it is dialectically constituted by the organism 
in interaction with its environment, is the source of all 
knowledge. We may thus view knowledge as metamorphosed and 
biomorphosed information. stated differently, information 
serves to inform the organism. Gnce the organism is informed 
it can be said to know; the piece of information which 
informed it has been assimilated and is thus no longer infor-
mation but knowledge. It is a possession of the organism, 
part of its understanding of itself and its world and part 
of its internal structure. Because of each species's unique 
internal structure, stock of knowledge and range of infor-
mation we may say, along with Von Uexhull, that man lives in 
a man world, dogs live in a dog world and fish in a fish 
world. No creature lives in the world. There is no the 
world. 
~ . .,.,~ Underlying the present study is the epistemological 
position of "hypothetical realism". A position derived from 
or implied in the works of such individuals as Lorenz, 
Campbell, Popper, Piaget, cassirer, Wilson, etc. This 
position, simply stated, assumes the existence of real living 
organisms in an equally_ real material world. It holds, as 
Campbell (1966) has argued, that though the Kantian thing-in-
itself is not and cannot be apprehended as i~ is, each 
species nevertheless, as is evidenced by its very existence, 
has a knowledge of reality. This epistemological position 
permits the claim that the information which reaches an 
organism reaches it from some external or internal source. 
In both cases the information is taken as having a physical 
or material referent and constitutive dimension. Because 
it emanates from something, information conveys some data 
about that from which it emanates. 
At its most basic, information consists of a flow of 
energy, whether in the form of pressure, light, sound, heat, 
electricity, radiation, chemical change, or any other form, 
which affects the organism in some way. Most generally, we 
may consider information whatever excites or irritates an 
orgamism. Excitability or irritability is a property of 
livingmatter manifest throughout the phylogenetic scale. It 
marks the beginning of the process by which organisms become 
informed about their surroundings and their own states. 
Information; beginning as emanation, may be regarded as 
undergoing a series of stages of biological translation as 
it progresse.s from excitation to sensation to perception· and 
finally to cognition. As each of these stages, the message, 
so to speak, conveyed by the information, is prepared for 
the next stage~ This process, quite obviously, requires at 
each stage an increasing amount of input from the organism 
itself. From studies of sensation and perception, it has 
been found that organisms actively constitute the·information 
they receive. They select from among the wide range of 
information available. The initial selection is simply a 
function of the type of sensing devices they have. "No 
organism," writes Hinde (1970:71), "is equipped with sense 
organs suitable for detecting all possible physical changes 
in tbe environment." From within the band of information 
they are sensitive to, organisms select further in terms of 
what Popper (1973:145-6) calls their "interpretations", 
11 prejudices"., "theories" and 11 expectations" ~ Some of these 
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are built into the sense organs and nervous systems of organ-
isms and are part of their genetic inheritance, others are 
the result of perceptual and cognitive learning (see Gibson 
1 969) ~ 
Jobn (1976:3-5) views sensations as first-order infor-
mation because all it consists of "are the s:patiotemporal 
patters of information arriving in the centr~l nervous system 
I 
because of the excitation of exteroceptive ahd introceptive 
Perceptions arc .second-order inforkation because organs". 
they "are the interpret2.tion of the meaning of sensations in 
the context of stored information about previous experiences". 
Consciousness is third-order information because it "is a 
process in which information about multiple individual 
modalities of sensation and perceptior. is combined into a 
unified, multidimensional represer~tation of the state of the 
system and its environment 2.nd is integrated with information 
about memories and the needs of the organism, generating 
emotional reactions and programs of t:ehaviour to adjust the 
organism to its environmer.t". John proc~eds to characterize 
11 subjective experience" as fourth-order information, 11 tbe 
self" as fifth-order information and "self'-awarencss" as 
sixth-order information. What is clear from his grading of 
types of information is that the organism is: active in 
forming each and that this active role and t:he organismie 
contribution increases as one proceeds fro~ iconsidering 
I 
first-order to sixth-order information. But1 though the "mix" 
does vary, the ·basic point is that information at each stage 
and order of constitution and assimilation represents a 
synthesis of what is external and what is internal, what is 
subjective and what is objective, it is a fusing of organism 
and environment (see Buckley :t967; MacKay 1961; Furth 1969; 
Polanyi 1964). This point is admirably made by Cassirer 
(1955:29) who wrote: 
It is one of the first essential insights of 
critical philosophy that objects are not 
"given" to consciousness in a rigid, finished 
state, in their nalced n as suc.bness", but that 
the relation of representation to object pre-
supposes an independent, spor .. taneous act of 
consciousness. The object does not exist 
prior to and outside of synthetic unity but 
is constituted only by this synthetic unity; 
it is no fixed form that imprints itself on 
consciousness but is the product of a for-
mative operation affected by the basic 
instrumentality of consciousness, by intu-
ition and pure thought. 
The point is also made by Piaget (1971:4). He writes, "••O 
no form of knowledge, not even perceptual knmfledge 1 con-
stitutes a simple copy of reality, because it always includes 
a process of assimilation to previous structures". 
To recap somewhat poetically, information represents the 
environment projecting itself inwards into living· organisms. 
Knowledge represents the organism projecting itself outwards 
into the environment. But these two projections, like two 
bcc..ms of light, arc always intersecting and dependent upon 
one another. Without the beam of information there could be 
no knowledge and without the beam of knowledge information 
would remain a cosmic cacophony and meaningless light show. 
As tho stock of knowledge of an organism increases, its light 
gets brighter, illuminating its world more widely. This 
allows the light of its world to enter consciousness more 
fully. 
Tho fundamental epistemic processes 
The concept "assimilation" has been used to describe the 
processes which transform information into knowledge. Having 
dealt with "information" and "lrn.m,-ledge" above as they are 
to be understood in this study, it is now time to expand on 
the meaning to 'be attached to "assimilation". 
It should already be apparent that the concept "assimi-
lation" is intended to be understood very broadly and 
generally. What is more, as tbis section will make clear, 
it is supposed to be read as lmplying tt.e associated pro-
cesses of "accommodation" and "equilibrium" since there is 
no assimilation without these. 
Because there are so many different types of knowledge 
and such a variety of processes whereby li1~e acquires knowl-
edge, it may be objected that the use of one concept (or 
three associated concepts) to describe all these processes 
is to distort and simplify them. While such an objection 
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may have merit, it seems to me that the concept "assimi-
lation" (or, more fully, the concepts "assimilation", 
"accommodation", "equilibriwn") if properly understood and 
applied can be used to describe all these processes. Its 
advantage is that it directs attention at the fundamental 
similarities and presuppositions of all knowledge and knowl-
edge processes while at the same time helping us to under-
stand what is peculiar about each type and process of knowl-
edge. Much of this dissertation is devoted to an elaboration 
of the basic thesis of genetic epistemology which holds that 
knmvledge is·the product of life and itself a life process. 
To the extent that this claim is valid, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that the concepts which can be used to describe 
biological evolution would also be of value in describing the 
evolution of knowledge. This dissertation is in part an 
exploration of this possibility. 
As a life system and as a living system, knowledge 
involves, like all biological systems, both organization. and 
adaptation. That is, at every stage of epistemic development 
there exists a structure which has content and which exists 
in some sort of relationship with its environment. The 
nature of this relationship is a dynamic one, variation 
characterizes both the organism and the environment, so that 
adaptation is an ongoing necessity. Gne way in which an· 
organism adapts is by modifying its knowledge in response to 
changes in its relatior...ship with its environment. Following 
Piaget, this ad.aptive modification of knowledge, which con-
stitutes epistemogenesis, involves three related yet dis-
tinguishable processes. These are always involved in the 
development of knowledge and may be regarded as basic to any 
account thereof. The three processes are: 
accommodation and equilibriwn. 
Assimilation 
assimilation, 
11 Assimilation" refers to the process or 13eries of pro-
cesses whereby information is transformed into knowledge and 
becomes integrated with an existing stock of knowledge. The 
concept is derived mainly from Piaget's work in which it 
features prominently. For him, assimilation denotes the 
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process whereby living entities incorporate environmental 
data into their own organization. "Assimilation is the 
incorporation of an outside element (object, event, and so 
forth) into the subject's sensorimotor or conceptual scheme" 
(Piaget 1978:6). The concept conveys the central idea that 
between the external world and an organism's representation 
of that ·v.-orld there operate certain processes which translate 
and transform the available information into an assimilable 
form. Thus, though there always pertains a correspondence 
between the external world and an organism's representation 
thereof, this representation is peculiar to the organism. 
It reflects its nature as much as it reflects the external 
environment. Knowledge is thus necessarily biologically 
relative. Assimilation implies that only that which is 
assimilable can be assimilated. What an organism comes to 
know is determined by both information available and its 
existing structures. 
Accommodation 
In assimilating anything, a living organ.ism has, of' 
necessity, to change in some fashion. As a minimal condition, 
the organism is changed by the simple fact that something 
new has been added. The term which is commonly employed to 
refer to the. changes which assimilation necessitates is · 
"accommodation". The two concepts are thus complementary, 
the one presupposes the other and to speak of one is to imply 
the ott~er. Though thus related, it is analytically necessary 
to employ the two concepts beca.use they direict attention at 
i 
different aspects of a holistic process. Whereas assimila-
i 
tion centres attention on the processes whidh operate on 
information to produce knowledge, accommodat_ion centres 
attention on the processes which operate on the existing 
structures to incorporate the new knowledge•, Thus, accomo-
dation involves the altering of existing organic structures 
to match and integrate a new input. Piaget ·(1978:7) puts it 
thus: "The entire scheme of assimilation must alter as it 
accommodates to the eiements it assimilates; that is, it 
modifies itself in relation to the particularities of events 
but does not lose its continuity nor its earlier power ot~ 
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assimilation." Assimilation refers primarily to the develop-
ment of knowledge via the acquisition of new elements. 
Accormnodation, on the other hand, refers to the development 
of knowledge as a result of the internal changes which take 
place in response to new elements being encountered or which 
lead to such encounters taking place. Though both are always 
present, specific instances of epistemoge~esis may be seen 
as primarily assimilatory while others may be primarily 
accommodatory. This statement should become clearer later. 
Equilibrium 
A basic characteristic of life is that it is precarious 
and exists always in dynamic tension with its environment. 
Life is, Piaget (19{'1:37) has written, "at the mercy of every 
possible disequilibrating factor, since it is always depen-
dent on an environment which has no fixed limits and is 
constantly :fluctuating''.. This tension between organism and 
world, between subject and object, which is reflected in the 
tension between assimilation and acconunodation, describes one 
of the me-st basic structures of the life world. The dyn;:imic 
character of this tension derives from both the nature of' the 
environment and that of life. It is a tension that seems to 
be without end though it varies in intensity. It is in the 
nature of life to strive to reduce this tension. That life 
has this capacity is without question as the whole of evol-
ution bears witness to it. 
It is this striving, this struggle to survive, which 
results in the adaptations which chronicle the development 
of life. Without this striving there would have been no 
biological evolution and no epistemogenesis. Life seems to 
be driven by an inner necessity to equilibrate what is in 
disequilibrium. And, as Piaget has shown, just as morpho-
genesis can be accounted for in terms of equilibration so too 
can epistemogenesis. Equilibration describes the tendency 
of all living entities to seek to restore balance in situ-
ations of imbalance. As regards the epistemic process, it 
refers to the seemingly inherent tendency of living organisms 
to learn about their environments in order to achieve a 
balance between what they need to know in order to survive 
' 
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and what tbey come to know. Another way of phrasing this is 
to say that organisms seek to balance assimilation with 
accommodation. "Piaget proposes," writes Lerner (1976:162), 
"that an organism's adaptation to its environment involves a 
balance, an equilibrium, between the activity of the organism 
on its environment and the activity of the environment on the 
organism." 
Piaget regards equilibrium as the fundamental factor 
accounting for epistemogenesis. It is the moving force 
behind all co€;nitive development whether at the level of the 
individual or society. Though his discussiol).s have been 
criticized, the concept "equilibration", according to Flavell 
i 
(1971:125), is perhaps the only serious candtdate there is 
I 
for a true "mechanism of development". Piaget regards the 
tendency to equilibrate as an internal necessity which corre-
sponds with disequilibrium, whether internally or externally 
induced, as its complementary necessity. There can be no 
development without disequilibrium and the capacity to 
equilibrate. Knowledge cannot come into being without coming 
into a relationship with already existing structures, i.e. 
without being equilibrated. At the same time, the existing 
structures, l::ecause they are involved in the equilibration, 
have themselves to change to accommodate what is new. 
The infant acting on objects, the perceptual 
system centring and recentring, the equili-
brium of operations in middle childhood and 
adolescence, the scientist developing a 
theory,, any kind of biological or intellec-
tual function or structure involves auto-
regulation, an equilibrating interaction 
with the environment -- Russell (197~:115) 
The tendency to. equilibrate in the facel of disequilib-
rium provides the tneed' or the 'motivation'/ for act~vity. 
I 
"Nonbalance, 11 writes Piaget (1978:13), "produces the 
driving force of development." We do not act unless we are 
momentarily in disequilibrium. We do not eat unless we are 
hungry nor do we work unless we need to do so. Similarly, 
as Piaget and Popper have both argued, there is no act of 
intelligence without a problem. KnoKledge evolves as a 
result of what Piaget (1978:13) refers to as "increasing 
reequilibration" and "without nonbalance there would not be 
increasing reequilibration". Disequilibrium opens the way 
to development since it offers a challenge to be surmounted 
and in this way can result in a higher state of equilibrium 
being achieved. "It is therefore evident that the real 
source of progress is to be sought in both the insufficiency 
responsible for the conflict and the improvement expressed 
in the equilibration" (Piaget 1978:13). 
It is one of the paradoxes of genetic epistemology that 
despite the tendency to equilibrate, living forms seldom if 
ever achieve anything more than momentary equilibrium. 
Equilibrium is a process which, in striving for closure, is 
in fact simultaneously responsible for opening new instances 
of imbalance. "By no means does an equilibrium constitute a 
stopping point, since any finished structure can always give 
rise to new requirements in fresh substructures or to inte-
grations in greater structureso The fact that states of 
equilibrium are always exceeded is the result •o• of a very 
positive :force. Any knowledge raises new problems as it 
solves preceding ones" (Piaget 1978!JO). For Piaget, the 
structures which lead to a particular equilibrium continue 
to :function beyond such a point and the result o:f such an 
equilibrium, even if it is more or less durable, has the 
potential to spawn further development. Paradoxically, an 
equilibrated structure can itself be respons;ible for dis.:... 
equilibrium and thus for change. Piaget feels that to regard 
equilibration as a mere step to equilibrium is misleading 
because equilibration continues beyond partipular equili-
briums and "it is constantly attempting to abhieve better 
equilibrium" (Piaget 1978:30). The reason why equilibration 
produces both equilibrium and disequilibrium' is that it 
involves an intrinsic necessity to construct, to continue 
functior.ing. Equilibration thus leads through momentary or 
simple equilibrations to what Piaget (1978:31) calls 
"increasing equilibrations". In our cognitive development, 
for example, and as is discussed in detail later, we achieve 
many equilibrations through the balancing of assimilation 
with accommodation. But our cognitive development does not 
stop with any of these. All such cquilibrations are an 
essential ingredient in future imbalances and they are part 
of' the resources we employ in achieving :f'urther equili-
brations. Science, for example, begins with problems and 
ends with problems (Popper 1977). This paradoxical nature 
of biological and epistemic equilibration is sufficient to 
distance the present usage of this term from those concep-
tions which have been attacked as promoting a static or 
conservative view of reality. 
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As the above indicates, assimilation, accommodation and 
equilibration are concepts which describe the dialectical 
nature of the relationship between information and knowledge 
and between the organism and environment. It is thus not 
surprising that these cor.cepts are similar to those employed 
by other dialecticians. To describe the moments or processes 
of development, Baldwin referred to "integration" and "dif-
ferentiation". Popper speaks of conjectures and refutation 
and trial and error. Other writers have spoken of "imitation" 
and "invention" while Hegel's wellknown trinity: thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis, stands as a parallel conception to 
that of Piaget. For Hegel, as for Piaget, all epistcmo-
genesis proceeds dialectically. An important feature of 
Hegel's theory of knowledge, as Russell (1978:34) points out, 
is the way in which every item of knowledge is treated as a 
stage in a process. All knowledge is seen as standing in a 
relationship to ·Khat precedes it and what succeeds it. 
Knowledge is hence unavoidably potentially progressive and 
always relative. The Piagetian argument that equilibration 
is most accurat·ely viewed as "progressive" or "increasing" 
is supported by writers such as Baldwin and Parsons, who 
spoke of "moving equilibrium", and Spencer, who referred to 
"open systems of fluent equilibrium" (see Russell.1978:41). 
Lorenz (1977:199) also views knowledge as developing dialec-
tically and requiring continuing equilibration. He writes, 
"As bone cannot grow without the dismantling of bone struc-
ture so human knowledge cannot advance unless what has 
already been adapted and is already known gives way step 
by step to be replaced by new and higher knowledge." 
The c.oncept s "assimilation" , "accorrunoda ti on" and 
"equilibration" do not refer to single or simple processes. 
All three are blanket terms for a variety of processes many 
0£ which are extremely complex and continuous. The full 
extent of these processes and their mode of operation and 
complexity will become clearer when specific examples and 
types are discussed later. The numerous processes which are· 
embraced by these three related concepts may lead to the ob-
jection that their ambit has been stretched too far. But 
such an objection would be resting on a category mistake for 
while, as will be shown, there are many separate epistemic 
processes these can be conveniently swnmarized under the 
above concepts. And, what is more, such a swnmarization 
helps to emphasize a basic thesis of genetic epistemology 
which holds that all knowledge is the outgrowth of biological 
processes and reflect these. Knowledge, it is submitted, may 
be seen as the result of the assimilations, accommodations 
and equilibrations that have taken place in three contexts. 
These are: the context of the species, the individual 
organism, and the interacting organisms. Thus, knowledge is 
seen as being phylogenetically, ontogenetically and socio-
genetically acquired and developed. · To mark the major cate-
gories of knowledge produced I shall speak of irmate knowl-
edge, learnt knowledge and social knowledge. The major task 
of this study is to deal with innate knowledge and to show 
how it relates to learnt knowledge and social knowledge. 
The human stock of knowledge -- a synopsis 
As it is not possible to discuss all aspects of the 
human stock of ·knowledge in a work such as this, it is useful 
to present a synopsis of some of the major topics which such 
a discussion might include. This synopsis can serve the 
purpose of indicating how certain biological and psychologi-
cal ideas and findings can be of relevance to the sociology 
of knowledge. Also, it can demonstrate to some extent the 
usefulness of defining knowledge and knowledge processes in 
the way they have been in the foregoing pages. 
The phrase "stock of knowledge" is largely inspired by 
the work of Schutz (1974) though it is often encountered less 
formally used in epistemological discussions. The full 
meaning and aptness of this phrase is easily appreciated 
when it is realized that it is an English rendering of the 
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German word WISSENVORRAT extensively employed by Schutz and 
that the word VORRAT is philologically related to both the 
idea of "storehouse" and 11 provisions''. Certain of Schutz 1 s 
applications of the phrase "stock of knowleC.ge 11 come close 
to what Piaget means by "action scheme" or w.l;l.at was earlier 
referred to as life's "organizing force", "structuring 
I 
mechanism", "behavioural programme", etc. I have selected 
to use the Schutzian concept because it fits more smoothly 
and consistently into the overall conceptual framework being 
developedo In other instances, as has already been indicated, 
Piagetian phraseology is preferred and emploted. 
Very broadly and generally conceived,-ak the concept is 
I 
I 
used here, the stock of knowledge of any living entity is 
I 
the totality of the things which it knmrn • It is the sum of 
I 
I 
all the information assimilated by that entity and at its 
disposal. The particular entity in question! allows us to 
qualify the concept and in this way restrict/its coverage. 
Thus, for example, we may speak of the universal stock of 
knowledge, implying by this the totality of the knowledge 
I 
possessed by living forms. This stock of kn~nvledge may in 
turn be viewed as comprised of the particulap stocks of the 
various individual species, and, within these, of the indi-
vidual members of each species. The whole can be understood 
by dealing w.i th these more manageable units. 
At the level of analysis of individual species, we may 
speak of the stock of knowledge peculiar to each species and 
label these 2.ccordingly. Thus, for example, we may refer to 
the canine stock of knowledge or the bovine stock of knowl-
edge, meaning by this the knowledge possessed by dogs and 
cattle. While the main concern of·this study is the human 
stock of knowledge, it will be necessary from time to time to 
make references to animal and, even, insect stocks of knowl-
edge in order to understand certain aspects .of the human 
stock of knowledge and its operation. 
The human stock oi' knowledge consists of. the totality 
of assimilated information possessed by currently living 
humans. By this I imply more than what is i;ncorporatcd under 
Schutzts notion of the social stock of knowledgeo The human 
stock of knowledge is much richer, variated and complex. 
' 
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than, for example, Durkheim's idea of the "collective con-
sciousness". The sociological concept "culture" includes 
some but not all the areas spanned by the concept "human 
stock of knowledge". The human stock.of knowledge, as the 
phrase is used here 1 includes both the "knowledge that" and 
the "knowledge how" as distinguished in philosophy. It 
includes whatever intelligence of the human ~pecies informs 
either its emotions, its sensations, its perpeptions, its 
thoughts or its behaviour. It includes the ~eep and distant 
epistemological regions mapped out by such investigators as 
I 
Jung and Freud as well as the various epistemic levels 
described by Piaget and Lorenz. It encompasses the multiple 
:forms of knowledge described by Schutz, Gurvitz, and Scheler. 
It includes all that some writers classify as skill, ability, 
habit, belief, ideology, truth, etc. In short, it incor-
porates all the varieties and types of knowledge at the 
disposal of mankind. 
Just as each specieE· may be considered to have a stock 
of knowledge, so too may each individual member of a species 
be considered to have its own particular stock of knowledge. 
In the case of the individual organism we shall speak simply 
of the " individual stock of knowledg·e" to refer to the swn 
of knowledge at its disposal. At their particular levels of 
analysis, both the species and the individual stocks of 
knowledge are comprised of a variety of dist~nguishable forms 
and types of knowledge. This variety is legior.., and the 
knowledge which humans possess constitutes the most vari-
egated and complex stock of knowledge known to exist. Con-
fronted by the richness and complexity of .the things which 
pass for knowledge in terms of the d.efinition adopted it is 
obvious that if this to.tali ty is not ordered and labeled in 
some fashion a sensible discussion cannot proceed. A tax-
onomy of the varieties of knowledge is consenuently essential. 
However, it should be remembered, the stock of knowledge can 
be divided and categorized in numerous, and e.ssentially 
arbitrary, ways. The value cf any taxonomy should be judged 
in terms of its efficacy in promoting understanding, 
initiating research, and facilitating discussion. 
As was indicated earlier, the basic question with which 
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genetic epistemology concerns itself' is, "How does knowledge 
come about?" (Furth 1969:255). This question and the answers 
it entails provides one way of categorizing, organizing and 
analyzing the universal stock of' knowledge. In answer to 
this question, 'it may be said that all knowledge, it seems, 
as f'ar as is presently known to science, arises from life in 
interaction with itself and its environment, or, as it may 
be abbreviated, the life predicament. Through this inter-
action process and the assimilation, adaptation, and evol-
ution it implies, various forms and types of knowledge have 
come into beingo The biological sciences, comparative 
psychology, genetic epistemology, and ethology have provided 
descriptions and taxonomies of many of' these forms and types 
of knowledge. These sciences reveal that not only do the 
higher forms of life share many of the biological processes 
and structures with more rudimentary life forms but they 
also share many varieties of k.1101,-led.ge with them. In the 
liGht of this diecoyery Piaget (1971:80~ has argued that it 
is "impossible to study human reasoning pm1er c.s tbough it 
were a ,\·atertight co1:1partment, quite separate from the 
evolutionary process o:f the other orders". It is :for this 
rAason tb.at Piaget is primarily concerned with the problem 
of cpistemog;ene sis, and initiated tl:.e approe.ch he calls 
genetic epistemologyo 
In his seminal work "Biology and Know·ledge 1~, Piaget 
(1971) is concerned with tracing the parallels between t~e 
evolution of life and the evoJ_ution of k.n.m·;ledge and reason. 
He attempts to demonstr&.te the essential unity of life and 
knowledge in order to corroborate the nee-evolutionist 
epistemological thesis which he proposes. Fiaget (1971:80) 
is of' the opinion that the fact that man shares certain 
varieties of knowledge with other rorms of Li.fe, "serves to 
corroborate the evolutionist interpretation11 • The isomorph-
isms bet,.;·een epistemogenesis and morphogenesif' provide 
further corroborz,tion. Piaget is one 2 .. mong a series of' 
scholars to view the processes of knowledge acquisition as 
being, at their root, analogous to the natural selection 
pro cc sse s advanced by tb.eorie s of' evoJ_ution. As a re pre sen-
tati ve of this type of reasoning, Campbell (1969:6) puts the 
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kernel of the argument ·well by stating, "Learning, percep-
tion, and other increases in knowledge 2•.t the individual 
level, and increases in the accuracy and scope of scientific 
knowledge, are part processes of the more general case of 
increases in.the adaptive fit of organisms to environment • 
••• Knowing and science are continuations of organic and 
social evolution and share their basic epistemology." 
The sources of knowledge 
Inquiries into the 1\ays in which tl:e things wl'lich are 
I 
known came to be k.noKn have generally led investigators to ·-'f. 




Lorenz (1969; 1977), for one, was led 
by his investigations to this dichotomy. 
there are only two sources of knowledge, 
He emphasized that 
the genetic struc-r--- ______ ,,._.,.__..,_=er----- ~-r-·r· -- . -· 
ture of the org·anism and the interacti_o.n bebveen organi.sm 
r----- - --~_,_--= ---·. -"- - - .. -- ·~ . - -
and environment. Thorpe (1963) also operates with this 
~·---~ .. · ·-
dichotomy and suggests tt.at it should be possible to dcter-
mir..e quantitatively the a.mount of phylogenetically and onto-
genetically acquired behaviour possessed by any individual 
species member. Pringle (1951) has stressed that the 
charc:..cteristics of any organism (and this includes k.nm,·ledge) 
come from only two sources: the zygote and the environncnt 
of the developing individual. (See, also, Rignano 1926.) 
The knowledge which is ontogenetically acquired, that 
is, '\\'bich an individual organism acquires as a result of its 
own experier..ces in the course of its lifetime, is designated 
"learnt knowledge" for the purpo:oes of this study. Just as 
individual organisms to a greater or lesser extent acquire 
knowledge in the course of their lifetimes through inter-
action with the enviro:rnnent, so too entire species may be 
considered as ongoingly acquiring knmv'ledge as a result of 
their interactions with the environment. This is what is 
meant when it is claimed that knowledge is phylogenetically 
acquired. According to Furth (1969) and Piaget (1971), the 
knowledge which is phylogenetically acquired and 1vhich may 
be viewed as evolutionary learning or learning by the genome, 
is as true a learning process as is ontogenetic learning. 
Because phylogenetic learning is learning by the genome, the 
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source of all inherited knowledge, it follows that such 
knowledge is genetically transmittable. For this reason 
this type of knowledge has been called "innate knowledge" by 
such writers as Piaget (1971), Bleibtreu (1976), Lorenz 
(1969, 1977) and Popper (1977). The term "innate knowledge" 
is adopted in this study to describe the knowledge possessed 
by a species which is genetically transmitted and which is 
the result of phylogenetic assimilatory, accommodatory and 
equilibratory epistemic processes. Put differer..tly, innate 
knowledge, in contrast to learnt knowledge, is the knowledge 
~hared by species members because it has been genetically 
inherited and is not the product of self discovery or 
learning. The totality of the phylogenetically assimilated 
information of a species or an organism constitutes, what is 
here referred to as, the "innate stock of knowledge" of that 
species or organism. At the level of the individual organ-
ism, the innate stock of knowledge forms the foundation and 
core of the individual stock of knmvlcdge. If an organism 
is to be capable of learning it seems axiomatic that an 
innate stock of knowledge and a range of information must be 
asswned. The sum of information 1..rhich is ontogenetically 
assimilated constitutes what is here called the "learnt 
stock of knowledge". 
Social knowledge 
Though the dichotomy "innate knowledge"/"learnt knowl-
edge" includes ·all varieties of knowledge and subsumes all 
processes of knowledge acquisition, there is a third major 
category which can be added to these, though its taxonomic 
position would not be the same. This third major·category 
is necessary because of the fact that there are so many 
social species. That is, many, if not most, organisms 
acquire some knowledge from their own kind as a result of 
social interaction (see, for example, Von Frisch 1967; 
Lindauer 1971; Wilson 1968; Etkin 1964; Barash 1977). The 
amount of knowledge so acquired obviously varies from the 
less social to the truly social species and according to 
their capacity for learning. The social· process of knowledge 
acquisition and communication is sufficiently distinct, it 
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seems to me, to warrant a separate category. 
The third process whereby.knowledge may be acquired may 
be referred to as the "sociogenetic process". This refers 
to the means whereby a social entity (organism, collectivity'V' 
group, society, etc.) transmits information and whereby I" 
individual members of a social entity acquire knowledge from 
sucb socially transmitted information. The knowledge which 
results from this process is here referred to simply as 
"social knowledge". Social knowledge is the result of the 
assimilation of information originating in the behaviour and 
co:rmnunications of conspecific s. Items of social knowledge 
are to a greater or lesser extent shares and shareable by the 
members of a social entity and its members acquire such 
knowledge as the result of informational exchanges with con-
temporaries and predecessors. When such items cease to be 
socially transmitted, they cease to be part of the social 
stock of knowledge but may exist as bits of archaeological 
information waiting to be rediscovered and reintroduced into 
the living stock of knowledge. Quite understandably this 
epistemic category has a central place in any treatment 0£ 
the human stock of knowledge, especially as this is dealt 
with in the sociology of knowledge. As defined, this cate-
gory does not imply a contradiction of the generalization 
that all kno~wledge.is, in the last analysis,' ontogenetically 
or phylogenetically acquired. Quite obviously, social 
k.no'''ledge is subsumable under the category "learnt knowledge". 
The study ·Of social communication in animals indicates 
that such communications are strongly genetibally determined. 
I 
Whereas, for example, ants use a chemical sy:stem, humans use 
primarily a vocal one. The systems have an obvious relation-
ship to different genetic dispositions and f~atures. Hany 
species have evolved elaborate mating ritual.s requiring the 
social exchange of detailed information. The dependence of 
sexual reproduction on the exchange of social information, 
and hence the acquisition of social kn.mvledge., illustrates 
the paradoxical and dialectical nature of the relationship 
between the genetic and the social component of knowledge. 
Not only does social communication presuppose genes, but 
genes presuppose social communication for their reproduction. 
BJ 
It seems therefore inescapable that the deepest structures 
of sociality are somehow articulated with genetically trans-
mitted schemas. 
The conununicating and interpreting schemas of the 
various species differ greatly in terms of a number of 
features. In an influential article, Thorpe· (1972) has com-
pared the communication system of animals and humans in terms 
of certain "design features" first developed. by Hockett 
(1960)'. An analysis of these provides insight into the 
features which the human communication system shares 1..rith 
those of other species and those which are more or less 
unique. Among the widely shared features are: the use of 
the vocal-auditory channel; broadcast transmission and 
directional reception; rapid fading; interchangeability; 
specialization; complete feedback; semantici ty; and 
arbitrariness. The features more or less unique to l:.uman 
communication include discreteness (implying that the reper-
toire is discrete, not continuous; and that the possible 
messages in any language constitute a discrete rather than a 
continuous one), displacement (implying that signals can 
refer to things remote in time and space) , op.enne s s (implying 
that messages are coined freely and easily and, in cor..text, 
can be immediately understood), tradition (i~plying that 
i 
messages can be passed on by teaching and le~rning from one 
group or generation to another), duality of patterning 
I 
(implying that though the signal elements tt~mselves may be 
I 
meaningless, patterned combinations of them ~re meaningful), 
I 
prevarication (implying the ability to transkit untrue, mis-
leading or nonsensical messages with deliberkte intent), 
reflectiveness (implying the ability of the bommunicator to 
reflect on and formulate messages about the bommunication 
system itself), and, finally, learnability (.implying that the 
speaker of one language can learn another laµguage). 
In terms of design features such as the: above, the com-
munication schemas of the various species may. be descr~bed. 
Such descriptions reveal the unique as well fl.s shared design 
feat~pr<::s of many such schemas. T~n communi9a.:l;_i..Q.n 
s~a is revea~a.s- wlique in. 6l specioJ .S~e; it make'.3 -# 
~~a-.rre-w-$.j.nq_g_f_J-_-i.f~-at:1,El-£0-rm-e1'~so.c.iaL-kn-ow-J:edge ( see 
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Lorenz 1977:171-172). All the evidence available about what 
the various species know and can come to kno1v suggests that 
I 
there is a qualitative difference between humans and all 
other living forms. This qualitative difference is the 
capacity to produce, transmit, acquire and store social 
knowledge in a way not found in other creatures. This way 
is the way of language and conceptual-thought. 
What is it in humans that makes language possible? The 
full answer to this question is still being sought. In his 
discussion of the roots of conceptual thought, Lorenz (1977) 
provides a partial answer. He describes seven cognitive 
functions which, though all found in animals,, are combined 
in humans in such a way that radically new cof;nitive 
capacities have arisen. The seven functions! are: abstract-
ing; insight and the cognitive representation of space; 
: 
insight and learning; voluntary movements; curiosity and 
self-exploration; imitation; and, tradition (Lorenz 1977: 
113). As is noted below, the work of Lenneberg, Chomsky, 
Bo'wer, Lorenz and others supports the conviction that hwnans 
have language because they have an innate aptitude for it 
which other animals seem to lack. This aptitude can be seen 
as shaping language and the knowledge this leads to. 
Cultural k'no-wledge 
The inborn aptitude which humans have f?r language makes 
' available to them forms of knowledge and modes of communica-
tion unavailabl·e to the other animals. To mark this dis-
tinction we may say that whereas many species (humankind 
included) acquire social knowledge, only humans to any sig-
nificant degree acquire cultural knowledge. Cultural knowl-
edge is a particularly human form of social knowledge even 
though it has obvious ties with forms of social knowledge 
found in animals. Among the characteristics of cultural 
knowledge are the following: it is learnt; it is acquired 
from others; its range of sharedness varies: from a few 
persons to all persons; it is generally symbolically trans-
. i 
mitted; it is expressed in and intenvoven with. the material 
aspects of society; it _is often objecti vateU and available 
in some last~ng material form; it is interp~eted and 
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assimilated in terms of schemas that are themselves cul-
turally developed; it is forever changiµg and immensely 
changeable; and it is generally consciously produced, 
transmitted and acquired. 
As here understood, cultural knowledge comes close in 
meaning to that classical definition of culture provided by 
EB Tylor in 1871, "Culture is that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society" (quoted in Gould and Kolb 1964:166). Because 
cultural knowledge is here defined in terms of its mode of 
production, acquisition and transmission and has nothing to 
do with questions of truth or falsity or the nature of the 
objects known, the list of things which are included as cul-
tural knowledge is extremely inclusive. It includes, for 
example, attitudes, ideas, interpretations, explanations, 
accounts, descriptions, assumptions, theories, beliefs, 
axioms, truisms, dogmas, sentiments, traditions, faiths, 
creeds, myths, theologies, doctrines, taboos, legends, 
superstitions, lies, truths, fictions, jokes, fairy talcs, 
facts, proverbs, languages, values, norms, ideals, goals, 
skills, abilities, techniques, etc. etc. 
Cultural knowledge is not only a particular kind of 
knowledge, developed and acquired in a particular way as 
described here. It is also, obviously, the knowledge which 
expresses itself as "culture" in the full sense with which 
this term is employed in sociology and anthropology. 
Adopting the perspective of genetic epistemology, as is done 
here, does, however, place this work among the iidealisti 
approaches to culture. According to Bidney (1970:174), 
cultural idealists are "impressed with the role of linguistic 
symbols in the communication and acquisition of knowledge and 
experience", and have as a consequence viewed culture "as the 
aggregate and historical continuity of communicated ideas or 
meanings exemplified in artifacts, institutions, and the 
behaviour of persons". 
The "idealistic"· approach to culture and society is well 
established in sociology and anthropology and complements 
the epistemic approach to biology and psychology adopted in 
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this study. According to Martindale (1964:346) the Tardean 
and Giddings branches of sociology, "stated that the ultimate 
subject matter of sociology consisted of ide'iis and beliefs". 
I 
James and Cooley also regarded society as largely an epis-
. I 
temic phenomenon, a relation between individ~al stocks of 
knowledge. Cooley put the matter thus, 
••• the imaginations people have of one 
another are the solid facts of society ••• 
Society exists in my mind as the contact 
and reciprocal influence of certain ideas 
named "I", Thomas, Henry, Susan, Bridget, 
and so on. It exists in your mind as a 
similar group, and so in every mind. 
(Cooley 1902:84; quoted in Martindale 1964:344 and 347). 
Kroeber, the cultural anthropologist, may also be regarded 
as someone who saw society and social evolution in terms of 
shared cultural knowledge and the transmission of cultural 
knowledge. He wrote: 
All civilization in a sense exists only in 
the mind. Gudpowder, textiles, arts, 
machinery, laws, telephones are not them-
selves transmitted from man to man nor 
from generation to generation, at least 
not permanently. It is the perception, 
the knowledge and understanding of them, 
their ideas in the Platonic sense, t~at 
are passed along. Everything social•can 
have existence only through mentality. 
(Kroeber 1917:186; quoted in Bidney 1970:37). 
The systems approach in sociology is also, fundamentally, 
an 11 idealistic 11 or "epistemic" approach as is the semantic 
approach. These are illustrated by Buckley (1967:43), who 
regards the relations of parts of society as "primarily 
psychic, involving complex communicative processes of infor-
mation exchange", and Zijderveld (1974:39), who regards 
society as a "compilation of meaningful configurations"o In 
recent years, it is the phenomenological branch of sociology 
and the sociology of knowledge as well as its offshoot, 
ethnomethodology, which most fully represents the idealistic 
approach to the analysis of social phenomena.. Some indi-
cation of the idealism of phenomenological sociology and 
ethnomethodology is provided by their central concepts. 
Concepts such as externalization, objectivation, socializa-
tion, internalization, roles, meanings, typifications, 
routines, rituals, legitimations, interpretive procedures, 
glosses, life-world, stock of knowledge, etc. (See, for 
example, Berger and Luckmann 1967; Schutz 1974; Cicourel 
1973; Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1959, 1971). 
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In the sociology of knowledge, which is concerned pri-
marily with ideas, the approach is obviously
1 
"idealistic" 
though the various representatives of this d~scipline range 
I 
(philosophically speaking) from extreme materialists, who 
. ! • 
see ideas as epi-phenomena, to extreme idealists, who see 
ideas as the prime determinants of reality. ·For reasons 
already expressed, genetic epistemology regards social and 
cultural knowledge as a part, and an expression, of matter 
while at the same time living matter and organized matter is 
ta.ken to be an expression of l:G.Towledge. In short, the kind 
of theory of knowledge being developed here is neither. 
materialist nor idealist, as already stated. Even the word 
dialectical, conveying as it does the notion, of an exchange 
between two poles or objects misses the mark~ Though matter 
and knowledge are at times opposed, they arel just as often 
inseparable. It is thus futile to rigidly oppose· mind and 
matter. Culture is not simply material and cultural knowl-
edge is not immaculately conceived. 
The "idealistic" or "epistemic" conception of culture 
adopted in this study implies a distinction between culture 
as artifact and 'culture as the knowledge embodied in arti-
fact. Conventional sociology of knowledge concerns itself 
with some culture as knowledge but not with all. It is this 
that limits its scope. By regarding all cultural contents 
as knowledge, the sociology of' knowledge would encompass, in 
addition to its present concerns, the "social phantasms and 
superstition and socially conditioned errorsl and forms of 
i 
deception" referred to by Scheler (1980:75).: It would 
furthermore begin to reverse the process of the "denial of 
the body" by thus also encompassing those forms of cultural 
knowledge which express themselves primarily in movement, in 
physical skills, in labour, and in technique, as well as in 
feelings and emotions. 
Rather th.an being, as it is, a small and separate 
specialization, the socioJ.ogy of knowledge by seeing all 
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culture as knowledge would expand to include the epistemic 
aspects of such other sociological specializations as the 
sociologies of art, education, culture and religiono This 
expansion together with the sociology of knowledge's obvious 
links with psychology and biology paves the way towards a 
comprehensive epistemic science devoted to the exploration 
of the entire epistemic. order. From this could come the 
sort of interdisciplinary theorizing and cooperation which 
may yield a better understanding of the human stock of 
knowledge. 
As designating major varieties of knowledge, innate 
knowledge, learnt knowledge, social knowledge and cultural 
knowledge must be treated as "ideal types". No one variety 
is ever present in pure form in reality. There is no way 
that they could be since organism and the physical and 
social environment form an inseparable unity. Social, 
cultural and individual learning presupposes an organism 
capable of learning. It thus presupposes at least some 
innate knowledge. Conversely, innate knowledge structures 
.....___... ----- -- - - -- ---· -
depen~ for their existence, operation and development on 
,. experiential~ and environmental factors. The articulation of 
these various types and processes of knowledge with each 





There is more reason in your I body, than 
in your best ·wisdom. 
Nietzcbe (1968:146) 
The concern of this chapter is to discuss tbat variety 
of knowledge which organisms possess by virtue of their 
genetic inheritance. Genetically inherited knowledge, like 
ontogenetically acquired b1owledge, is insephrable from the 
organism itself. Tbe org·anism is a representation of what 
-----------· ·-
it knows. KnoKledge, physical form and behc:.viour are all 
attributes of living things and to speak of one is to imply 
the others. Thus, while it can be said tt~at innate knowl-
edge is transmitted from parents to offspring in the same 
way as anatomical features, we must not make: the mistake of 
thinking ttat knowledge and anatomical features are mutually 
I • 
exclt:.sive things. The genetic transmission hf knowledge 
implies the genetic transmission of anatomical form and 
behaviour characteristics. To describe life in terms of 
knmvledge is to refer to much that is shared by anatomic and 
behavioural descriptions. Life is synthesis and unity. 
Knowledge and organism originate in the same .instance. 
The knowledge of an organism, which is, in a: manner of speak-
ing, the organism itself, originates in the brocess of 
conception. The information conveyed by sperm and ovum fuse 
by mutual and simultaneous assimilation to form an embryonic 
organism with its corresponding embryonic stock of knm,~ledge. 
Though conception takes place in a physical environmer..t, 
it seems from the study of conception that the information 
exchange which takes place between sperm.and ovum is so 
massive in comparison with the little if.any information 
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exchanged between sperm and ovum and enviror~ent that we 
can legitimately regard such information as basically 
genetically transmitted and assimilated. Furthermore, 
because the transmission of' information f'rom parents to of'f'-
spring during conception is the very process which con-
stitutes a creature capable of' experience we may regard the 
conceptually transmitted information as ontogenetically A 
PRIORI knowledge. {This is not strictly correct because 
both sperm and ovum are living cells and themselves capable 
of' experience 'Khicb can rnodif'y the information they transmit. 
The dif'f'iculty and, to some extent, artificiality of' 
separating inheritance and experience is recognized but the 
fact remains that both are also, to some extent, real and 
have to be taken into account.) It is f'or these, and other, 
fundamental reasons that I consider it necessary and justi-
f'iable to establish and use the te:rm.s 11 innate knowledge" and 
"learnt knowledge". 
Innatism def'ended 
The considerable opposition to biological arguments and 
theories characteristic of' much social science during the 
past f'if'ty years has had the eff'ect of making the word 
"innate" a dirty word. A word which, like other emotionally 
charged words, has the effect of' inducing various forms of' 
psychological disturbance in both user and opponent. This 
emotional halo is obviously not conducive to an objective 
study of the phenomena which the word labels. 
In 1976 Lerner wrote that the nature/nurture controversy 
was still very much alive whereas in 1978 Barash (p 24) wrote 
that, "The old nature/nurture controversy has' effectively 
been buried." Who is correct-'? Probably both, it is all a 
matter of' the constituencies which they were representing. 
My m\-n experience and reading suggests that for society as a 
whole, or even for f::ocial scientists as a group, the con-
troversy is still alive and well. There may be no point in 
flogging dead horses as Koestler (1970:391) kindly tells us. 
But even a brief' encounter with the social sciences is 
sufficient to inform one that there are no dead horsesi In 
what follows I wish to defend a certain version of' innatism 
and in this way clarify further what is meant by "innate 
knowledge" in this study. 
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Innatist ideas, like biological argwnents in general, 
have been consistently attacked during the past half' century 
because they can be used, and have been used, to support 
racist; fascist or sexist ideologies and actions. In 
addition, such ideas are often considered to be reductionist; 
detracting attention away from the grandeur and irreducible 
nature of' humankind and culture by reducing humans to a 
chemical equation, a double helix or an ape or some other 
demeaning entity. The recent emergence of' sociobiology and 
its widespread condemnation is handy proof' that the nature 
of human nature is still very much a living issue (see, for 
example, Caplan 1978). This is no doubt partly due to tbe 
scientific fact that so many important questions regarding 
hwnan nature still remain to be satisf'actorily'answered. 
Equally importantly, ideas regarding the nature of' human 
nature form a crucial element of all ideological systems and 
hence it is naive to expect a single model of' human nature 
to be universally adopted even if' science were to produce 
such a model. In brief', it cannot be denied that ideological 
considerations infect innatist theories and criticisms of 
such theories. Accepting such an admission should serve to 
make us all ~ore cautious in proposing innatist arguments and 
in dismissing them. 
Since conjecture and refutation are the essence of the 
scientific enterprise, it is not surprising that criticisms 
of' innatism have been instrumental in the development of more 
satisfactory innatist theories and that the past ten years 
have witnessed a gro\ving acceptance of some of' these by the 
scientific community. Had the fundamental idea of innatism 
been worthless or erroneous it is unlikely that it would have 
survived its baptism by criticism. That it has survived 
suggests not only that it is a useful idea but also that it 
bas empirical and theoretical support. 
Space does not permit a full cataloguing of all the 
objections that have been raised against innatist ideas. 
'l 
Hebb (1958), Lehrman (1953), Beach (1955), Taylor (1958), 
Drever (1961), Tinbergen (1963), Putnam (1967), Hinde (1968), 
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Lerner (1976) are a few among a host of' writers who nave 
criticized innatist ideas. A common criticism of' innatism 
is the argument that it is not possible for some forms of' 
mind to be acquired and others to be innate (see Taylor 
1958). This criticism makes the mistake of' overlooking the 
fact that the innate aspects of' mind are also acquired, only 
they are not acquired in the same way as those aspects 
acquired ontogenetically. To explain mind means to account 
for both acquisitions and the articulation of' the phylo-
genetically acquired forms with those that are ontogeneti-
.cally acquired. The above objection also seems to involve a 
category mistake since it is a logical error to expect that 
the acquisition of' the innate aspects of' mind could be 
accounted for in the same discourse as would suit an account 
of' its learnt aspects. 
From the kind of' mistaken logic just referred to flows 
a related objection that holds that by employing concepts 
such as "innate", "instinctive'' or "genetically given", an 
investigator is taking the easy way out of solving a crucial 
theoretical and empirical question. In the context of learn-
ing, Putnam (1967:2) puts such an objection tbus: "Invoking 
'innateness' only postpones the problem of' learning, it does 
not solve it." One response to this is that far from being 
the easy way out or postponing the problem, references to 
what is innate can be seen as an honest attempt to deal with 
the full complexity of' learning and of' human nature. That an 
hohest scholar does then not proceed to elaborate on the 
innate black box could just as readily be ascribed to a 
reluctance to enter a different universe of discourse. But, 
by noting the conr..ection between, say, learning and what is 
innate, such a scholar prepares the way for the integration 
of his or her own ideas with those of' scholars who have taken 
upon themselves the task of investigating the genetically 
derived aspects of' human nature. The task of unravelling 
humankind ts genetic inheritance is anything b.ut an easy task. 
The efforts and failures of molecular biologists, genetic-
ists, ethologists, sociobiologists, generative 1-inguists and 
others attest to this fact~ In reply to the above criticism, 
one might just as easily say that recourse to experience or 
learning or environment is the easy way out because these 
things quite literally stare us in the face. 
Lerner (1976:101) is among the writers {vho advocates 
i 
that in studying behavioural development the; term 11 innate" 
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should be· avoided because, as he states, "Such terms end 
scientifi.c investigations by simply saying that behaviour 
develops in a certain way because tl:.e organism is built that 
way." Lerner advocates this despite admitting that the 
dichotomies nature/nurture, innate/learned are useful, des-
pite accepting Piaget's use of the concept "innate schema" 
and despite himself writing (p 104), "All species of animals 
have processes available that are adaptive; i that is every 
living species, by virtue of its existence, has processes 
that allow it to adapt to its environment." ! since, as is 
indicated below, Lerner's basic position is similar to that 
adopted in this study, it is hard to understand why he is so 
strongly opposed to the concept "innate". Lorenz's use of 
innatism in particular is attacked. In this attack the 
travesty of so much scholastic criticism is clearly in evi-
dence. What Lerner attacks is a caricature of Lorenz's 
thought. Obviously such a caricature cannot offer sound 
reasons for rejecting innatism. 
In his attack on Lorenz, Lerner overlo~ks a basic fact 
of all scientific writing. Some things have1 to be left 
unsaid. One page 100 of his book Lerner attributes to Lorenz 
the view that certain properties appear in an organism 
"directly from ·the genotype, with experience having no in-
fluence". Does Lerner believe that a scholar of Lorenz's 
stature could seriously hold such a view? The use of the 
term 'phenotype' by Lorenz underlines his awareness of the 
unity between organism and environment and between experience 
and gene. It seems to me that Lorenz, like ;others, takes 
the 11 wmvelt" for granted. Lerner wishes to !remind us of it. 
Lorenz points to properties which develop a~ a matter of 
course in the phenotype, given that it exists. in an environ-
ment roughly similar to that in which the genes evolved. 
Lerner tells us that ontogenesis always involves interaction 
between organism and environment. The one is referring to 
phylogenetic experience Fassed on genetically, the other is 
referring to ontogenetic experience. To admit the former is 
not to deny the latter but to accept the latter without 
accepting the former is to propose an organismless organism. 
Lerner maintains that there is simply no isomorphism 
between genotype and eventual behaviouro HO\\' can this be 
taken seriously? A great deal of ethology and animal psycho-
logy -- which does the obvious thing of assuming a natural 
habitat -- demonstrates that in a given environment, clear 
isomorphisms do exist between genotype and behaviour for many 
species. How in fact can one infer anything about the geno-
type -- which is an abstraction -- except from its phenotypic 
expressions which imply environment and experience? 
Nowhere in Lorenz's writing have I come across the 
assertion that "genes can directly give you behaviour" (Ler-
ner 1976:101) and nowhere have I found Lorenz to be so dog-
matic as to argue that certain behaviour is "unavailable to 
environmental influence" or that "an organism must develop 
certain behaviours because it inherited a certain genotype" 
(Lerner 1976:101; Lehrman 1970:J). As a qualified medical 
doctor Lorenz must at least have been aware of the radical 
effects environment and experience can have on behaviour, 
especially when these lie behind mutation, physical injury 
or poisoning, to cite a most obvious point somehow overlooked 
by Lehrman and Lerner. It is only by understanding Lorenz•s 
use of certain terms in the way he intended them to be under-
stood that proper sense can be made of his work. In reply 
to criticisms J:evelled at his employment of the term "innate", 
Lorenz has stated, "Contrary to Hume, we believe, just as 
Kant did, that a •purev science of innate forms of human 
thought independent of all experience is possible~" Were 
one to interpret "experience" here to mean both phylo- and 
ontogenetic experience then this would read like a meta-
physical or idealistic proposition, not a scientific one. 
But I take Lorenz to imply ontoger..etic experience 2nd as such 
it makes sense within the bounds of his evolutionary epistem-
ology. Tb.at is, he uses "experience" in the same way as does 
Hebb (1972:118) when he writes of the pecking behaviour o:f 
chickens, " .... learning is not es.sential ·for all aspects o:f 
behaviour: the tendency to peck at small objects is present 
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in the newly hatched chick, and it has been reported that.no 
prior experience is needed to make the chick peck at rounded 
objects rather than sharp-cornered ones." I am certain that 
Lerner would not misconstrue Hebbts meaning as he has 
Lorenz's. 
It does seem to be the case, as Lorenz claims, that 
certain organic forms, behaviours and properties of mind do 
develop relatively invariably in the members of the species 
despite substantial variations in their environments and 
experiences. Because of this, the concept "innate" can be 
regarded as referring to sometting of substance. This is 
most clear if we regard that substance as the information 
coded in the DNA mucleotide sequences which constitute the 
genes. It is this DNA that lies behind the invariance of the 
characteristics of the members of each species. In an impor-
tant statement, M:onod (1974:107) says of the functional 
Y interpretation' of genetic information that it is wi.equi-
vocal and rigorous. 
No supplementary input of information other 
than the genetic is necessary; nor, it seems, 
even possible, as the mechanism as we know it 
leaves no room for any.. And to the extent 
that all the structures and performances of 
organisms result from the structures and acti-
vities of the proteins composing them, one 
must regard the total organism as the ultimate 
epigenetic expression of the genetic message 
itself o 
According to Monod (p 108), there is no conceivable mechanism 
in existence whereby any instruction or piece of information 
(in the DNA sense) could be transferred to DNA. (The recent 
development of gene splicing is not a contradiction of this 
claim as Monod can be regarded as referring to natural 
mechanisms. On the other hand, the recent discovery that 
simple organisms such as viruses do assimilate and transmit 
pieces of DNA obtained from other organisms does suggest that 
mechanisms for the transfer of DNA do exist in nature and 
that such transfers have taken place and do t.ake place. How-
ever, as regards complex organisms, it seems likely that 
structures have evolved to make the assimilation of foreign 
DNA difficult if not impossible. Hence, in a qualified sense, 
Monod may be correct. Since the 1980s are witnessing a 
revolution in biochemistry and microbiology it seems that in 
the near future many widely accepted ideas and theories will 
have to be amended in the light of the incredible discoveries 
now being made about life. See Davis 1980.) 
In the sense that it reproduces itself virtually in-
variably, the operation of DNA, "••• denies,,dialectical 
description. It is not Hegelian at all, but thoroughly 
Cartesian: the cell is indeed a machine" (Monod 1974: 108). 
So insensitive is DNA to "experience", "environment", and 
"learning" that the the anatomical outlines of the main phyla 
were differentiated over five million years ago. Biology 
tells us that certain species have hardly changed in hundreds 
of millions of years. Monad (p 117) cites the example of 
lingula which have remained unchanged for 450 000 000 years 
and the oyster which has not changed in 150 000 000 years. 
Furthermore, the basic chemical structi.:.re of living cells has 
been in existence for two or three thousand million years. 
The stability of life in the face of the forces of variation 
makes stability as much a puzzle as evolution. 
What the foregoing amounts to is an argument :for the 
retention of the dichotomy "innate/learnt". Both concepts 
are substantively, theoretically and empirically warranted. 
Chomsky ( 1968: 73) has stated that, '~We cannot avoid being 
struck by the enormous disparity be tweer.. knowledge and ex-
perience", and proceeded to argue that for this reason, among 
others, an innate structure must be postulated that is rich 
enough to account for the disparities between experier..ce and 
knowledge. Bidney (1970:x..."'C) points out that without innate 
and universal properties there wou.ld be no particulars or 
variables to study, "Because human nature does not explain 
everything about culture, it does not follow that it explains 
nothing and may be disregarded for explanatory purposes." 
The unity of life and environment 
A proper appreciation of the nature and .acquisition of 
knowledge seems to preclude opposing in any absolute fashion 
the concepts 11 innate" and "learnt". It does not seem 
meaningful or even possible to categorize an actual item of 
knowledge as purely innate or leµ.rnt o Kno·wledge, like 
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physical-form and behaviour, is a ~henotypic phenomenon. As 
such, innate/learnt, organism/environment, inheritance/ex-
perience are all aspects of the phenotype. It cannot be 
described in terms of one to the exclusion of the other. It 
is for this reason that Lorenz (1969:21) has stated, "••• the 
stratified structure of the whole organism forbids the con-
ceptualisation of living systems or life processes in terms 
of 'disjunctive' -- that is to say, mutually exclusive --
concepts. It is nonsense to oppose to each other tanimalt 
and tmant, tnatu.ret and 'culture', 'innate programming' and 
'learning' • • • J>.lan • • • is still an animal; human nature 
persists in and is the basis of culture; and all learning is 
very specifically innately programmeC.. 11 Pribram (1969:2), 
who regards the neglect of the issues conceptualized by 
earlier investigators under the title "innate" as the con-
sequence of the later narrow devotion of psychologists to 
behaviourism, posits t~at the correct behavioural response to 
the "innate/learnt" riddle is the view that all behaviour is 
inextricably composed of both innate and learned factors <llld 
that these are in continuous interaction. 
Knowledge should not be seen as either innate or learnt, 
even though the requirements of discourse force us to adopt 
such categories. The truth is probably inexpressible. A 
line adapted. from Lerner (1976:52) suggests how inexpressible; 
100 per cent innate knowledge and 100 per cent learnt knowl-
edge constitute knowledge and thinking 100 per cent of the 
time. The epigenetic approach to this conundrum seems to 
offer the most Eatisfactory solution. This approach main-
tains that each higher level of complexity is characterized 
by a new characteristic that was not present at the lower 
level. The unity of organism and envirorunent is suggested by 
the epigenetic claim that the emergent characteristic has no 
direct precursor in the earlier state of the organism (Lerner 
1976:31). Piaget (1971:125) expresses the essential epi-
genetic argument by stating that the deyelopment of knowledge 
as a biological attribute precludes 
any idea of empiricism or A PRIORISH and 
favours a continuous constructio~ embracing 
the two aspects of inseparable relational 
totalities and historical development. The 
formation of kr..owledge is thus seen as the 
history of a progressive organisation; by 
eliminating any kind of fixity in both ob-
ject and subject, the explanation of it 
necessarily lies in the direction of equi-
librium and autoregulation mechanisms, as 
much in order to link the respective con-
tributions made by subject and object into 
one functional totality. 
The inextricable nature of the relationship between innate 
knowledge can be further illustrated by emphasizing the 
dependence of what is acquired through learning on what is 
genetically given. As was stressed earlier, all knowledge 
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presupposes a biological compor£nt. Lorenz (1965:585) says 
in this regard, 11 tt~e innate" is "what must be in existence 
before all individual learning in order to make learning 
possible". It is Lorenz's view tt.at all learning is per-
formed by mechanisms which contain "phylogenetically acquired 
information". A basically similar argument has been pre-
sented by Piaget (1971~252) who states that every kind of 
knowledge presupposes an irreducible biological component as 
a necessary and continuous functioning accompaniment. Just 
as learning depends upor. and reflects what is innate, so too, 
in an analagous way, what is innate depends upon the environ-
ment and experience for its unfolding. If we pause for a 
moment to consider what is meant by environment or experience 
it will be clear that a phenotype cannot develop without both 
of these no matter how rigidly its genes are held to deter-
mine it. Nost obviously and fundamentally, the phenotype is 
developed out of material taken from the environment. This 
is itself an organism/environment interaction, a form of ex-
perience. Also, "environment" is not a simple, unproblematic 
concept. Where does organism end and environment begin? 
Sensations, perceptions, cognitions are all a fusion of both. 
Each part of an organism bas its own "environment". As 
Ausubel (1957:27) states, "••• the influence of genes on 
development is never complete or absolute, but always 
reflects to a variable extent the influence o±~ the intra-
cellular, intercellular, gestational or external environment." 
Modern genetics has discovered that the genetic in.for-
mation available at conception is insufficient to produce a 
fully developed organism. To develop, the embryonic stock 
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of knowledge has to be supplemented by information from out-
side -- even in the most genetically determined organisms. 
Because of the constancy of certain bits of information in 
the environment, life seems to have adopted the strategy of 
a traveller. That is, life, like a traveller, does not have 
to have at the beginning of its rjourney all the information 
necessary for its journey or for arriving at its destination. 
All that is required is the knowledge necessary to recognize, 
decode and assimilate salient information encountered on the 
way. The road to development is externally signposted just 
as is a journeyo Buckley (1967:61) notes in this connection, 
''••• it is not necessary for the genes to carry all the 
detailed information, but rather it suffices for them to 
carry a set of rules to E;enerate the inforrr.ation." Because 
it is keyed into the en-\-iromnent, knowledge, whether innate 
or learnt, can Eimplify matters by resorting to conden~ation, 
abbreviation, signing,. symbo_lism, anticipation, abstraction, 
generalization, selective forgetting, etco etc. Constancies 
in the enviro1'ment and constancies in the genes account for 
the constancies in the adult phenotype. 
Though issue was taken ,~-ith Lerner earlier as regards 
his rmf'air treatment of' Lorenz, it is worth referring to him 
in concJ.udin.g this section as he provideE, in his description 
of' the "organismic poEition", a statement of a theoretical 
position. which I would e&dorseo This position is character-
ized by the fact that it is epigenetic, probabilistic, anti-
reductionist, qualitative, multiplicative, and interaction-
ist (Lerner 1976:15-16, 31). An organismYs form, behaviour, 
experiences, kno-v.-ledge, and so fortt-~, are a product of what 
is innate 2nd what is learnt. The development of knowledge 
is characterized by qualitative changes tbat are due to both 
innate and learnt factors. Knowledge develops, to some 
extent, epigenetically. Different stages are characterized 
by forms of knowledge not directly derived from earlier 
forms. They are the result of creative equilibrations, in-
volving existing knowledge and action upon this resource and 
the· environment. Organisms do not passively acquire knowl-
edge, knowledge is a construction • Knowledge drives organ-
. isms to act upon their environment just as much as environ-
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mental events can be seen to produce reactions in the organ-
ism. 
Granted that what is innate and what is learnt are 
inextricably interwoven, it is fair to ask whether it is 
worth hanging on to this distinction. Some theorists, like 
Lerner, suggest that we abandon "innate" but then we might 
just as well abandon "learnt". It seems to me that given 
the state of knoll·ledge currently available and the structure 
of human discourse, we have no alternative but to resort to 
and use sue!: admittedly tm.satisfactory cor.cepts. To speak 
about reality we have to begin somewhere and focus on some-
thing. There is n<? other way we have discovered to come to 
grips with our world. We have no alternative but to seek 
truth via the distortions which set in once we begin seeking. 
In i::eeking to sneak about the nature of hw11ankind we are 
probably trying to speak about something that is ur.spealcable. 
Herein lies many of ou~ difficulties. The concepts "i1U1.ate 
knowledge" and "learnt knowledge" are used here in the sense 
that certain forms of knowledge are "primarily" genetically 
acquired while others are "primarily" acquired through 
learning. The preceding discu.ssion should serve as qualifi-
cation for the use of these concepts in this study and the 
meaning that should be attact.ed to "primarily". 
The phylogenetic process of knowledge acquisition 
Innate knowledge refers to the knowledge an organism 
possesses by vi:rtue of being a member of a specific species. 
In what follows attention is devoted to the manner in which 
species may be considered to have acquired the kno-Kledge 
which its members transfer genetically to offspring. Because 
the origin and development of-innate knowledge is reflected 
in the genesis of physical characteristics and behaviour, it 
can be asserted that a fair amount is known about the genesis 
of this form of knowledge. 
In addressing the problem of the acquisi.tion of innate 
kno"ledge the genomic perspective needs to be adopted since 
it is the genome which is the controlling system of a 
species. It is the genome which acquires innate knowledge 
and modifies its knowledge. Tbe innate laiowledge. inherited 
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by individual organisms is, as far as is now known, gene-
tically speaking, basically static. It does not change and 
is not added to as it exists in the individual phenotypes. 
The genome acquires knm·:ledge or alters its knowledge 
through the phylogenetic assimilation of information. Thus, 
"••• instinctual, or more strictly innate, knowledge refers 
to learning that took place during the millenia of biological 
evolution" (Furth 1969:186). Throughout the eons of their 
existence, the various species have, by means of the phylo-
genetic assimilation of information, acquired and continued 
to acquire the knowledge of the physical form and modes of 
behc:..viour suited to survival in their environments. Because 
the relationship between species and environment is charac-
terized by both periods of relative stability and rapid 
change, a species may be regarded as essentially cor£irming 
the effectiveness of the knowledge it has acquired during 
the periods of stability and attempting to modify this 
knovrledge in some advantageous direction during perioc s of 
change. As knowledge is the preduct of billior.s of years of 
interaction between genome and environment it is to be 
expected that the innate stock of knowledge would reveal 
strong teleonomic characteristics. The stock of innate 
knowledge seems to ensure a remarkable fit beb\een species 
and environm.ent. Individual species members seem, under· 
normal circumstances, eminently genetically prepared for the 
world they inhabit. To illustrate, Piaget (1971) has drawn 
attention to this general point by referring to the case of 
instinbt which may, in this context, be regarded as represen-
tative of a variety of innate knowledge. lie writes (Piaget 
1971: 196), "Instinct is the model of behaviour which is bot~' 
pre-established, since it rests on genetic information to a 
large extent and yet also remarkably anticipatory, since it 
adjusts itself to the external environment as though it had 
both knowledge of the end in view and instrumental relation-
ships subordinating to this end a series of successive and 
connected means in a soundly adapted manner." 
The origin of life marks the origin of innate knowledge. 
Its genesis is to be foW1.d in the appearance on Earth of the 
first forms of life which resulted from an accumulation of . 
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random events involving the organic molecules present in the 
upper layers of the warm oceans (Burnet 1980~6). According 
I 
to Hawkins (1964:269), life commenced with the appearance of 
self-reproducing molecules. These moleculesldid not learn 
to reproduce themselves; rather, they learned to live. Like 
' . 
a hoof in soft turf leaves its impression, these molecules 
of necessity reproduced themselves whenever lt chanced that 
they came into contact with the necessary mo~ecular material 
I 
under appropriate conditions. Seen thus, life is, in a most 
fundamental sense, epigenetic since, 11 out of; a solution of 
i 
I 
monomeric molecuJ.e s devoid of any symmetry, !larger molecules, 
of a higher degree of order, have appeared ahd immediately 
I acquired functional properties previously ab.sent" (Monod 
I 
1974:84). But life is also the result of chance preforma-
tions and the laws governing inert.matter. ~ccurately con-
sidered, therefore, life is neither solely p~eformed nor 
I 
epigenetic. "The complete structure was nevier preformed; 
but the architectural plan for it was present in its consti-
tuents themselves, so enabling it to come inlto being spon-
taneously and autonomously,' without outside belp and wi tllout 
the injection of additional information. Tde necessary 
I 
information was present, but unexpressed: in'. the constituents. 
Tho epigenetic building of a structure is nolt a creation; it 
is a revelation", writes Monod (1974:87). 
Hawkins (1964:269) makes the important observation that 
self-reproducing molecules, even though internally inert and 
externally naked, are nevertheless subject to the Darwinian 
i 
principles of variation and selection. Dif,erences in the 
"reproductive behaviour" of such molecules 1nd in their 
capacity to use tbe environment could conce~vably have given 
I 
some an advantage over others and thus init~ated the enduring 
saga of evolution. Life appeared, writes Hcl.wkins, when 
certain self-reproducing molecules became, ~robably as a 
result of molecular variation and primitive !selection forces, 
encapsulated in a membrane that gave them a new advantage. 
What the membrane did was probably to increeise the concen-
tration of material used for reproduction a.Act thereby 
increase the reproduction rate. It is obviJus that an I . 
informational exchange is involved between ~elf-reproducing 
'. 
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molecule and environment in the acquisition of reproductive 
material. "The semipermeable membrane, which admits one 
molecule and excludes another, is an informed membrane", 
writes Hawkins (1964:270), "The cell is discriminating, selec-
tive, it sets itself over against its environment, it is not 
merely an inert element, it is an ensemble. It is a micro-
cosm that maintains commerce with the world and is not just 
kicked around, it is alive." According to Monod (1974:52), 
the "teleonomic" performance of protein molecules in cell 
construction and reproduction rests upon their tstereo-
specific' properties, "••• upon their ability to 'recognize' 
other molecules (including other proteins) by their shape, 
this shape being determined by their molecular structure. 
There is here, quite literally, a microscopic discriminative 
(if not 'cognitive') faculty. 11 
As remarked earlier, variation is the fundamental source 
of life, information and knowledge. It is now accepted by 
many scientists that chance events in cosmic terms lie behind 
the formation of our life supporting Earth. Similarly, 
chance lies behind the variations wl-lich procuced life. And, 
finally, Earth's living forms are the result of chance 
occurrences in environment and in genetic structure. What is 
basic to life is both the arbitrary arrangeme~t of the 
primary proteins and their faithful reproduction in stru~turc 
after structure through countless ages. That life should 
have occurred at all is, as Monad convincingly argues, 
massively improbable, even miraculous. But it did happen 
because, as Monad states, "A totally blind process can by 
definition lead to anything; it can even lead to vision it-
self." Life is, from its inception, the product of chance 
and neceE-sity. The same may be said of knowledge. 
The paradox of life is that while DNA guarantees the 
invariance of the species, microscopic variations in the 
transfer of information in genetic reproduction and in the 
codes themselves ensure the changes upon which natural selec-
tion operates and from which evolution flowso These micro-
scopic variations arc due to the inherent variability of 
molecular, atomic and sub-atomic matter ... Modern physics, 
says Monad (1974:108), bas discovered that no microscopic 
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entity can fail to undergo quantum perturbations whose 
accumulation within a macroscopic system will slowly but 
surely alter its structure. Because of this fundamental 
physical fact, genetic reproduction, seen microscopically, 
is not quite the guarantor of invariance it appears when 
I 
viewed macroscopically. A small perturbation in the 
chemistry of. the DNA will be replicated in reproduction. 
Similarly, during reproduction miniscule "errors" in trans-
lation might lead to a minute difference between parent DNA 
and offspring DNA. Such an error or mutation might there-
after be faithfully reproduced in succeeding generations. 
Monod (1974:109) lists some of the discrete ~ccidental 
I 
alterations which DNA sequences might suffer. Such mutations 
might be due to: (1) The substitution of a single pair of 
nucleotides for another pair. (2) The deletion or addition 
of one or several pairs of nucleotides. (J) Various kinds of 
'scrambling' of the genetic text by inversion, duplication, 
displacement, or fusion of more or less extended segments. 
An example of the last form of mutation is offered by Hill 
et al. (1971:278). This form of mutation is called 
"crossing-over" and occurs when the order in which genes lie 
on the chromosomal thread is altered through the thread 
looping in sucb a way that it breaks at the point of the loop 
and the loop ends s'vitch connections with the rest of the 
chromosomal thread. In this simple rearrangement the infer-
mation available to an organism or species may be signifi-
cantly altered.· (For further examples, see Monad 1974: 177-
180.) 
Because of the tenacious conservatism of DKA it is 
common to regard mutations as extremely rare ever..ts. But 
mutations are not quite as rare as many texts lead one to 
believe. In fact, mutation can be seen as the rule rather 
than the exception. Because of either the vast numbers and 
rapid rates of reproduction of simple organisms or the 
massive amounts of information contained in the genes of 
higher organisms and their high number of cellular gener-
ations in the germinal li'ne, mutations are fairly common. 
Monad (1974:116), ·from whom this important insight comes, 
estimates that in the present-day human population there 
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occur, with each new generation, .about a hundred thousand 
million to a billion mutations. Rather than life evolving 
on a meagre sum of variation, it has a "vast reservoir of 
fortuitous variability ••• in spite of the jealously conser-
vative properties of the replicative mechanisms" (Monod 1974: 
117). The vastness of this variability makes the stability 
of forms as much a puzzle as evolution. 
What is particularly significant about the variations 
just referred to is that these are accidental events. From 
this observation flows the profound discovery that since such 
variations"•·· constitute the only possible source of 
modification in the genetic text, itself the sole repository 
01· the organism's hereditary structure, it necessarily follows 
that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of 
all creation in the biosphere'' (Monad 1974:110). According 
to Monod, this hypothesis is today the only conceivable one 
that is compatible with observed and tested fact. He is, 
furtber, of the opinion that nothing warrants the suppositiori 
(or hope) that this hypothesis could be wrong. His conclu-
sion is worth quoting, "••• the same source of fortuitous 
perturbations, of 'noise', which in a nonliving (i.e. non-
replicative) system would gradually lead to the disintegra-
tion of all structure, is the progenitor of evolution in the 
biosphere and accounts for its unrestricted liberty of 
creation, thanks to the replicative structure of DNA: that 
registry of chance, that tone-deaf conservatory where the 
noise is preserved along with the music" (:Monad 1974:113). 
Since life is the product of the fortuitous variability 
of matter, as just indicated, it is not entirely surprising 
that life "discovered" the value of creating differences. 
Most living species have evolved structures and processes to 
generate variation; these may be seen as producing "designed" 
rather than "fortuitous" variation. Beca.use·of both of these 
forms of variation, organisms are intrinsically variable even 
before they undergo differentiating experiences. Sexual 
reproduction involving J\1EIOSIS is the primary genetically 
"designed" variation generating mechanism found in nature. 
(:MEIOSIS refers to the variation generating probability mech-
anism by which lawfully combined random samples of genes and 
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chromosomes are passed on from parent to offspring. (See 
Hirsch 1972:298; Hill et al. 1971:8.) Genotypic variance is 
compounded in the phenotype. According to Hinde (1970:428), 
the variance of any biological characteristic is "the sum of 
the quantities representing phenotypic variance, genotypic 
variance, and the variance in the interaction between geno-
type and the environment". The adaptive advantage of any 
single genetic variation is tested in terms of, firstly its 
interaction with the rest of the organism's genetic struc-
ture, secondly, its interaction, as part of the phenotype, 
1·.rith other organisms of the same kind, and, thirdly, its 
interaction, again as part of the phenotype, with the physi-
cal environment. Because a miniscule variation in"the geno-
type can be compounded into something significantly 
advantageous in the phenotype as a result of these inter-
actions, it is not stretching credibility too far to imagine 
that much of evolution has proceeded on the basis of such 
tiny variations. It is worth remembering that it was one of 
the important discoveries of Darwin and Wallace tt:at the 
individual members of a species show variation in all 
characteristics (Hill et al. 1971:291). This abundance of' 
variation must be seen as both the producer and the product 
of biological evolution. 
It is f.rom assimilating the information flowing from its 
own variability and from that of the environment and pbeno-
typic responses that the genome acquires knowledge and 
modifies its existing knowledge. Each new generation 
instructs the genome as regards which phenotypes best match 
the demands of existence. The genome accommodates its 
knowledge to this information. Its knowledge evolves towards 
an equilibrium between itself-- and the sources of variation. 
Though certain equilibrations are achieved during this 
evolutionary process, no final or absolute equilibration is 
achievable because of the fundamental contradictions involved 
in the evolution of life and knowledge. Hawkins (1964:279) 
puts this well when he wrote, "It is in the nature of life 
to change its nature." 
The fact that some variation is genetically produced 
has led certain writers to see the genome as acting "blindly 
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intelligently". We can recall Popper's (1963:51) words, 
"••• to live in this world of ours ••• there is no more 
rational procedure than the method of trial and error -- of 
conjecture and refutation." One may view the designed yet 
random differences generated by particular species as 
"hypotheses" or "experiments" leading to better adaptations. 
Which is to say, to a better match between organic structure 
and reality. These genetic "hypotheses" or /experiments" 
are confirmed or rejected by organism/environment inter-
action. Thus, as Lorenz (1965; 1977) suggests, we may see 
tl:e genome learning about itself and the world through the 
process of "trial" and "success". As Lorenz (1965:19) 
explains, the genome cannot learn from its mistakes as can 
an intelligent organism. The hit and miss method of genetic 
variation gains only by its successes and not by its 
failures. The genome continues blindly to produce those 
variations that have proved lUlsuccessful millions of years 
ago -- it proceeds like a scientist who has no memory and 
keeps no notes of the outcome of his experiments. Thus while 
we may appropriately see the individual organism as learning 
from both its errors and successes, the blindness of the 
genome implies that it can onJ_y learn from its successes. 
These successes will drag with them all the errors which arc 
not fatal but which are, objectively speaking, surplus 
baggage. In this hamstrllllg fashion the genome achieves its 
knowledge. Only the successful variations survive to re-
produce. The most fit of these reproduce most prolifically. 
They thus direct the route of evolution in the direction of 
their characteristics. In swn, innate knowledge develops 
through tbe genetic generation of variability and ·the 
survival and reproduction of specific stocks of knowledge 
under t.he selective pressures of the environment. 
The processes sketched above provide part of an answer 
to the question, "Where does innate knowledge come from?" 
Though it seems highly improbably that genes can contain all 
the information ascribed to them and that chance, variation 
and natural selection should accolUlt for this information, 
this is as things stood m1til fairly recently. (As alr.eady 
noted, the current explosion in biological lmowledge as a 
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result of the discoveries made possible by the "new biology" 
may require that many of the ideas expressed here will have 
to be severely modified.) According to Lorenz (1969:23) 
there seems to be no limit to the quantity of information-the 
gene can acquire and retain. Its capacity seems to be 
superior to that of mind and culture. 
As fantastic a procedure as the genomic assimilation of 
information is, it has· two fundamental weaknesses. (1) It 
cannot deal with rapid changes in the environment, especially 
with those that take place in the "dead time" between one 
reproductive ·season and another. (2) Despite its incredible 
informational capacity it cannot convey a completely detailed 
knowledge of the environment in all its minute detail. It is 
probably because of these limitations that mechanisms for 
processing detailed instantaneous information about the 
environment and for ontogenetic learning have evolved. The 
senses, the nervous system and the brain may be seen as ways 
in which the genome overcame some of its inherent weaknesses 
as an intelligent instrument. The variability of in:formation 
made available to the individual organism by these organs 
led, it seems, to the selection of the superior organs at 
each evolutionary stage. Obviously, the organism enjoying 
the most accurate picture of its environment had a better 
chance of survival and reproduction than one with a less· 
accurate picture. Hence it was that the sensory, perceptual 
and cognitive apparatuses evolved along with their associated 
and gradually improving stocks of knowledge. By acquiring 
the capacity for instantaneous information utilization and 
for learning certain species achieved a new form of knowledge 
-- learnt knowledge. This form of knowing was in its turn 
handicapped in that the knowledge it yielded always died with 
the individual organism. It was only when a few species 
learnt to learn from their own kind and other creatures that 
this handicap was overcome. The result of this phylogenetic 
advance was social learning which yielded first social 
knowledge and, in a few species, eventually cultural knowledge. 
An alternative view 
The foregoing is a description in primarily nco-Darwinian 
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terms of' the acquisition of' knowledge by the genome. This 
is, scientifically speaking, the most respected approach 
today. But since, among biologists, the isJue of natural 
selection and mutation versus types of Lamarckism has still 
not been settled, it is worth noting a few Lamarckian or 
"dialectical" ideas. Piaget is among those lwho argue that 
evolutionary theories employing the notions,of' chance 
mutation and natural selection (like that of Monad) to 
account for the evolution of the species constitute an 
unsatisfactory body of explanation (see Piaget 1971). The 
solution to the Lamarckism versus Darwinism debate Piaget 
finds most satisfactory is one employing the notion of 
"regulatory interactions". Such interactions he considers 
to supply "the epigenetic system with infor~ation about the 
external environment" and in this way effect alterations in 
the stock of knowledge of the species (Piaget 1971:238). 
Piaget says of such regulatory interactions .that tbey can be 
• I 
conceived in the light of a nwnber of explarlations, including 
the Lamarckism and the even more promising preser:t-day cyber-
netics. Koestler has commented in several books on tbe 
matter of Lamarckism versus Darwinism and has provided power-
: 
ful evidence against the unqualified_acceptance of the 
Darwinian position. His view is that experience does affect 
hereditary but not in the simple and direct way posited by 
Lamarckism (see, for example, Koestler 1970:i141; 1979:193-
204). Lamarck, as is well known, argued that adaptive 
modifications of ways of life which an animal acquired to 
cope more effectively with its environment could be trans-
mitted by heredity to its offspring. Lamarckism, as this 
doctrine became known, if valid, thus prov:!-des one answer to 
the question of how the stock- of innate knm,•ledge is altered 
and alterable. 
Writers who adopt something of a Lamard<:.ian stance as 
regards evolution seem to be in general agreement that life 
does possess some self-regulatory or mnemonic. quality (to 
borrow concepts used by Paiget 1971 and Rignano 1926). It 
I 
is this biological quality which for such writers lies at 
the root of the explanation of the origin and development of 
living forms and tbeir various properties. 
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According to Rignano (1926:34), the notion of (what is 
here called) "innate knowledge" in biology can be traced back 
to the work of Semon, Haeckel, Butler and Orr who all saw in 
the phenomenon of the recapitulation of phylogeny by ontogeny 
evidence for a thesis that living matter somehow "remembered 
all the modes of being through which the species had passed 
as a result of the continual acquisition of new characteris-
tics superimposed on old". This thesis led, as Rignano goes 
on to say, to Hering• s 1870 proposal that "memory is the 
universal and fundamental function of all living substance". 
This thesis was further developed by Semon and by Rignano 
himself, especially in his work "Biological memory" (1926) 
being referred to here. The thesis of life being a knowledge 
acquisition or memory process helps, according to Rignano, 
explain the behaviour of cells, the transmissibility of 
acquired characteristics, the ontogenetic development of 
organisms, the instincts of-animals, thinking, memory, and 
logical reasoning. "All these_ phenomena", states Rignano 
( 1926: J4), "thanks to the nmemonic substratwn which can be 
detected in all of them, may be considered as merely very 
different manifestations of one and the same fundamental 
phenomena. 11 
In developing his brand of Lamarck.ism~ Rignano came to 
argue that the fertilized egg embodied in its nucleus all 
the memories acquired during the past history of its race~ 
According to MacBride (in Rignano 1926:4-6), Rignano assumed 
that all reacti-ons on the part of an organism leave some 
kind of trace in its body. Repetitions of the reaction 
gradually engrain the trace deeper and deeper and in this 
way may come to be genetically transmitted. The ideas of 
Rignano regarding biological memory referred to aboYe find a 
modern counterpart in tl:_e work that has been done and is 
being done in the field of molecular memory. Discoveries in 
this field are obviously germane to a discussion of phylo-
genetic information assimilation processes. Bleibtreu (1976: 
106-109) sees the discoveries made in the field of molecular 
memory as substantiating the "flesh-as-knowledge" view. A 
view, which minus its theological extravagances, comes close 
to the arguments of this study. Blei~treu comments at length 
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on the work of Sager, Sonneborn, Hyden and McConnell. Among 
the things suggested by this work is that both in the 
chromosomes and the flesh or cytoplasm of the cell there is 
"hereditable information or knowledge" (Bleibtreu 1976:107). 
The work of Sager and Sonneborn suggests that cytoplasmic 
genes are more responsive to environmental factors than 
chromosomal genes and so may play an important role in 
phylogenetic information assimilation and, especially, the 
development of instincts. 
While the exact mechanisms whereby species acquire 
knowledge is uncertain, findings like those of Zamenhof 
0968) indicate that Lamarckism still holds promise for a 
possible solution. Zamenhof and his associates have shnwn 
that the dietary restriction of the protein intake of 
developing foetuses may result in reduced DNA content and 
thus lead to a reduced cell number in the brain of the 
eventual offspring of .such foetuses -- even though the off-
spring are well fed throughout their lives. ivicC onne 11 ' s 
( 1964 ) famous experiments with flatworms is also often 
cited as providing evidence for the thesis that ontogenetic 
learning can become incorporated in some way into genetic 
material. Discoveries like those of Zamenhof, McConnell, 
Sager, Sonneborn and Hyden suggest that it is probable that 
a complex two-way interactional relationship seems to apply 
between innate knowledge and learnt knowledge. The phylo-
genetic and on.togenetic processes o:f information assimilation 
seem to be linked and intersect in seemingly more direct ways 
than is granted by those who opt for the more exclusive 
mutation-variation-and-natural-selection thesis. 
It may be, as Piaget suggests, that the future will see 
the emergence of a more satisfactory theory o:f organic 
evolution which is neither Darwinian nor Lamarckian. How-
ever, since most modern investigators adopt a Neo-Da:nvinian 
approach and it is this that is being modified and improved, 
they might continue to call their approach "Da:nvinian" long 
after the point where it begins to incorporate certain 
"La..marckian" ideas. The position at present seems to be th.at 
most recent biological discoveries are seen as further 
"substantiations" of Da:nvinY s theory. For example, the 
112 
recent discoveries that pieces of DNA from one organism are 
fairly routinely incorporated in other organisms in nature, 
that mutations are more common than formerly thought and 
that each species is characterized by incredible variation 
at the molecular level as well as at the morphological and 
behavioural levels are all seen as deepening our under-
standing of the processes of organic evolution and as 
providing further confirmation of Darwin's theory. It seems 
that Lamarck's theory has lost its struggle for survival. So 
much is known today, and so much has beer: demor...strated that 
one prominent biologist has been able to proclaim, "Except 
for those skeptics willing to discard rationality, Darwin's 
theory has now become Darwini s Law" (Davis 1980: 79). 
Because of the constraints under ·Khich this study pro-
ceeds, it is not possible to explore these interesting 
matters further. The abo've is intended to provide some idea 
as to tow it is that innate stocks of knowledge arise and 
evolve. That the exact nature of these processes is still a 
matter of lively debate and continuing research is an 
indicatior... of both their importance and complexity. Li£e 
did not arise in a day nor, it seems, will it be widcrstood 
in a lifetime. 
Inr~ate knowledge in animals 
Innate knowledge, as mentioned earlier, is not directly 
observable, it is inferred from its representations in such 
things as physi:cal form, behaviour, the deep structures of 
language and the universals of culture. Since humankind is 
an animal species, it seems appropriate to consider a few 
examples of innate knowledge in animals before proceeding to 
the hwuan stock of innate knowledge. 
In looking at animal and human behaviour and cognition 
one is observing the "working" ("operation", "functioning", 
"application") of their stocks of knoKledge. Eehaviour and 
thought imply knowing how to behave and how to think. The 
appropriateness of behaviour and thought in most situations 
also indicates that animals and humans know what to do (or 
think) in particular situations. Furthermore, because of the 
capacities they reveal for making discriminations between 
11J 
objects, events and their own behaviour and thought, humans 
and animals may also be. said to possess the :knowledge "that". 
Because an organism's knowledge is organized it is 
useful to use such terms as "schema" , 11 system" or 11 programme" 
to refer to particular arrangements of know).edge. My prefer-
ence is for the term "schema" because this suggests something 
of the "schematic" yet structured nature of knowledge. 
Knowledge being a schematic assimilation from inf'ormation 
providing a definite yet never final mapping of the world and 
of behaviour and thought. Though the term is employed here 
more broadly than it is by Piaget, this usage is nevertheless 
consistent with his. Defined most simply, a schema is a 
system of knowledge. Addressing the abstract nature of the 
concept, Piaget has written (1973:156), "Now the schema of an 
action is neither perceptible (one perceive~ a particular 
action, but not its schema) nor dir~ctly introspectible, and 
one becomes conscious of its implications only in repeating 
the action and in comparing the successive results ••• they 
(schemas) remain unconscious as long as •reflective abstrac-
tion• does not transform them into operations." Flavell 
(1977:16) who adopts a basically Piagetian approach, defines 
a schema (he calls it, more accurately he c.1aims, a "scheme") 
as an "enduring cognitive organization or knowledge structure 
within a child's head that does the assimilating and 
accommodating". 
Biological, ethological and psychologidal literature is 
replete with examples of phenotypic representations of innate 
knowledge. Direct observations and film and television 
documentaries provide further examples. Though the method-
ology 6f the social sciences has not yet come to terms with 
the scientific status of film- and television as sources of 
inf'ormation, these provide a rich supplement to the meagre 
direct observations of nature by most urban±tes. It may be 
that the time has come to ranl~ the celluloid and video image 
alongside that of written articles as a sourc.e of ideas and 
a substantiator of arguments. There is mucq to be learnt 
about innate knowledge from directly observing· animals. 
Failing this, it is probably the case that as much can be 
learnt from documentary films today as can·9e learnt from the 
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literature about innate knowledge in animals. 
For example, a documentary film dealing. with the South 
American sloth brought home vividly to me the fact that the 
genome of the sloth had, during the millenia of its evolution, 
gradually assimilated the fact that there are nwnerous -
I 
predators in its environment which are orien'.tated to catching 
moving prey. Movement is a sign of life and food to them, 
not surprisingly. It is easy to imagine natural selection 
moving away from the faster, more frenetic s!loths, favouring 
the slower ones and thus giving rise gradually to the now 
existing extremely slmi moving and cautious variety. It is 
difficult to imagine, but equally difficult ,to deny once the 
! 
idea takes root, that there is some sort of determinate con-
nection between th.e keen eye and speed of the eagle and the 
ponderous movements of the sloth. In a way,. the eagle has 
been assimilated by the sloth. Its deathlikb movements 
suggest that it knows something· of the nature of eagles. 
Another interesting animal example of inEatc knowledge 
was provided by a television docwnentary on ~uckoos. How and 
why the cuckoo came to highjack the nests and incubating and 
parenting labours of other birds in order to propagate itself 
is still a mystery. But it is undeniably an eminently 
i 
adaptive strategy as far as the genome is cohccrned. How-
ever, in subverting the property and energies of other birds 
to its own ends, the cuckoo as a species has, had to assimi-
late the knowledge which allows it to do this successfully. 
Through the int·eraction between cuckoos and other bird 
species, the cuckoo genome has assimilated a fair amount of 
ornithological knowledge. For example, it h~s acquired the 
I 
intelligence which allows its eggs to hatch faster than those 
of its hosts. The cuckoo, of-necessity, must lay its eggs 
after its prospective host lays hers. (Eggs in the nest arc 
an obvious sign that the cuckoo's addition t~o the nest will 
be sat on.) As a rule, the cuckoo's egg hatches before 
those of the host. The cuckcio genome has also acquired the 
knowledge which ensures that the eggs laid roughly or, even, 
i 
exactly match the eggs of the host in colouring and markings. 
The fact that the sizes are different is·itself instructive 
-- the host does not reject eggs which differ in size but are 
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similar or identical in markings and colouring. Because each 
cuckoo carries this knowledge with it, cuckoos as a rule only 
lay their eggs in the nests of members of the species which 
raised them. The newly hatched cuckoo appears, from its 
behaviour, to have some innate inkling regarding its relation 
to its environment, siblings and unwitting foster-parents. 
One of the first things newly hatched cuckoo~s set about doing 
is to eject the eggs containing rival siblings from the nest. 
In the documentary being referred to, a baby cuckoo got under 
one of the eggs in its nest by pushing backwards against the 
egg. By arching its wings backwards, the cuckoo was able to 
balance the egg on its back and then, by standing up, was 
able to tilt the egg out of the bowl-shaped nest. Two other 
eggs in the nest were attended to in the same way. Such 
i 
detailed and ruthlessly efficient behaviour suggests, for me, 
that the cuckoo is endowed with the knowledge that its small 
hosts cannot adequately feed the large, hungry chick it will 
be while also feeding their own young. Its behaviour is 
clearly teleonomic. 
Since, as was noted, the scientific status of the 
validation of ideas in terms of references to film and tclc-
' ' vision sources is still to be decided upon, it is safer to 
leave such sources at this point and to turn to the vast 
literature which has accumulated from the systematic study of 
animals. These documents, if used correctly, are endowed by 
science with the power to validate theories and hypotheses. 
Among other things, these documents provide evidence for the 
reality of innate knowledge as proposed here. 
It seems from the literature that many forms of animal 
behaviour not only develop independently of learn1ng but 
cannot easily be modified by experience. It has been dis-
covered, for example, that visual experience is not essential 
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for the development of space perception in chicks and that 
some ability for form discrimination is present in visually 
naive mammals (Hinde 1970:498; Hebb 1972:118) .• Barraud 
(1961) reports the case of hand-reared twelve-day-old great 
tits which, without any previous such experience immediately 
crouched and froze at the sound of the high-pitched whistle 
generally emitted by adult great tits on the approach of a 
f'lying predator. Other sound patterns -of similar intensity 
did not elicit this response. A thirty-day-old chaf'f'inch 
which has never seen an owl will evidently exhibit the 
mobbing response on the first occasion that an owl is 
presented to it (see Hinde 1954). Such investigators as 
Caspari (1958), Fuller and Thompson (1960) and Ewing and 
Manning (1967) have conducted experiments in which animals of· 
diff'erent species were similarly reared and have in this way 
demonstrated that certain behavioural differences are largely 
genetically determined. 
Bird song patterns provide further examples of varieties 
of innate knowledge. Baeumer ( 1962) and Lade and Thorpe 
(1964) are among the investigators who have demonstrated that 
the avian species-characteristic vocalization repertoire is 
sometimes capable of being developed independently of example. 
Studies such as these suggest that many species of bird 
genetically transmit what amount, following development, to 
auditory templets. These templets permit the young of such 
species, even when they are reared in isolation, to correct 
their spontaneous improvized vocalizations and eventually, 
when song matches templet, to fix the song in its correct 
form. Practice and the immediate feedback and learning it 
permits are obviously involved in this song producing process 
but the genetic .dimension is also illustrated by these song 
productions. Such cases help to substantiate, as Hinde 
(1970:462) points out, "the impossibility of dichotomising 
behaviour into ·categories such as Yinnatet and 'learned'"· 
A sentiment which this study endorses. 
An interesting example of an innate schema is provided 
by Hodgkin (1976:43) in his description of the behaviour of 
the young kingfisher. The kingfisher evidently emerges from 
the nest endowed with an innate capacity for catching fish 
with an accuracy of about one in t~venty according to Hodgkin. 
This figure is generally improved as a result of practice 
and maturation to about seven in twenty by the developing 
kingfisher. The five per cent success rate due seemingly to 
innate capacities is regarded by Hodgkin as surprisingly low 
in comparison to the largely genetically-attributable success 
rate found in many insect species. Hodgkin also draws 
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attention to the fact that bees and ants are genetically 
progr~mmed with a vast stock of detailed knowledge of com-
munity living. Spiders, at a similar level of evolution are 
capable of weaving a perfect web having never seen one before 
or having practised web-weaving. In the world of insects the 
unfolding of unrehearsed and unrepeated schemas provides a 
wealth of evidence for, and examples of, innate epistemic 
systems. 
The thesis that certain forms of knowledge are largely 
innate and that knowledge is inextricably linked to the 
anatomy of an organism is supported by such findings as those 
reported by Weiss ( 1941). Weiss surgically interchanged the 
left and right forelimb rudiments of salamander embryos at a 
stage when the axes of the limbs were already developed. 
The grafted limb rudiments developed naturally, but as could 
be expected, they faced backwards instead of forwards and 
moved just as they would have done in their original 
positions. Being in opposite po:::itions, however, the grarted 
limbs operated to move the body backwards when the rest of 
the body was attempting to propel itself fo~~ard. Weiss 
reports that a year's experience with such contrary func-
tioning forelimbs did not lead to any reversal in the move-
ment of these grafted limbs. 
Manifestations or representations of innate knowledge 
suggest, among other things, that innate knowledge structures 
are not present in the organism in its early life in any full 
blown operativ~ fashion. Rather, the evidence suggests that 
the stock of innate knowledge should be viewed as dynamic and 
unfolding through time. It is more epigenetic in development 
than preformed. Processes of epistemic epigenesis akin to 
the processes of morphologic epigenesis d~scribed by biolo-
gists seem to be responsible for this gradual unfolding. An 
tID£olding, like morphological llll.folding, characterized by 
the emergence, in a definite order and with definite regu-
larity, of specific features in the life of the members of a 
particular species. This un1'olding of innate knowledge is 
itself the representation of an overall innate development 
stimulating and monitoring schema. Thus; for example, the 
schemas which control the action of the heart, the lungs, 
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the production of semen, the process of menstruation, and so 
forth, are established P-nd activated at different times. 
The physical growth of an organism is also controlled by an 
innate schema -- a schema which operates during the years of 
growth of the organism and is terminated at ;maturity. An 
example of an emergent innate psychological schema is pro-
vided by Hebb (1972:205). He notes that the "fear" of snakes 
in chimpanzees does not appear to be learned. Studies 
indicate that the year-old chimpanzee is not disturbed by the 
sight of a snake but an adult chimpanzee who sees one for the 
first time is generally thrown into a paroxysm of fear and 
agitation. 
Evidence reveals further that though innate knowledge is 
not acquired by the individual organism on the basis of 
learning, certain innate schemas are only manifest in the 
context of learning activities and others must be elicited by 
particular sign stimuli. The triggering of mating and 
parenting behaviour by definite sign stimuli in many species 
provides a good example of this connection between certain 
innate schemas and external information. The organism, so 
to speak, knows innately how to mate and produce and care for 
its young but it relies on the environment to tell it about 
the things it does not know -- that is, when to start doing 
these things and where to do them. The profound unity of 
organism and environment is evident from discoveries such as 
these. 
Crganisms ·seem to have both repeating innate schemas and 
single-run schemas. The overall growth and development 
schema is an example of a single-run or linear schema. The 
cycles of breathing, eating/digesting/eliminating, reproduc-
tion, and so forth, provide examples of repeating schemas. 
Writers like Lorenz (1969, 1977), Hinde (1970) and Thouless 
(1963) provide a large number of examples of behaviours 
representing the operation of innate schemas. Among the most 
commonly ob served are those called irri tabili·ty, the 
regulating feedback cycle, the pseudopod respon~e, the phobic 
response, taxes, innate releasing mechanisms, fixed motor 
patterns, search images, orientation responses, orientational 
reflexes, spontaneous behaviour, avoidance and fear responses 
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and neuronal models. 
The foregoing may all be regarded as examples of 
varieties of innate knowledge or examples of this form of 
knowledge expressed in observable behaviour. To comment on 
a few: the fact that the members of a given species respond 
in a predictable fashion to hitherto unencountered situations 
has led to the postulation of the innate releasing mechanism. 
The members of the species in question seem to know by 
genetic means exactly what to do under certain conditions in 
a particular situation. The notion of an innate search image 
is used in connection with the observation that many animal 
and insect species know what food to look for and eat without 
having been taught this. The idea of spontaneous behaviour 
is used to account for the observed changes in the behaviour 
of an organism which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for 
in terms of any external factors. Many of the above examples 
can be grouped under the more general but less satisfactory 
title of "instincts". The general characteristics of 
instincts as set out by Thouless (1963:27) can usefully be 
listed at this point as they help to clarify the idea of 
innate schemas. According to Thoulcss, instincts (1) have 
an adaptive teleonomic character, (2) are relatively un-
modifiable, (3) are conunon to all the members of the species, 
(4) occur with a remarkable degree of perfection on their 
first performance, and (5) are remarkably complex. 
Many other examples of representations of innate knowl-
edge in the animal behaviour literature could be cited. In 
addition, I could cite examples I have myself observed in an 
unsystematic fashion in the course of personal encounters 
with animals. The sympathetic reader could also probably add 
some examples. Such further -examples would not serve much 
purpose at this point and so the discussion can proceed to 
deal with the human stock of innate knowledge after the 
following brief note. 
Knowledge and behaviour 
Since many of those concerned with studying animals 
(and hwrians) are devoted to a behaviourist approach, it is 
worth.while pausing for a moment to consider what advantage·;-
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if' any, an epistemic approach offers. An initial point is 
that an epistemic approach is not the antithesis of a 
behaviourist one. Knowledge and behaviour are related 
phenomena, though not synonymous. No organism behaves 
without utilizing its knowledge but at the same time its 
behaviour is not its knowledge. It is knowledge that 
"informs" behaviour -- that is, it is knowledge which gives 
form, structure, meaning, intelligence, etc., to behaviour. 
But though there is .an element of knowledge in all behaviour, 
any observable behaviour is a phenotypic representation of· 
an organism's knowledge. It is its knowledge working in a 
given context, in the face of specific environmental inputs 
and constraints. Behaviour is a complex amalgam of internal 
and external factors. Small wonder then that behaviourists 
have had such difficulties with the genotypic notions of 
"innate characteristics" or "instincts" and have tended to 
overemphasize behaviour, learning and environment. One 
obvious advantage, therefore, of the epistemic over the 
behaviourist approach is that it opens up and facilitates 
avenues of synthesis difficult to achieve via behaviourism. 
It is not difficult, as I hope this study shows, to move from 
behaviour to knowledge, consciousness and dreams or from 
blind innate knowledge to conscious thought and culture using 
the epistemic apprcach. Furthermore, while the behaviou:d.st 
approach tends to devalue certain phenomena, even denying 
some, the epistemic approach~ I submit, permits the inte-
gration of diff.erent orders of phenomena and in this way may 
convey a more accurate picture of reality. The strength of 
the behaviouristic approach is obviously its strong reliance 
on observables. Though the epistemic approach is open to the 
reproach that the objects about which it speaks are largely 
unobservable, its strength lies in the fact that we all 
routinely do infer knowledge from observables. 
Inferring knm~ledge from ol:: servable s 
The procedure of inferring knm\·led5·e from observables 
and experiences is a common procedure. We 2.11 do 1t. It is 
a necessary part of social intercourse and self knowledge. 
In our everyday lives we are continually judging the extent 
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of other people's knowledge on the basis of a few perfor-
mances. We can soon say whether people know their jobs by 
watching them work or inspecting the products of their 
labours. It is also only by observing our own performances 
that we gain some measure of the extent and variety of our 
own stock of knowledge. But we also learn from our experi-
ences in inferring knowledge that it is an imprecise measure. 
Even such highly formalized and objective measures of' 
knowledge as tests and examinations fail to satisfactorily 
overcome the disparity which seems to exist between knowledge 
poE.sessed and knm.;ledge revealed, the distinctior.. bet1veen 
competence and performance as it is sometimes couched. In 
our own experience, we sometimes imagine we know some fact or 
think we know how to do :=omething (like juggling) only to 
discover perhaps that we do not. Yet, as imprecise and 
unsatisfactory as inferring knowledge from performance might 
be it is the only method kn.own to us and we find it indis-
pensable. Inferring knowledge.from behaviour is a conunon 
procedure in science, even in behaviourism. Linguists and 
psychologists, for example, when studying language u~-;e the 
indirect evidence of linguistic performance to infer a 
child's knowledge of the rules of its langu2.ge. It is ob-
vious from such inferences that children gradually gain a 
knm,·ledge of the grammar of their language though they are 
seldom formally taught this and can only, with difficulty, 
articulate what sucb, linguistic rules are. 
The human stock of' innate knowledge 
No living c_reature ~s wi _!_~ou~_i.I1!1.<:1:!~--~~'"l:_E.':_9:ge. 
Numerous writers have discussed aspects of the genetically 
determined intelligence which-humans seem to possess. The 
list of these writers includes such persons as Freud, Marx, 
Jung, Levi-Strauss, Goldmann, Levy Bruhl, Chomsky, Maslow, 
Scheler, Pareto, Nietzche, Gurvitch, Popper, Fiaget, Lorenz 
and Wilson among a host of others. While it is still 
necessary to exercise caution when speaking about innate 
properties in humankind, it seems, after a shaky start, that 
the time .has arrived when it is not only possible but 
necessary to speak about such properties. Humank:.indt s genet1c 
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endowment has been neglected by certain of the sciences due 
to factors mentioned earlier. This has led some scholars to 
be timid and reticent in instances where the logic of their 
/ 
argLUUents forced them to speak about innate human properties. 
The neglect of the innate in hwnans, has, many now agree, 
delayed the proper understanding of humankind and, in many 
instances, produced distorted images of humankind. 
Innate knowledge is present in humans at the molecular 
and pe'ilular levels just as it is in the most elementary 
forms of __ ~~~~"- It is also present at the neural and anatomic 
levels as is the case of other higher forms of life. Human-
kindt s entire repertoire of behaviour, both motor and 
cognitive, is constructed upon and dependent upon its stock 
of innate knowledge. In individual hwnan beings, this stock 
of knowledge is present as an operating system or schema: a 
schema of integrated complexity. It is a complexity built 
out of simpler semi-autonomous schemas. Some fairly simple 
schemas are common. DNA, RNA and the living cells they con-
stitute may be considered the physical and chemical 
correlates of a most basic type of innate knowledge. Another 
basic type of innate knowledge or innate schema conunon, to 
living organisms from the simplest to the most complex is 
the knowledge these have about the danger~ of ultraviolet 
light and the ability to repair some of the damage this · 
causes. The ensymes responsible for the replication and 
repair of DNA may be seen as representing knowledge achieved 
phylogeneticalJ..y (see Burnet 1980:19-20). A knowledge which 
both points to a reality of the organism/environment unity 
and the organism's adjustment to this. By its repair of 
radiation damage the cell signals its knm·:ledge about such a 
danger and its knowledge of hew to repair such damage. Need 
it be·said that were there no such thing as radiation damage 
it would be inconceivable that such knowledge would exist? 
The monosynapse (in the jargon of neurobiology) may be 
considered as another rudimentary and fundamental example of 
an innate schema. The monosynapse is characterized by the 
invariant response it produces in an effector organ as a 
direct result of the stimulation of the sense receptor (Rose 
1976:115~117). Viewed behaviourally, a monosynapse 
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constitutes a simple reflex. Reflexes together with tropisms 
represent, in epistemic discourse, some of the simplest 
innate schemas of which we are aware. Reflexes represent 
intelligence which has been phylogenetically acquired and 
which is genetically transmitted. An organism lives to a 
great extent in terms of its endowment of reflexes and also 
uses these to deal with threatening situations. Our bodies 
and those of other organisms know how to do numerous things 
without ever being taught. That much of this doing takes 
place unconsciously is a further indication that it relies 
on non-cognitive and non-learnt forms of knowledge. Accord-
ing to Lausch (1975:148), reflexes are reactions of the body 
which are not improved by reflection. Like all innate 
knowledge, which is blind to sudden and minute changes and 
atypical situations, the generally benevolent and 'intelli-
gent' reflex can sometimes prove malevolent and stupid. One 
has only to consider the case of the moth consumed by the 
candle flame or a human•s reflex to jerk an a.rm back after 
it has gone through a pane of glass. It has been estimated 
that over twenty thousand reflex paths protect the human 
organism (Lausch 1975:149). This c;ives some indication of' 
the richness of humankind's stock of innate knowledge. 
Simple and complex innate schemas are shared by hwnans 
and the other mammals. All these species are, for example, 
genetically endowed with the knowledge which allows them to 
keep their bodies at a certain temperature despite fluc-
tuations in the external temperature. Besides this they 
also innately know how to maintain a constant blood pressure, 
how to sleep, how to match oxygen supply with oxygen demand, 
how to digest and eliminate food, how to take in moisture 
and eliminate waste and toxic-substances, how to combat 
certain diseases, how to mend certain wounds and injuries, 
how to communicate, how to copulate, how to reproduce and 
rear their own kind, and so forth. These abilities, these 
acts of knowing how, are largely involuntary and dependent 
on inborn reflexes as Penfield (1969:139) has pointed out. 
In the same vein, Kelly (1963:51) has drawn attention to the 
fact that human behaviour is partly based or.. many "inter-
locking equivalence-difference patterns which are never 
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communicated in symbolic speech". He proceeds to cite some 
instances of the bodyts ability to make certain discrimina-
tions on a purely physiological and non-conscious level. 
Kelly speaks of "physiological construction systems" and, to 
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indicate the coincidence of his formulation with the unity 
between innate and learnt knowledge proposed in this study, 
goes on to say (p 52), 11 ••• we may subsume a person's 
physiological construction system within our own psycho-
logical system". Among the examples of physiological con-
struction systems Kelly refers to are those discriminatory 
behaviours involved in digestion and glandular secretions. 
As an aside, Kelly's incorporation of the notion of physio-· 
logical constructs into his overall systems of constructs 
contradicts his constructive alternativism argwnent. 
Physiological constructs, as a variety of innate knowledge, 
are biologically given and, as was pointed out above and as 
most geneticists agree, alternativism at the genetic level 
is possible only via phylogenetic processes and here it is 
usually extremely gradual and non-spectacuJ_ar in its opera-
ti on. 
The human male may have to learn to copulate but he 
does not learn how to produce semen or to ejaculate. 
Similarly, the human female conceives without being aware of 
this happening. It is copulation which occupies her mind 
and of which she is conscious. Furthermore, it is largely 
in ignorance and outside consciousness that she nurtures and 
the foetus develops during gestation. We may thus legiti-
mately say that in the womb the foetus and the mother are 
directed by innate knowledge. The irrelevance of cognition 
and consciousness to this process of reproduction·is 
emphasized by women in coma who have delivered viable off-
spring. What is known about conception makes it possible to 
suppose that a woman in coma could also conceive. 
The partial morphological recapitulation by the 
developing embryo of the phylogenetic morphological stages 
can be cited as an example of innate knowledge. Illustrating 
as it does in a very graphic fashion the thesis that higher 
forms of knowledge develop out of lower forms and incorporate 
these to some extent in their own structures.. Examples of 
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more specific innate schemas in the developing embryo can be 
mentioned. One of these, present after about the second 
month after conception, is represented in the avoidance 
reaction which the embryo exhibits if an unpleasant stimulus 
is applied to its upper lip. The reaction consists of the 
withdrawal of the hand region by contraction of the neck 
muscles (Rose 1976:192). 
The intra-uterine behaviour of the foetus and its rates 
and stages of development are further examples of innate 
knowledge systems in operation. During its period of growth, 
the foetus exhibits a kick reflex and spontaneously exer-
cises other, what seem to be, innate schemas. These 
activities are a prelude to the more commonly noted reflexes 
and motor activities which occur at birth and soon thereafter. 
And while these are the result of both exercise and innate 
elements, the regularity and inevitability of their occur-
rence justifies treating them as representations of innate 
schemas. 
The stock of knowledge constituted at the moment of' 
conception unfolds and develops according to an innate 
monitoring schema and results at the time of birth in a 
vastly expanded stock of knowledge. This knm1•ledge directs 
the infant's behaviour just prior to and during birth in such 
a fashion that the infant actually co-operates in and 
facilitates the birth process. This stock of knowledge is 
also sufficient to ensure that at birth and shortly there-
after the child does perform certain rudimentary behaviours 
which enhance its chanceE of survival. c The new born infant often begins breathing spontaneously. 
Even if the infant has to be assisted to start breathing it 
nevertheless remains the case that the bulk of the activity 
represents the operation of the infantts own breathing schema 
which is largely innately determined. Crying, another 
initially primarily innately directed activity, presupposes 
the func·tioning of the breathing schema. Crying lays the 
foundation for communication between in1'ant and adult. By 
its cry, the child signals that it knows how to register and 
to express pain, displeasure, discomfort· and fear. Neona·tal 
crying is a good example of teleonomic activity. By its 
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crying the baby indicates its innate awareness that this 
rather than some other motor activity is the path to comfort. 
The existence of the caring "other" is thus somehow phylo-
genetically built into the child's basic behavioural reper-
toire. The young of many other species get on with the job 
of restoring comfort by themselves, they are programmed to 
do this. They have assimilated the existential fact of the 
indifference, impotence and ignorance of their parents. 
The teleonomic nature of the hwnan infant cry is further 
evidenced by the discovery that the distress calls of a child, 
to which we seem to respond innately to some extent, fall 
within the frequency range of about J 000 cycles per second, 
the most sensitive part of our auditory range. (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt 1970:462.) Wolffis (1969) discussion of the neo-
natal cry is consistent with, though more detailed than, that 
of Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Wolff has reported that the neonate's 
cry is essentially a high-frequency micro-rhythm, regulated 
by apparently endogeno.us brain mechanisms arranged as an 
auditory pattern involving quite complex time sequences. She 
has also indicated that there are at least three distinct 
varieties of crying and t,hat mothers generally have li ttlc 
difficulty in distinguishing them. This latter observation 
and the reports of parents, especially mothers, suggests that 
human adults seem to exhibit a re2.ction to crying that i;:; 
innate at base. The innate arousal properties of the baby's 
cry rouses parents from the deepest sleep and is, if con-
tinuous, so di~turbing to cerebral and emotional functioning 
that it seems highly likely that it is an important factor in 
accounting for baby bashing. 
Crying, as initially largely an innately directed per-
formance is modified as a result of experience and maturation 
but learning theory is nevertheless inadequate to account for 
its attention getting effect on parents. It is as if the 
child and the parent are so biologically orchestrated that 
the child emits sounds which are particularly disturbing to 
the parent and in this way the child virtually compels the 
parent to take some action to stop the crying. Not surpris-
ingly, it is the pain cry in particular which has the most 
extreme arousing properties and seems to compel parents to 
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prompt action. Judging from the arousal properties stemming 
from the various types of neonatal cry, it appears that there 
seems to be some sort of biological correspondence between 
the message conveyed by the cry and its "meaning" at the 
adult innate knowledge level. Wolff's research and findings 
in sociobiology reported by Barash (1980) suggest that 
mothers are more sensitive to their babies' crying than are 
fathers. Sociobiology would argue that this: difference in 
response .is due to genetic factors. A claim that would no 
doubt upset those who argue that there is no such thing as a 
maternal instinct or innate mother-child bondo Tbere is 
little doubt that infant crying upsets some males strongly; 
this is clearly evidenced by the brutal punishment some males 
dish out to crying infants in order to get them to "shut up". 
Other males react with considerable compassibn towards crying 
babies. Though there may or may not be innate male or female 
differences in this regard, what seems inescapable is the 
fact that humans are so biologically constructed that it is 
difficult for most of them to ignore the cries of an infant, 
especially their own. 
Breathing and crying are among a growing list of complex 
behaviours which psychologists have come to recognize that 
the newborn is capable of 'vi th.out practice or example. To 
avoid the word reflex for such complicated behaviours some 
writers use such words as "rules" or "strategies" to label 
them. These words come close iri meaning to what is here 
called epistemic systems or schemas. For example, Holme 
(1971 :81) writes, "It seems as though nature has endmved the 
newborn with general rules for behaving in certain situations." 
He cites, as one example, the sucking reflex. Of this he 
says, "If sucking were merely a reflex response to a nipple 
in the mouth, the baby would suck at any time, but it is 
well known that he will not ••• it appears that one of the 
rul.es with which the baby comes into the worl.d is: if 
aroused and nipple is in mouth, then suck." Hinde (1970:4J6) 
views the lateral head movement of the neonate as an example 
of stereotyped behaviour which he regards as· not necessarily 
specific to feeding but which is nevertheless useful. in 
locating the nipple and sucking. D .H. Lawrence. (1921: 51) in 
128 
reply to the question how the child finds the breast with 
its blind and mindless little mouth answered. poetically that 
the child needs no eyes or mind, "From the great first-mind 
of the abdomen it moves direct, with an anterior knowledge 
almost like magnetic propulsion as if the little mouth were 
drawn or propelled to the maternal breast by vital magnetism, 
whose center of directive control lies in the solar plexus." 
(See also La Barre 1954; Thouless 1963; .McCan.dless 1967.) 
Among other innate schemas which can be cited are the 
well known Moro reflex, the grasping reflex, the primary 
walking reflex, the Babinsky reflex, the yawning ref lex and 
the sneezing reflex. These reflexes all seem to have clear 
phylogenetic antecedents. 
Hinde 1970; Prechtl 1965; 
Rose 1976; McCall 1975.) 
(On the various reflexes see 
La Barre 1954; McCandless 1967; 
The observation is now well established that a number of 
innate schemas, operative at birth or soon_ thereafter, wane 
in the weeks following birth. Part of the explanation for 
this seems to lie in the fact that the infant's nervous 
system is still being formed during the weeks and months 
after birth. The pbylogenetically older parts of the nervous 
system, for example, are formed before the newer parts. 
Thus, in a sense, the newborn is a more physiologically 
primitive being than is the two-year-old. Its relative 
primitiveness is witnessed by its range of innate behaviours. 
As the nervous system develops, what appeared at one moment 
of development .to be fixed and inflexible innate schemas 
disappear through processes such as schematic fragmentation 
and the subordination of innate schemas by more complex.and 
flexible schemas often under volitional control. It is 
widely accepted that the human young are prematurely ejected 
from the womb in terms of their physical and nervous develop-
ment. This premature expulsion and consequent period of 
development are seen as important factors in humankindVs vast 
capacity for learning. The information assimilated simul-
taneously with the final stages of development of the nervous 
system particularly as seen in the convolutions of the 
cortex seems to form a permanent and basic strata in the 
stock of learnt knowledge. Things., like language, assimilated 
during this period leave their stamp on all subsequent 
assimilations. 
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As an example of' the process whereby what was initially 
a reflex gives rise to and becomes incorporated into an open 
and flexible voluntarily controlled set of' schemas, the 
sucking reflex can be considered. The innately directed 
activity of' the tongue f'orms an important element in the 
sucking reflex. The behaviour of' the tongue in this situ-
ation has not been much conunented upon in the literature and 
hence I have asked adults who are ignorant of the behaviour 
of' i:nf'ants when feeding to explain to me how they think an 
i:nf'ant sucks and to demonstrate their method to me. None of' 
the sizable group I have questioned could describe to me what 
an i:nf'ant in fact does, which is to create a vacuum of sorts 
between the top of' its tongue and the roof of its mouth by 
rhythmically moving the tongue slightly up and down and 
slightly back and f'orth. The nipple being held in the mouth 
by this vacuum, and the pressure of the tongue holding it 
against the upper gum and lip. The lower jaw, gum, and lip 
are free and the baby breathes to some extent independently 
of' its feeding activity. This latter aspect of the feeding 
procedure gives rise to the terrible problem of air swallowed 
with the milk. Tbe reason for citing this example is th.at 
it illustrates a kind of knowledge which the i:nf'ant has which 
human adults find hard to imagine, choosing instead to think 
in terms of sucking with both lips clasped over the nipple, 
in drinking-straw fashion, and using the lungs to create the 
difference in pressure. (The sucking reflex and sucking 
patterns have been extensively described by Lipsitt (1967) 
and Sameroff (1968). They have both drawn attention to the 
instinctive aspects of sucking, the phenotypic variations in 
practice, the effects of experience and exercise, and the 
possibilities of learning and conditioning. Kessen, Haith 
and Salapatek (1970) and McCall (1975) have also described 
i:nf'ant sucking.) 
As i:nf'ants mature, their reflexive sucking and feeding 
schemas gradually develop and become incorporated into open, 
flexible and voluntary schemas. The fact that humans achieve 
volitional control over these initially innate schemas is an 
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observable :feature o:f normal development and is inexorably 
linked to the development o:f speech. To be able to speak it 
is obviously necessary that the cerebral cortex gain control 
over the organs o:f speech, o:f which the tongue, lips, lower 
jaw and larynx are o:f prime importance. Some volitional 
control over breathing must also be achieved but it is easy 
to demonstrate that such control is never absolute. While 
we can re:frain :from speaking :for as long as we choose, we 
cannot commit suicide by simply holding our breath. The 
innate breathing schema automatically takes over when the 
oxygen supply in the body falls beJ.ow a certain level. 
Observations such as this suggest that some innate schemas 
remain relatively intact but arc incorporated into other 
schemas to form more complex and flexible schemas during 
development. 
The operating hwnan stock o:f innate knowledge consists 
of many kinds of innate schemas -- too many to all be dealt 
with here. Some of these, as just indicated, become incor-
porated into learnt schemas, others operate througbout li:fe 
with learning having relatively little in:flucnce en them. 
Yet others only become operative at s.pecific moments in 
ontogenesis. The schemas responsible for sexual responses 
and behaviours provide a good example. At the psychological 
level, it se.ems that hwnans have an innate schema which · 
operates LUlder normal circumstances to produce such things 
as the fear of imaginary creatures or events associated "Kith 
the darkness. ·Such a fear is rare in the hwnan cbild before 
the age of three yet common thereafter. Similarly, infants 
from about six months of age appear to begin avoiding 
strangers spontaneously. (These examples are from Hebb 1972: 
119, 129.) Obviously, in these examples, learning, experi-
er..ce 2nd maturation are all involved, but the invariance of 
these behaviours points to invariates in humankind's genetic 
make-up and in its life situation. 
An innate s.chema was discovered by Bmrnr. et al. ( 1 970) 
which is worth noting. In a series of experiments conducted 
by Bmrnr et al. and replicated and extended py Ball and 
Tronick (1971) it has been demonstrated that very young 
infants indicate by their actions that they know certain 
1J1 
objects and events are "dangerous" and that they know how, 
in a rudimentary fashion, to take evasive action. These 
experiments also suggest that very young infants organize 
their visual perceptions three dimensionally. They know 
when objects are near or far and whether they are approaching 
or receding. In the experiments babies as young as one or 
two weeks of age were placed in a position to watch a large 
patterned box approach. The box was moved in various ways in 
these experiments and the infants' reactions carefully 
ob~:erved. It was found, for example, that if the box was 
moved directly towards the infants, they exhibited a charac-
tcristic response: they all put their hands up between their 
faces and the approaching box,, pulled their heads back and 
opened their eyes wide. The infants did not do these things 
when the box was moved along a "miss path". l\ioore (1975:452), 
one of the original discoverers of the schema described, has 
written: 
These results indicate that the babies know the 
consequences of what is happening -- ttat this 
thing approaching them may hit them and that 
they should protect themselves from it as well 
as they can. This sequence of behaviours is a 
complex reaction, and it is most LU!lilceJ.y that 
it could have been learned. 
Motivational. and orientational schemas 
Besides those already mentioned, humans are genetically 
endowed with, what may be called, motivational and orien-
tational schema·s. These presuppose, like all schemas, those 
most elementary and necessary of all schemas, the schemas 
responsible for the rudiments of life: form, organization 
and energy. The motivational and orientational schemas 
operate to produce the "drives" described inipsychology. A 
close look at drives indicates that these consist not only of 
internally generated forces which compel organisms to 
activity, but they are always structured, expressing them-
selves in particular types of activity directed towards 
identifiable objectives.. Drives are, on inspection, highly 
teleonomic in character. They generally function to organize 
perception, cognition, feelings and behaviour in such a way 
that enhances the chances of the organism attaining a 
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particular life supporting, even life enhancing, state of 
affairs. A thirsty animal will be driven to drink and when 
the time for reproduction is reached it will be driven to 
copulate. In the case of hurnans, beginning at birth, such 
drives as the respiratory drive, the hunger and thirst drive, 
the stimulation drive, the curiosi~ drive, the exercise 
drive, the attachment drive and the sex drive all represent 
to a greater or lesser extent the operation of distinct 
innate motivational and orientational schemas. 
The recognition that humans are innately endowed with 
some knowledge as regards which physiological, envirorunental, 
social and psychological states and experiences are "good" 
for them and which are "bad" suggests that the sharp dis-
tinction between knowledge and values drawn in philosophy and 
the social sciences needs to be reconsideredo It would seem 
that human beings, like all creatures, are endowed with a 
rudimentary system of values which, because it manifests 
itself in feelings, gradually leads to the c?gnitive knowl-
edge of human preferences and dislikes and also, eventually, 
to highly abstract cultural values. Homans (1974:27) has 
described this genesis and interconnection between the 
various levels and types of human values. He writes, "A 
value is learned by being linked with an action that is 
successful in obtaining a more primordial value ••• By such 
processes of linking, men may learn and maintain long chains 
of behaviour leading to some_ ultimate reward." In his book, 
"The Biological· Origin of Human Values", Pugh ( 1978) clari-
fies the origin and structure of human values and describes 
the relationships between different types of values in con-
scious human decision making. His major insights are drawn 
from a comparison of the human value schema with the decision 
criteria and programmes used by computers. According to his 
analysis (p 8), decision systems normally use two types of 
values. These he calls "primary" and "secondary". The 
primary values are those that are built-in by. the designer 
(or. innate). These define the decision system's ultimate 
criteria for decision making. Secondary values are derived 
from the primary ones and may be developed by the decision 
system itself as a practical aid in decision making. Pugh 
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cites pain and hwiger as primary values of the human value 
schema and morality, love of money and art appreciation as 
secondary values. He distinguishes between prescriptive and 
descriptive knowledge and shows how, in deciding upon a 
course of action, both forms of knowledge are inevitably 
involved. "We draw on our factual or descriptive knowledge 
to predict the consequences of a proposed action. We draw 
on our prescriptive knowledge to evaluate the consequences 
so we can decide which course of action is 'best'." (Pugh 
1978:11.) In short, our sensations, feelings and emotions 
are a form of "gut" knowledge which informs our conscious-
nesses about the things the genome has discovered to be life 
enhancing or life endangering. The coordinates and pathways 
encouraged by this innate knowledge may be seen to leave its 
mark upon the shape of individual lives as well as human 
history and culture. As Pugh (1978:9) notes~ "Human values 
prov·ide the guiding criteria for all personal decisions. 
They are therefore the fundamental driving force of human 
history." 
Humankind's innate evaluative (or prescriptive) knowl-
edge is and remains a fundamental part of the human stock of' 
knowledge at every point of cultural evolution. Though 
culture evolves rapidly, our innate evaluative knowledge, it 
is generally agreed, has hardly changed in cultural time· 
(though it certainly may have in biological time). This 
observation is important for it suggests that the development 
of cnltural knowledge is everywhere and at all time ballasted 
by similar fwidamental orientational promptings. Each 
generation of children looks to find their primary values 
expressed in society in some way. They are, after all, 
along with our other ancestors, the phylogenetic parents of 
society. Though it is obvious that cultural values can come 
to contradict biological values, it is also obvious that if 
human societies survive they have, at least minimally, 
equilibrated these two levels of value to some extent at 
each stage. Biological values then, apart from providing the 
initial impetus and direction for the development of culture, 
also serve as the ultimate judge of culture. 
In learning theory in psychology, the existence of some 
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sort of innate motivation and orientation (or value) schema 
is generally a.sswned. . This is true especially of theories 
which see organisms learning in terms of the effects of 
pleasure and pain. Obviously, stimuli are not in themselves 
either pleasurable or painful. They are only so in terms of 
an organism's biological structure. An organism's innate 
value schema generally ensures that it wil:!: __ le arn__!_2__?Lvoid 
painful stimuli and experiences and seek pleasurable ones. 
L_ ---- ------------ - --- .. ------- ··-··-----
It also generally ensures that the learnt elements of its 
total value schema will bear the imprint of the innate one 
and remain, to some extent, equilibrated with it no matter 
how extensive the learning of values becomes. 
To demonstrate the structured goodness or teleonomic 
nature of hwnankindYs innate value schema, Pulliam and Dun-
ford (1980:32-34) cite experiments which have been conducted 
using newly weaned infants as subjects. These infants 
revealed that they seemed to possess some unlearnt knowledge 
as regards what foods and what_ quantities were good for them. 
Pulliam and Dun:ford also cite detailed experiments with rats 
which also show them to have a complex innate knowledge of' 
an adequate and healthy diet. 
In his book, "The Whisperings Within", Barash (1980:39) 
asks the prosaic yet interesting question, "Why is sugar 
Slveet?" He .answers, "Because it contains sucrose, of course. 11 
He then asks the more pertinent question, "But why do we 
experience it the way we do?" Evolutionary reasoning sup-
plies the answer. Our distant ancestors spent a great deal 
of time in the trees and ate a lot of fruit. Ripe fruit is 
more nutritious and has more sugar than unripe fruit. 
Following Barash, it can be supposed that a slight preference 
for ripe fruit led, in evolutionary time, not only to the 
selection of those ancestors who preferred ripe fruit but 
also to the selection of those who liked it most. Those 
encouraged by their preferences to eat the more nutritious 
fruit were thereby rendered biologically fitter than their 
contemporaries. That is, they matched physiological needs 
more optimally with the available food than did the others. 
Their greater fitness probably expressed·itself in higher 
energy levels, more robustness and enhanced reproductive 
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success. In this way sugar became phylogenetically sweeter 
until it is now all but irresistible to humans and primates. 
The high biological value attached to sugar is now no longer 
only reflected in its sweetness, but is also expressed in 
our highly advanced_ knowledge, technology, economics, cul-
tu.re and medicine o:f sugar. Paradoxically, because o:f the 
overabundance o:f sugar made possible by these value induced 
achievements, humans in the industrialized countries o:f the 
world are exposed ·to a danger :foreign to early or less 
industrialized societies. This is the danger o:f eating too 
much sugar. -It may be that because o:f this danger indivi-
duals with a lower preference :for sugar are being selected 
today as the more :fit among individuals living in a situation 
o:f overabundant s'..reetness. 
The matter o:f cravings :for, and the "sweetness" and 
11 tastineEs" o:f, certain :foodstuffs and beverages rather than 
others provides a :fairly straightforward example o:f, what is 
at base, a biologically evolved schema o:f motivation and 
orientation. Sociobiology provides many :further examples. 
In :fact, the whole corpus o:f sociobiology to date may be read 
as a catalo5·ue o:f what has been :found to be, or is claimed 
to be, "sweet" or "sour" to the human genome. According to 
sociobiological theory, human individuals are the genome's 
method o:f adapting and surviving. Our learning, adaptation, 
reproduction, survival and other li:fe achievements are as 
much the genome's achievements as they are ours. (See, for 
example, Wilson 1975, 1978; Barash 1977, 1979; Trivers 1971; 
Dawkins 1976; and Gregory et al. 1978.) 
In its eons o:f evolution, -the human genome discovered 
many things to be life enhancing and life diminishing. The 
push and pull between these and the teleonomic nature of li:fe 
seem to have caused life to evolve toKards what is beneficial 
and away from what is threatening. However, since what 
benefits and what threatens life deper ... ds on the structure o:f 
life, we now know that each change in structu;re heralded a 
new set of benefits and threats; evolution is a road without 
end. The evolution towards sociality, to survival through 
strength of numbers and the pooling of le2rning spawned its 
own dangers. It is thus not surprising that in achieving the 
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benefits of sociality the genome has also learnt of its 
costs. This is reflected, for example, in our innate value 
schema which includes altruistic and selfish elements. 
According to sociobiology, genes are fundamentally selfish. 
They operate simply to live and reproduce themselveso Their 
ultimate task, states Barash (1979: 1JJ), "is to manipulate 
the bodies within which they find themselves, so as to make 
as many copies of themselves as they possibly can". Accord-
ing to Barash, our genes "whisper" to us, telling us not so 
much what is good for us as individuals but what is good for 
the life and ·reproduction of our genes. Our knowledge of 
marriage 2.nd of what type of mate to marry, of how to relate 
to our relations, of how many children to have, of how to 
rear them, and of how to marry them off, are all amplifica-
tions of the whisperings of our genes, of our innate knowl-
edge. We hear these whisperings, if we choose to listen, in 
the voice of our emotions and in the loud proclamations of 
cultural norms, values and laws. Human altruism is not a 
love and sacrifice for all, it is a selective altruism which 
may not make much sense in terms of universal ethical systems 
but makes a great deal of sense in biology. Because we share 
more genes with more immediate blood relatives it appears 
that our genes have encouraged ideas about family and self 
sacrifice which favour most highly those who share most genes 
with us. Sociobiology provides much surprising evidence in 
support of this argument. Blood seems indeed to be thicker 
than water for all living things, as Barash (1979:132) 
remarks. Humans, like other living things, exhibit in 
knowledge and behaviour a tendency to maximize their incJ.u-
sive fitness; to maximize their reproductive success through 
their offspring plus that of their relatives (Barash 1979: 
136). 
Sociobiology documents other genetic "whisperings" which 
have shaped culture in a way beneficial to the survival and 
reproduction of human genes. It also indicates something of 
the extent to which such inner promptings can be complicated 
and muted in the human case and can lead to contradictory and 
disequilibrated results. These need not be entered into here 
since it seems that though much controversy.still surrounds 
137 
sociobiology and it is still an infant science, its basic 
message is incontrovertible: the human genome has played 
and continues to play a significant role in shaping human 
knowledge, culture and behaviour. 
In modern sociology it is that small new branch called 
"existential sociology" which portrays most clearly the 
relationship between what is here called the innate value 
schema and culture.. A passage from Douglas (1978) is worth 
quoting since it conveys the essence of both existential 
sociology and t~_:relationshi_I> between innate values and 
culture. - Love and hate, ecstasy and agony, pleasure 
and pain, lust and satiety, hope and despair, 
satisfaction and frustration, excitement and 
boredom, sympathy and spite, full and hungry, 
comfort and discomfort. These and a vast 
number of other feelings, named and unname-
able, are the core of our being, tte stuff of 
our everyday lives. They are the foundations 
of all society. They come before symbolic 
meaning and value, lead us continually to re-
interpret, hide from, evade, overthrow, and 
recreate thoughts and values. Feelings 
pervade all meanings and values. They in-
spire our practical uses of rules and they 
are the reasons behind reasoned accoLOnts ••• 
without feeling, without brute being, there 
would be no use for rules, ideas, or social 
structures; and there would be none. 
Douglas (1978:51). 
It is because we know re2.li ty through our feelings as 
well as our thoughts that we are not social puppetso We are 
necessarily social but we are also necessarily outside and 
often in conflict with society (Douglas 1978:49) .. The brute 
side of our being feels, speaks and acts in a primordial 
language which echoes through culture and society but can 
also oppose them. It seems to me that sociolog_y c.a.I!_ move -- ----. 
beyond its "oversocialized" and "cognitivist 11 distortions 
.......___ ~ --
(see Wrong 1961; 1980) by recognizing that feelings and 
emotions are a form of knowledge and information. They re-
present the wisdom of tho genome and the body and are their 
way of speaking to society and mind. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INNATE LEARNING SCHEMA 
When behaviour implies elements acquired 
through experience, they are acquired 
according to a program, and that program 
is· innate -- that is to say, genetically 
determined. The program's structure in-
itiates and guides early learning, 1vhich 
will follow a certain pre-established 
pattern defined in the species' genetic 
patrimony. 
Jacques Monod (in Fox 1975:1) 
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It was argued earlier that knowledge has only two 
sources. The first is the assimilation of information by the 
genome and the second is its assimilation by the individual 
-.......__ - " 
organism. One of the things for which innate knowledge is 
responsible is the various basic assimilatory schemas which 
any knowledge acquisition presupposes. These, while they 
make the ontogenetic assimilation of information possible, 
also direct and limit this assimilation and the knowledge 
which flows from it. 
The schemas which enable individual organisms to assim-
ilate information are of various types and yield different 
varieties of knowledge. Some such schemas inform the 
o:-ganis,m of its interna~- state, others convey i~_o!mation 
about the environment. Some information is assimilated and 
utilized without ever reaching consciousness, other infor-
mation is consciously assimilated and used. Some information 
is instantaneously assimilated and used, other information 
is permanently assimilated and used repeatedly. 
It seems that all living organisms and even plants are 
capable of assimilating some forms of informationo All life 
is thus, to some extent, capable of acquiring knowledge in-
dividuallye S~r.sations represent a lo~_ level but important 
form of awareness and as such may legitimately be regarded 
139 
as a form of knowledge. Such sensory knowledge is probably 
the most basic and universal of the various forms of 
individually acquired knowledge. It is a form of knowledge 
without which life could not exist. According to Lorenz 
(1977:45) all forms of life, including bacteria and plants, 
possess some potential for the acquisition of sensory know-
ledge. 
Beginning with sensory knowledge and the sensory schemas 
which it presupposes, knowledge may be seen to have evolved 
to perceptual knowledge and cognitive knowledge as the 
capacity of organisms to learn from their sensations and 
irritations expanded. Following Hebb (1972:29) perceptual 
knowledge is a form of learnt knowledge because such know-
ledge produces a lasting change in the perception of an 
object or event as a result of earlier perceptions and 
experiences. For Hebb, perceptual knowledge is inseparable 
from cognitive knowledge. He writes (p 219), "Perception ••• 
is the beginning of a thought process and cannot occur where 
there is no thought." 
Learnt knowledge 
Sensory knowledge is instantaneous knowledge. It is 
fleeting and stimulus bound. Sensory schemas on their own 
yield no lasting increase in an organism's stock of know.:.. 
ledge. However, when such schemas are integrated with per-
ceptual and cognitive schemas such increases become possible. 
Irritability _ _, or sensitivity -- is thus not only the basis 
of instantaneous knowing, it is also the basis of more 
permanent types of knowledge. It provides the basis for all 
higher processes of" information assimilation {see Lorenz 
1977:45; Taylor 1962:340). 
The value to life of both instantaneous knowledge and 
more lasting knowledge is self apparent. The evolution of 
schemas yielding these two forms of knowledge is thus not 
surprising. And while sensory (or instantane.ous) knowledge 
is universal, even very simple life forms seem capable to 
some extent of acquiring more lasting knowledge from sensory 
knowledge. The knowledge assimilated from the immediacy of 
experience constitutes what I have called "learnt knowledge". 
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This knowledge, because it is incorporated more or less 
permanently into the organism's stock of knowledge, may have 
the effect, unlike sensory knowledge, of actually modifying 
the schemas through which it is constituted. For, as Lorenz 
(1977:66) has argued, it is essential to all learning that 
an adaptive change should take place in the structures of 
the sense organs and nervous system that are concerned with 
behaviour. It is in a modification of physiological struc-
ture that the storing of knowledge is actually accomplished. 
The distinction bet·ween learnt knowledge and instantaneous 
knowledge is· captured by Piaget (1973:105) when he states, 
"In contrast to perception and immediate understanding it is 
necessary then to reserve the term learning to an acquisition 
as a function of experience but unfolding in time, that is 
mediate and not immediate like .instantaneous perception or 
understanding." Learnt knowledge may thus be defined as that 
knowledge which is ontogenetically more or less lastingly 
assimilated by an organism out of the information at its 
disposal·. 
The fact that certain forms of knowledge appear to be 
the immediate results of ontogenetic accommodatory and 
equilibratory processes should not be seen as undermining 
this definition. For, as already noted, the latter processes 
also, always, imply ass;i..milation and all learning, even if 
achieved primarily through accommodatory and equilibratory 
processes, reaches back ultimately to initiatory assimi-
lations and implies the assimilation of self generated 
information. For example, though infants can be said to 
construct aspects of language for themselves on the basis of 
acconunodatory and equilibratory processes, they rely on their 
own linguistic acts and those-of others to supply the infor-
mation without which these other processes and such con-
struction would be impossible. 
The phrase 11 learnt knm·;ledge" may not be very elegant 
but it accurately describes that form of lasting knowledge 
which cannot be primarily attributed to or explained in terms 
of genetic factors. In the light of what was written earlier 
about innate knowledge, it is important to note that learnt 
knowledge is not something entirely distinct from irmate 
141 
knowledge. They are not opposites nor are they exclusive 
categories. Learning always takes place and can only take 
place in terms of the operation of innate schemas. 
By defining "learnt knowledge" as ontogenetically 
assimilated information a meaning is being attached to the 
word "learning" which signals a deviation from the more 
strict behaviourist or S-R usage. Learning is basically a 
process which modifies the stock of knowledge, generally in 
an incremental fashion, and since only certain items of 
knowledge relate directly to observable behaviour, any 
approach to learning too narrowly bound to the notion of 
changes in observable behaviour of necessity omits a great 
deal of the substantive change actually resulting from the 
learning process. A novel or altered form of behaviour is 
not what is acquired as a result of learning; how could a 
behaviour be stored? What is acquired is the knowledge of 
which the behaviour is a manifestation. 
A little reflection is enough to confirm for ourselves 
that not all knowledge is represented in observable behav-
iour. Unused knowledge does not mean non-existent knowledge. 
A great deal of knowledge is represented in such things as 
conscious thought, dreams, feelings and emotions. It seems 
that we know more than we showo And, given the present 
state of our. knowledge of ourselves, we know more than we 
know we know. Even in the context of scientific knowledge, 
as Polanyi (1967) has so persuasively argued, more knowledge 
is involved than we are even aware of. As he says, in doing 
I 
science,"••• we know more than we can tell" (Polanyi 1967: 
4). Objectivity is impossible, all scientific knowledge is, 
in a profound sense, personal knowledge. An example of an 
inadequate behavioural definition of learning is provided by 
Hilgard (1956:3). Hilgard defines learning as: "The process 
by which an activity originates or is changed through 
reacting to an encountered situation, provided that the 
characteristics of the change in activity cannot be explained 
on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or 
temporary states of the organism." This definition seems to 
me unsatisfactory because it detracts attention from what is 
actually acquired by learning, pointing instead to its 
repre'sentation -- a new or changed activity. What is 
actually acquired and what the learner has as a lasting 
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,possession is not the activity -- this is bound in time and 
place -- but the knowledge which makes that sort of activity 
possible. There is no one to one relationship between 
learning (learnt knowledge) and activity or behaviour since 
activity or behaviour generally involves environmental 
inputs as well as inputs from tte organism. Hence, what has 
been learnt may remain constant while its representation in 
behaviour will vary. What has been le2.rnt is not always 
rigidly bound to the stimuli or situation i'rom which it was 
assimilated. Learning can be 2.pplied and is applied in a 
creative and synthetic fashion to ma.ny and varied situations. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on activity obscures in the case 
of cognition tl:e difference between the process and content 
of cognition. Nuch cognitive learning makes little differ-
ence to the process of thought while radically altering its 
content. Cognitive definitions, such as that proposed by 
KrPch and Crutchfield (1948:112) to tr~e effect that, 
"Le2.rning is a reorganization of the cognitive field", are 
adequate as far as cognitive learning is concerned but as 
learning does not only apply to the domain of the cognitive, 
such definitions must also be judged inadequate. 
Definitions of learning which refer to the physiological 
changes resulting from particular experiences are closer than 
the behaviouristic ones to the conception preferred in this 
study. (See, for example, Eugelski 1956; Penfield 1969; 
Rose 1976). The acquisition of knowledge or its modification 
implies some alteration in material structure. It is the 
altered material structure which results from learning 
experiences and it is this that is responsible for changes 
in behaviour. These altered structures are more homologous 
with learnt knowledge than is altered behaviour. The idea 
of the "engram" as used by Taylor (1962) is consistent with 
the notion "learnt knowledge" as used here. .For example, it 
can be said of learnt knowledge, just as Taylor (p 340) says 
of the "engram", that it"••• is not something that was 
there from the beginning_ ••• (it) ••• represents a portion 
·. 
of the organism2s commerce with the environment, written in 
the :form o:f ·.temporary coP.nections built into the brain." 
Unlearnt learnt knowledge 
Learning theorists regard behavioural changes due to 
maturation or development as something LESS than what is to 
be understood by learning even though these take place as a 
result o:f experience and simultaneously with learning. 
Maturation and development are characterized by the absence 
o:f su:f:ficiently direct and definite experiences to which the 
changes they signal can be attributed. On the other hand, 
learning theorists like Piaget and Furth have pointed out 
that the human stock o:f knowledge includes certain items and 
schemas which represent something MORE than what is commonly 
understood by learning. Such theorists have drawn attention 
to the knowledge which is universally encountered among 
humans but which can be empirically demonstrated to be 
dependent :for its emergence on both physical and intellectual 
maturational :factors as well as environmental experience in 
general but on no specific learning experiences in particulnr. 
Piaget has argued that certain invariants o:f normal human 
thinking, such as the permanent object, the self, the other, 
space, time, class, number, logic, conservation, reversi-
bility and causality cannot, in terms o:f more conventional 
definitions o:f learning, be regarded as instances or the· 
product o:f learning. Besides these invariants, there are 
other types o:f knowledge which individuals achieve not as a 
direct result o:f learning but as a result of working on what 
they have learnt. The knowledge o:f the permanence o:f objects 
or of reversibility might be achieved by all of us through 
no direct effort on our part and through no direct learning 
experience but simply, as Furth (1969:225) puts it, as a 
result o:f "normal living and biological time". But other 
types o:f cognitive knowledge involve conscious effort even 
though they too do not arise "directly" :from specifiable 
learning situations as does language, :for example. Included 
here would be self achieved generalizations, new meanings 
and understandings, new concepts.and arguments, new theories; 
in fact all knowledge involving a high degree of creativity. 
Thinking and dreaming are processes which can generate novel 
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information which is, at least to some extent, "immaculately" 
conceived. Obviously, knowledge created in this way is only 
"unlearnt 11 for the creative individual. If it is communi-
cated to someone else through speech, writing, gesture, 
movement, art, music, and so forth, it is acquired by that 
person in the more conventional learning way. The forms of 
knowledge identified by Piaget, noted above, are unique in 
that they cannot be transmitted to others. Every individual 
has to create or discover these for himself. They are "••• 
not just given, to be taken from a tree or a book" , they are 
"actively constructed by the person11 (Furth 1969:221). 
Piaget (1971:4) provides an important clue as to the 
nature and genesis of 11 unlearnt 11 knowledge when he insists 
that, "The essential starting point here is the fact that no 
form of knowledge, not even perceptual knowledge, constitutes 
a simple copy of reality, because it always includes a 
process of assimilation to previous structures." All 
learning is an active and constructive process and we see in 
11 unlearnt 11 knowledge the operation of characteristics present 
in even simple cases of learning. 
Piaget rejects empirical theories of knowledge because, 
although sensations or perceptions are continually at work 
in the elementary stages of the formation of knowledge, they 
are never al.one in this process. That which is added is; 
for him, at the very least, equally important in the develop-
ment of knowledge (Piaget 1972:46). Consider a child playing 
with objects and thereby learning about them and the lessons 
which such play can give rise to. Certain of these lessons 
are essentially 11 empirical" as they relate to the position, 
movement and property of the objects. But such object play 
also generates knowledge not about the objects as such but 
about relationships and properties which play and the child's 
existing knowledge impose on the objects. For example, 
object play often leads to classification, ordering, placing 
in correspondence, counting and measuring and, hence, to the 
kinds of knowledge such activities (not objects) are 
primarily responsible foru Piaget calls such activities 
- 11 logico-mathematical" activities because· they lead to logico-
mathematical knowledge. In distinguishing "empirical" from 
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"logico-mathematical" knowledge, Piaget (1972:21) writes, 
"Study of the child's behaviour in relation to objects 
indicates that there are two kinds of experience and two 
kinds of abstraction, according to whether experience draws 
on the nature of the things themselves and permits discovery 
of' some of their properties, or whether it draws on relation-
ships which are not intrinsic in the things themselves, but 
which some action imposes upon them." 
In view of Piaget's work, it can be asserted that many 
conventional views of' learning are simplistic and misleading. 
To call the process whereby an individual's stock of know-
ledge develops "learning" is to give prominence to some 
processes while detracting attention from others of equal 
importance. The development of knowledge involves, as Piaget 
helps us appreciate, not only the passive assimilation of' 
information but also the active seeking after and construc-
tion of knowledge. It also involves maturational and 
developmental factors and "normal living". It also involves 
equilibratory processes which operate to motivate learning 
and to integrate and articulate new knowledge with existing 
knowledge. It also involves the creation of new items and 
levels of knowledge out of more fundamental items and levels. 
Rather than speaking of "learnt knowledge" therefore, it 
might be more accurate to speak, depending on context, of' 
11 learnt knowledge", "constructed knowledge", "maturational 
knowledge", "empirical knowledge", 11 abstracted knowledge", 
"equilibrated knowledge", "created knowledge", etc. In this 
way the other processes apart from learning which are 
responsible for the ontogenetic development of knowledge 
might be given the prominence they deserve. Piaget himself 
addressed this problem when he drew the distinction between 
"learning in the strict sense" and "learning in the broad 
sense" (Piaget 1973: 105). Learning in the strict sense 
refers to all learning that is acquired as a function of 
exper~ence. Learning in the broad sense is, for Piaget 
(1973:105), "••• the combination of learning in the strict 
sense and the processes of equilibrium". 
Though the concept "learnt .. knowledge" (or "learning") 
is problematic and wisatisfactory for reasons such as those 
/ 
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just mentioned, I have chosen to follow convention to some 
extent and use the word "learnt" to refer to all the above 
types of' knowledge -- including those which are to a large 
extent 11 unlearnt 11 • That is, the meaning of' learning in the 
broad sense used by Piaget is adopted. 
Learnt knowledge basic to life 
The argument that life is a knowledge process applies 
in two senses. Firstly, as has been discussed, the evolution 
of' a species implies the phylogenetic assimilation of' know-
ledge. Secondly, the members of' most if' not all species are 
capable of' modifying their knowledge as a result of' experi-
ence. It should be obvious that by developing a capacity 
whereby individual organisms can acquire knowledge a species 
enhances its capacity for adaptation and survival. In this 
way adaptations to the finer variations in the environment 
are possible and the species is able to bridge the dead time 
between one generation and the next when genetic adjustments 
are not possible. Furthermore, by the development of' 
capacities for the individual acquisition of' knowledge, 
species are able to utilize types of' kn01vledge and infor-
mation which cannot be genetically transmitted. It would 
seem that because of' the advantages it offers, many species 
have evolved. in the direction of' the individual utilization 
and acquisition of' knowledge. Some writers see the genome 
of' the various life forms as having evolved in one of' two 
directions: either a concentration on the direct genetic 
transmission of' knowledge or an increasing genetic develop-
ment of' the know-how for the individual acquisition of' know-
ledge. The insects are an example of' the former and the 
animals of' the latter. This division is, however, too crude 
to be of' much use because of' the widespread nature of' 
learning capacities. 
The capacity for learning has been so repeatedly and 
convincingly demonstrated for animals, birds,. and reptiles 
that it is now taken for granted as a feature of life at 
these phyletic levels. But the capacity to learn has been 
discovered to extend even further. In 1912 Yerkes demon-
strated that earthworms could learn to traverse a simple 
T-shaped maze and Semon around the same time referred to 
learning at the plant and protozoan level (referred to in 
Rignano 1926:110). In 1940 French discovered that Paramecia 
could modify their behaviour in certain directions as the 
result of specific experiences. Corning, Dyal, and Willows 
(1973), in a detailed review of invertebrate learning, 
arrived at the conclusion that despite the fact that the 
evidence for simple learning remains highly controversial, 
there does exist compelling evidence that life forms as 
rudimentary as protozoans display the ability to learn. Thus 
the point has now been reached where it is scientifically 
acceptable to regard learning in some form or other as a 
capacity of life down to the insect and protozoan level. 
Thus it can be said that all life from man to protozoa 
possesses a stock of knowledge which includes both items 
which are innate and items which have been modified or added 
as a result of the organisms own experiences. 
Lorenz (1977) is opposed to the notion that the capacity 
for learning extends to protozoa. He maintains that, "Only 
animals with a central nervot::.s system are capable of learning 
in the strict sense of the termn (Lorenz 1977:83). He argues 
that extending the capacity to learn to the lowest of living 
creatures is the result of self-deception, "•••born of the 
need to beli_eve in a unified world picture" (p 41). His· 
reason for objecting_ to the view that the ability to learn 
in some form or other is found virtually throughout all the 
forms of life is that he regards it as, "••• essential to all 
learning processes that an adaptive change should take place 
in the tmachineryt -- that is, in the structure of the sense 
organs and nervous system that are concerned with·behaviourn 
(p 66). As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the 
evidence seems to be against Lorenz on this point. It seems 
that certain elementary life forms do alter their behaviour 
as a result of experience and that this can only be accounted 
for in terms of some semi-permanent or lingering structural 
change. Pursuing the discussion of his narrow conception of 
learning, Lorenz (1977:69) speaks of such things as facili-
tation by practice, sensitation, habituation, habit, avoid-
ance responses acquired by trauma, and imprinting as 
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"half-way" houses between instantaneous information utiliz-
ation, which is clearly not learning at all, and learning 
proper. In this study, because learning, like other 
epistemic processes, emerges imperceptibly out of' the inter-
action between phylum and environment over time, learning 
will be regarded in the more general non-Lorenzian fashion 
indicated above. That is, a characteristic of' life down to 
at least the protozoan level. 
The phylogenetic and ontogenetic modification and 
acquisition of' knowledge are processes whereby species adapt 
to their environments. They are complementary processes 
operating to ensure a fine degree of' ongoing adaptation 
between organism and environment. The differences in learn-
ing capacity and mode of' learning for the various species 
\ 
are themselves, as stated earlier, a product of' evolution. 
The stock of knowledge peculiar to the members of' the various 
species appears always to consist of' just the right pro-
portions of' innate and learnt elements to ensure survival. 
Species which are virtually totally equipped for the vicissi-
tudes of' their life by their stock of' innate knowledge 
generally have as little capacity for learning as corresponds 
with their small need therefor. Other species, by contrast, 
which may be judged to be ill-equipped by their stock of' 
innate knowledge for the vicissitudes of' their life are 
nevertheless genetically endowed with learning schemas 
sufficient to acquire the knowledge necessary for successful 
adaptation. Each species may thus be viewed as having 
evolved via the method of' trial-and-~uccess (see Lorenz 1977; 
1969), what may be called an "adaptation schema". The 
adaptation schema operates to ensure the survival of' the 
species and it is characterised; as just suggested, by 
generally sufficient symmetry between innate endowment, 
capacity for learning and environmental variation. 
The learning schema 
All learning may be considered to take place as a result 
of' the operation of' a "learning schema". Such a schema is a 
sub-system of' the more general adaptation schema just 
referred to whereby a species as a whole is capable of' 
self-regulation and survival. Since the term "learning" is 
being used in the broad and inclusive way discussed earlier, 
it is useful to note that the learning schema is responsible 
for all those processes of knowledge acquisition listed 
before. That is, the learning schema involves assimilatory,,\·. 
-··--·••••• T -~---·~- " O - ~- ~- ----~- --~· ··----~---- f 
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accommodatory and equilibratory processes. It involves 
selectio!l_, co~_st:r_'.~_c_t~on a~.d c.r.eation. It involves develop-
ment and maturation. It involves generalizing, synthesizing 
and abstraction. It involves storing and rearranging. 
All acts of learning consist of environmental inputs and 
organismic inputs to some extent. Learning has both a 
motorially passive, information receiving and assimilating 
dimension and a motorially active information generating and 
teaching dimension. The broad meaning of "learning" is 
understood to include both the learning dimension, implying 
the processes which serve to extract knowledge out of 
experience, and the teaching dimension, implying the pro-
cesses which serve to create the experiences out of which 
knm\Tledge can be extracted. The ambiguity of the word 
"learning" seems unavoidable. Some writers, like Lorer..z 
(1969, 1977), actually speak of "teaching mechanisms" as part 
of an organism's learning armoury but in this study to avoid 
the semantic and theoretical pitfalls which result from 
opposing "le.arning" and 11 teaching" I have opted to use 
"learning" to imply 11 te2.ching" as well. 
The innate learning schema 
An organism's ability to assimilate information is 
itself, in the first instance, not som~~~~~g which is 
acquired llX -~~".:_ .. _?::_~~_:!:~~-~Eroul?_~ __ -!-_e.':1::1'.'~:!:ng. All ontogenetic 
_learning is grounded in and takes_.P_~ace J:>~~Yi:~E-1:1-~ of_ ~~he 
innate properties of the organism. It is for this reason 
~hat it has been said that the most important act of phylo-
genetic learning was learning how to learn. Before any 
specific learning can take place it is logically necessary 
to assume an organism with certain characteristics, one of 
which is the ability to learn the item in question. This 
applies as much to the most rudimentary forms of learning as 
it does to the higher forms. As Piaget (1971:252) states, 
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II ••• every kind of knowledge at the higher level presupposes 
the intervention of (an irreducible biological component), 
whether as innate :framework or as starting point or, going 
back to biological roots, as a necessary and continuous 
:functioning, outside of which no sort of structuration is 
possible." For this reason humans cannot, like birds, learn 
to fly just as birds cannot learn calculus. Such a basic 
observation has led Lorenz (1965, 1969, 1977) to speak of the 
innate as being that which must be in existence before all 
learning in order to m::ke such learning possible. He regards 
this innate A PRIORI as c .. :msti tuting a structure in terms of 
whicb learr ... ing takes place. In short, all learning is 
innately programmed in the last analysis (Lorenz 1969:21). 
In terms of the concepts being developed in this study 
we may say that all organisms which are 2.bJ_e to learn do so 
by virtue of, and in accordance witt, the operation of an 
"innate learning schema". By _inna t_e ~-~2-L_r!:-_~ng __ ?_?_her.i.a is meant 
a genetic2.lly inherited system of k:I101,-ledge (learning know-
-- --~-·~-----·. --~- - .. ______ :.... ... ~--·------·---·- - ~ 
hoH) whi~h functions to determi:ie --~~at infor_I!l(3.t_ion the __ 
organism assimilates, how is assimilates it and 1dlat "lessons" 
it draws there:frora. under certain circumstances acts of 
le2.rning affect the contents and mode of operation of tt.e 
iru1ate learring schema itself. It is thus necessary to 
consider this schema as open to modification by the very· 
processes it is responsible for (see Gibson 1969; Flavell 
1977). For the reasons cj_ ted aboye ~ the innate le2.rning"-
schema should also be considered to consist of a teaching and 
learning dimension and to refer to knowledge processes otr_er 
than learning in the strict t.iense. 
The ~eaching dimension 
The innate learn.i:ag schema, initiates learning, it bi:i.ses 
attenti_on towards certain stimuli a...'1.d away from others,_ it_ 
c"ori._s.tructs relevant in.formation out o:f the variation in the 
envi_ro.nmen.t, it motivate3 learning activity. - All organisms 
capable of learning appear to be to some extent self- · 
.--- -
instructing. This characteristic is lini<:.ed to the matter o_f 
survival and economy; orga:nisms do not have the time nor 
energy that a random 3.pproacb. to knowledg,e acquisitio:'.l woald 
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require. Instead, organisms appear to have systems whereby 
they home-in fairly quickly on the important information 
available and from this extract t:1.e knowledge essential for 
survival. SuC:'.~ ... ?:t'gan~_sm~ -~-~--~~-e~~--1::<?.~ __ ?nly ~w i~~-t~ 
how to learn but also know something about what to learn. 
"'-...: ~ ----~--- - - ~ --· - -_-.--_- --. =--=""'=----·~----,.~~~-- .. _- -·- ~~-·~~......--..-~---- --·-·-----
"Most surprisingly they also know innately·something about 
producing the kinds of' experiences which will generate the 
types of infor.nation out o:f which the important lessons o:f 
life can be assimilated. This ~e~.t:_-:~.~_s_~:;t:'uct:i_:?:r:t:_P_~:!:nts ____ !~ 
the teaching dimension o:f th~-}~:ri-i:ia te learnin_g __ schema 
As already noted, Lorenz speaks of organisms as having 
11 i.rmate teaching mechanisms". He provides a."'1. example of such 
a mecb.anism in operation when he writes of the young chicken: 
"Even in the most primitive l~ind o:f trial-and-error learning 
the animal does not run, scratch, or peck indiscriminately in 
all directions but, by virtue of sorae taxis or other, 
posses:3es a measure of 'insight' that qu.i.te co:isiderably 
improves the chances of' success 11 (Lorenz 1969:57). In a 
later work Lorenz (1977:89) says o.f the innate teaching 
mechanism that, :t Unle:3S o:ie believes in supernatural factors, 
such as a pre-estab.lished harmo:':ly between the organism and 
its environment, one has to postulate the existence of innate 
teaching mecb.anisms in order to exp.lain 1.vhy the majority o.f 
learning processes serve to enl1.ance the organism's fitness 
for survival." 
The irinate learning schema functions in such a way that 
rather than bej_.ng passive learners, organisms seem to be 
fundamentally active. "Even without external stimuli", 
~-rrites Von Bertalanffy (1969:208), Hthe organism is not a 
passive but an intrinsically active system. Reflex theory 
presupposes that the primary element of behaviour is response 
to external stimuli. In contrast, recent research. shmvs with 
increasing clarity the autonomous activity of the nervo~s 
system, resting in the system itself, is to be considered 
primary. II Nu..."'lil (1920:28) was one of the earl.ier investi-
gators to argue :for the recognition of a general exploratory 
tendency in all healthy organisms, a tendency especially 
marked in the higher vertebrates. Ashby (1951:218) has 
remarked that, 11 The higher organisms have sensitive skins, 
152 
responsive nervous systems, and often an instinct which 
impels them, in play an.d curiosity, to bring more variety 
into a syste.m than is immediately necessary.!' This tendency 
does not proceed, though it sometimes appears so, in a 
totally random or haphazard fashion, as noted above. It 
seems to be directed in internally determined directions. 
What is more, it reveals on close inspection a clear tele-
onomic or anticipatory character. 
The striving after knowledge characteristic of life is 
due, suggests Von Bertalanf'fy, to the__.!~- t_[la,t __ .?rgan~?J11S 
11 The living system main-
tains a disequilibrium called the steady state of an open 
system a.nd is thus able to dispense existing potentials or 
ttensions' in spontaneous activity or in respo~se to 
releasing stimuli; it even advances towards higher order 
and organization11 (Von Bertalanffy 1969:209). Spon~aneity, 
the tendency for organisms to behave in the absence of any 
external stimulus su.fficient to account for such behaviour, 
appears to be a common characteristic of life and is regarded 
by many as the most primitive form of behaviour (Von 
Bertalanffy 1969; Lerner 1976). Hill et al. (1971:192) 
state that, 11 The nervous system, especially in the higher 
animals, does not necessarily wait for stimcili and then act 
to cancel their effects, but may also initiate action in· the 
absence of stimuli. 11 Experiments by Von Holtz (1973) have 
revealed that certain motor cells are spontaneously active 
and that what non-activity consists of is often the inhi-
bition or containment of this dynamism by a higher level 
controlli:cig structure •. Spontaneity is seen in the first 
movements of embryos and foetuses. It is also found in brain --· -------- ·--ftL.'1.ctions, ... in psychological p-rocesses and in natural 
. . --···- ~-- - . ·---·- .~ .. -·--· ~· _,. - ~-- -· -·- --· -·- - ~-- ----
behaviour ranging from exploration, play and ritual in 
animals to _!~.e. __ q;:_e_~Et v~ cognitive acti vi ties of humans (Vo:ci 
------- ----~ 
B-e~te1l_(3.Ilf.:fy __ 1969: 209). 
Drive theories suggest that organisms h~ve a "learning1' 
drive or need as powerful as many of the other drives. While 
the drive to learn may be seen as an obvious expression of 
the learning schema, this schema also takes in the operation 
of the other drives. McCandless (1967:203) has suggested 
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that the energizing function of drives is probably innate and 
that drives serve the organism by increasing its activ_~_.!_u_ 
~-------- •-c--.w--•¥ ___ -~----·-
usually in a direction determined by and functionally linked 
to the drive. Drive motivated activity generates drive 
related information as well as behaviour. Thus, for organ-
isms able to take advantage of it, drives·apart from leading 
to drive satisfaction also provide a wealth.of information 
from which important lessons may be learnt and which can 
-~. - ------=-....-=~-- ~-,,.-_..,,-.-,::: ... -i::_--~-·~~ 
benefit future drive behaviour. For example, the hur...ger 
drive can lead to tr~e a.cquisi tion of knowledge related to 
food acquisition, production and preparation. It can also 
lead to a detailed knowledge of what is edible and what is 
inedible and can massively expand a creatureR s ran5·e of food..,. 
stuffs. Similarly, the other organic drives m2.y also 
generate teleonomically relevant information and thus play a 
part in the development of knowledge while enhancing 
adaptation. 
Available evidence su~ports the view that organisms, 
especially the more advanced orbanisms, have a learning drive. 
This drive is sometimes also referred to 2.s the "curiosity" 
drive or the "activity" drive. (The terms "learning drive" 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~-
and "curiosity drive", denoting as they do an internal 
information seeking tendency, seem to me preferable to 
"activity drive" which denotes something too random and 
unspecific.) . Hebb ( 1972) _ ~po.!':~ __ of __ -~~~-~isms seeking optimal 
stimulation and Glanzer in his 1958 review of the literature 
----~-=-~ 
on curiosity suggested that organisms need a certain amount 
of stimulation per unit time. A shortfall of information 
leads to disequilibriwn and is sufficient to motivate certain 
creatures to seek and generate information. Conversely, an 
overabundance of information. at one time may cause an organ-
ism to act in such a way as to reduce the available infor-
mation to a manageable level. This can be accomplished in 
many ways. The organism's °'in sense organs and nervous 
system may shut out -surplus information thu::: .closing "the 
doors of perception", the organism may act upon the sources 
of information directly to quieten some of them, the organism 
may flee to a more tolerable information-environment, etc., 
etc. 
The learning drive is well illustrated by the power:ful 
tendency exhibited by many organisms to play and explore. 
These activities are also illustrative o:f the teaching 
dimensions o:f the innate learning schema. Play and explo-
ration generate information, o:ften teleonomically :functional 
in:formation, and in this way enrich an organism's stock o:f 
knowledge in a li:fe enhancing :fashion. Wbile, as has been 
noted, most drives can produce knmfledge, this production is 
incidental. Not so in play and exploration. Here learning 
o:f one sort or another a.ppears to be the prime objective and 
learning constitutes its own reward (Lorenz 1977:149). 
The evidence provided by Glanzer (1958) indicates that 
a rich in:formational environment to which an organism has 
accommodated itsel:f serves to enhance its learning capacity 
and it comes to need stimulatior.. in advance o:f members of its 
kind living in normal or impoverished environments. This 
kind o:f evidence provides the ground for a possible rec-
onciliation between those theorists who po:::tulate an innate 
learning (or curiosity) drive and those who see this drive 
as the result of the positive rcin:forcement o:f accidentally 
explorative behaviours. The two are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and may be viewed as working in unison to produce 
strong explorative behaviour. The very fact that some forms 
o:f "accident.al" learning arc rein:forcing points to some, - even 
i:f minimal, innate structurationo 
The knowledge o:f skills and the knowledge o:f :facts which 
result :from play and exploration o:f necessity involves a 
certain amount of redundancy when judged :from the perspective 
o:f the knowledge a particular animal actually employs in its 
li:fe-time activities. Yet this very redundancy-in-retrospect 
is a necessary ingredient of -the stock of knowledge o:f 
exploratory animals since it :facilitates their success:ful 
adaptation to the contingencies o:f their lives. The animal 
cannot know exactly what may befall it in the :future. Its 
strategy seems to be to prepare it self :for a :wide range o:f 
possibilities by developing an open and flexible stock of 
knowledge. This enables the animal to combine bits and 
pieces of knowledge in a creative synthesis to suit the re-
. quirements of new situations. The bits and pieces may have 
• 
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been learnt but not the new synthesis and application -- it 
is for this reason that. the behavioural approach to learning 
is misleading, as noted earlier. Lorenz (1977:147) regards 
exploratory behaviour as objective behaviour. It is the 
seeking of knowledge for its own sake. He writes (p 147), 
"The raven that investigates an object has no 'wish to eat it; 
the rat that examines the nooks and crannies of its territory 
has no wish to hide; they both want to know whether the 
object in question can be eaten or used as a hiding place." 
Refutation of equipotentiality thesis 
In the early years of S-R learning experimentation the 
principle of "equipotentiality" was formulated. This prin-
ciple, essentially a form of null hypothesis, held that any 
discriminable stimulus could become associated with any motor 
response an organism was capable of. This principle has now 
been rejected following numerous demon.strations that organ-
isms generally reveal a tendency to associate certain stimuli 
with certain responses. Often, in experiments, the responses 
most likely to be associated with a given stimulus as 
dictated by the equipotentiality principle have been found 
not to be so associated. Instead, responses less likely in 
terms of the equipotentiality principle but biologically more 
likely have .been found to be associated. (For further 
details see Seligman 1970: Seligman and Hager 1972; and 
Hilgard and Bower 1975.) Seligman (1970) and Seligman and 
Hager (1972) have proposed that the now empirically refuted 
equipotentiality principle be replaced by a "preparedness to 
associate" principle. In terms of this principle, animals 
are recognised as being genetically endmrnd with discrimi-
natory tendencies which direc·t them to associate certain 
stimuli with certain responses. These genetically endowed 
discriminatory tendencies may be viewed as important com-
ponents of the innate learning schema. Tbe "preparedness to 
associate" principle is readily supported by .observations of 
the ease with which animals learn certain things while other 
things are learnt with great difficulty and still others not 
learnt at all. For example, the experiments conducted by 
Garcia and others (see Garcia and Koe.lling 1967; Revusky and 
Garcia 1970) reveal that rats have a tendency to associate 
states of experimentally induced nausea, vomiting and 
diarrhoea with certain nutrients and not others as well as 
with nutrients rather than other factors. Such experiments 
serve to confirm the preparedness to associate principle. 
As Hilgard and Bower (1975:574) state, animals seem to 
possess innate "connector mechanisms" which induce them to 
connect some stimuli and not others with a particular effect. 
The authors say of the rat that, "It 'lcr10ws• innately" that 
it is looking for a taste stimulus in the recent past to 
hook up to the illness. The rat•s association procedures 
appear, these authors argue, to be governed by some kind of 
"natural fittingness" principle rather than equip,otentiali ty • 
. It seems that rats have a tendency to look to the food they 
have eaten rather than any other external factor for the 
"cause" of digestive ailments. A strategy, from the perspec-
tive of medical science, which would more often under normal 
circumstances lead to a successful diagno:::is than a strategy 
biased, say, to non-nutrient factors as causes. The specific 
preparedness to associate principle and the more general 
notion of the innate learning schema receives additional 
support from the work of Seligman (1970) who has proposed 
that there exists a difference between "biologically pre-
pared" le2.rning and "biologically unprepared" learning. ·The 
first, as can be expected, is more easily achieved and is 
retained longer by the organism than the latter. Certain 
forms of learning are biologically impossible for cert.ain 
species, an obvious point perhaps, but one often lost sight 
of in over enthusiastic discussions of learning. (See, also, 
Bolles 1970; 1972). 
Wilson (1978:65) sums up-the equipotential debate by 
writing, "••• the underlying assumptions of simplicity and 
equipotentiality in learning have crumbled. In their place 
bas emerged a picture of the existence of many peculiar types 
of learning ••• The learning potential of each species 
appears to be fully programmed by its brain, the sequence of 
release of its hormones, and, ultimately its genes. Each 
animal species is 1 prepared' to learn certain s.timuli, barred 
from learning others and neutral with respect to still 
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others." Wilson provides several examples of the genetically 
structured nature of animal learningo Gne example is that 
of' the adult herring gull which quickly learns to distinguish 
between its newly hatched chicks and other chicks but never 
between its eggs and other eggs which are just as visibly 
distinct. 
The innate learning schema could be further described 
in the foregoing general way and further examples and sub-
stantiation provided. However, it seems appropriate to move 
now to deal directly with humankind's innate learning schema. 
This will allow us to link up the discussion of innate 
knowledge and the innate learning schema with the process of 
socialization and the many products of' human learning and 
socialization which constitute the subject matter of' 
sociology. 
CHAPTER SIX 
HUMANKTNl) 1 S INNATE LEARNING SCHEMA 
The young baby is actively interested in 
his surroundings. He shows by his be-
haviour a knowledge of the existence of 
the external world which he cannot have 
inferred from his own experience. He is 




Human society more than any other organic collectivity 
requires of its young that they rapidly and successfl1:_lly 
assimilate a great deal of information if they are to become 
adequa!~_ly functioning. adults. During the years in whicb a 
child develops into an adult, the child must not only, as 
less gregarious creatures do, create for itself a world of 
understanding out of tl:.e morass of stimuli in which it is 
enveloped, but it must also equilibrate its understanding 
'ivi th those i.t discovers around it. Socialization pro\.:--idesl' ~' 
part of the answer to the question of how the young child 
comes to develop into an integrated and furtctioning adult 
!Ile~ber ()f so_~iety. The other part of the answer, perhaps 
the most obvious but also the most neglected, is provided by 
the fact that human young are human young in the first place. 
A chimp cannot be humanly socialized. Hwr:an socialization 
cannot be understood apart. from the humanly socia~~zable 
nature of the human infant. Similarly, human culture cannot 
be understood apart from the capacity of human infants to 
both acquire and produce culture. It is the purpose of what 
has preceded and what is to follow to elabora.te upon these 
obvious but neglected points. 
Lorenz (1977:171) has expressed the view that the learnt 
knowledge of even the most intelligent ape represents only 
"••• an infinitesimal fraction of the information stored in 
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the genome of its species". And adds, "Even the knowledge 
contained in the sequences of the nucleotides in the lowest 
of living organisms would, indeed does, fill many volumes 
when expressed in words." The ratio of learnt knowledge to 
innate knowledge in humans in comparison with the higher 
primates is of such an order that Lorenz feels that humans 
constitute a wholly other form of life. Though this judge-
ment may have to be modified in the face of the rapidly 
expanding literature on primate learning, especially language 
learning, the essential point being made by Lorenz seems 
unchallengeable: Bccause ___ o!_}.an~_uage and writing humans have 
so increased their stock of learnt kno'1Tledge that their ratio 
of innate to learnt knowledge is totally unlike that of any 
De cause 
humankind's capacity for language and writing seems to be a 
species specific characteristic, the emphasis on the biology 
of knowledge in this study makes it necessary to qualify tbc 
previous statement and to assert that the human young, even 
at birth, is already a unique form of life since it possesses 
the physical and intellectual attributes which enable it, 
under the necessary conditions, to develop into a "feral 
man", an "ape man", a "business man", or a "space man". No 
other creature has this potential. Or..e of the features 
which helps account for the wholly other life lived by hwnans 
is their peculiar innate learning schema which operates to 
facilitate and direct learning along particular world opening 
lines. 
The idea that humans are born with an innate learning 
schema is inspired and supported by the 'vri tings of many 
scholars drawn from a wide variety of disciplines• Reference 
to Piaget, Popper and Lorenz on this score has already been 
repeatedly made. _s~~-~ivan (quoted in Lorenz 1977:187) came 
to the conclusion that, "A child is born with the capacity 
to learn, and will learn by itself, proYided the necessary 
external stimuli are present." According to Lewis (1977:54), 
"An infant is an active participant in his world, constantly 
testing himself and others, picking and choosing from the 
vast amount of information he receives." A baby rather than 
being a blob of malleable.clay or an assembly of reflexes or 
an organism only capable of random movements is more 
accurately viewed as a-" ••• being with considerable powers 
to gather and process information from his surroundings even 
in the earliest weeks of his liTe, and though his capabili-
ties are obviously limited by adult standards his orientation 
and responsiveness to the envirorunent are nevertheless a 
marked feature from the beginning of life", writes Schaffer 
(1975:167). The evidence which is cited in the following 
discussion is intended to substantiate the foregoing ideas 
and validate the claim that the hwnan infant is (1) motivated 
to learn, (2) knows how to learn, (J) knows how to teach 
itself important lessons, and (4) knows to some extent what 
to learn. It is further argued that, in the l'irst instance, 
these observable a.bilities _are representations of the oper-
ation of the human infant's innate learning schema. 
}- The innate learning drive 
Attention was drawn earlier to the role which the 
physiological drives play in increasing the amount of i:n.lor-
mation available to an organism and in this way promoting 
learning. The human infant, via the energizing and acti-, 
vating"effect of drives may, like other life forms, also be 
co~sidered as enriching by this means its inf'ormational 
environment~ The .neonatal informational envirorunent is 
further er..riched and structureC. by its repertoire of rei'lexes 
which, besides, like drives being schemas serving specific 
and~.:i-~~d~ate purposes, can also be vie1rnd as schemas which 
generate information. Thus, we may regard drives and 
reflexes as constituting important component_s of an infant rs 
s~~f~educating sy~tem. 
·But be sides the "physio1.-0gical" drives and rei'lexe s, 
more specifically ~'.e:p.:i:-_stemic" drives and reflexes ca.ti be 
identified. These are obviously _c~.::~--~le~ll!.~_I1:t_s. of the innate 
_!~_arning schema. When the assimilative aspect of the 
infant's learning schema is considered it appears that the 
infant is as hungry, if not more hungry, for knowledge as 
for food. Observers of infant learning have repeatedly been 
struck by the keenness and spontaneity of e2.rly learning; 
learning which appears to take place in the absence of more 
typical extrinsic motivators and reinforcers. Influenced by 
Rousseau's ideas regarding the innate competence and goodness 
of the child, Froebel in 1887 and Pestalozzi in 1895 drew 
attention to the self generated activities of children. In 
1900 Dewey wrote of the child's "intrinsic interest" in the 
world around it. The child educationalist Montessori (1909) 
founded her system of education on the idea that children 
have a spontaneous interest in learning. She emphasized the 
important element of intrinsic motivation inherent in the 
learning of the very young when she spoke of their capacity 
for "spoI'lt_~eous learning':. 
Dating from such early observations is the realization 
that humans are born with some sort of drive or instinct to 
learn~;;;-~-(191-5:4,J) claim~, for ex~~le, that, "Man's~·,.,"·~~, 
greatest instinct is the instinct to learn/.1 s;~~--;;fer to 
the "curiosity drive", others to the "explora.tive drive". 
The name is of little importance. What is important is the 
realization that human infants find learnin&' intrinsic,ally 
rewarding and actively seek kno1..rledge. Behaviour which 
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of conven-
tional empiricist learning theories. The available evidence 
indicates that the innate learning schema includes motivating 
- v ·- • ~ -
and rewarding routines which accelerate knowledge acquisitior.. 
in the early years of life. (See also Eendrick 1943; 
- -· - - ---·~-- -
Mittleman 1954; Hunt 1972; Bower 1974; Lorenz 1977.) 
One illustration of the learning drive is an infant's 
tendency to str.ive to accomplish certain ends and its tend-
ency to repeat certain activities almost endlessly. Young 
babies, if unrestr&ined and under normal conditions, will 
often spontaneously attempt to reach a nearby object, they 
will strive to sit up, later they will strive to crawl, and 
later yet, they will strive and persist in striving to stand 
up and eventually to walk. Piaget's reports on the cognitive 
development of his children and other children is replete 
with examples of children repeatedly trying to accomplish 
some task or, having mastered a task or made an interesting 
discovery, to repeat the activity over and over again. Any 
parent will have experienced their children's demands to do 
certain things "again" , "again" , "again" until adult patience 
is exhausted but the children's is still keen. Bower (1974: 
2J8) reports how one of his daughters spent a large part of 
one night placing small objects in his hand, closing his 
fingers on them, moving the hand to a new location, and then 
opening the hand to see if the objects were still there. 
She kept this up until nearly 4 a.rr.. L Striving_ and 
repetition are activities obviously related to the acqui-
sition and consolidation of knm·iledge and both are to some 
extent endogenous. Through striving ne-H information becomes 
available for assimilation and through repetition a fuller 
and more permanent assimilation is achievedo Apropos the 
last point, by repeating specific learning activities, the 
infant indicates that it has some innate knowledge of an 
important pedagogic principle: the repetition of learning 
activities and the recall of memory traces is essential for 
the acquisition and preservation of knowledge. 
Intrinsically initiated and motivated learning is 
exhibited by humans even in the womb. There seems to be 
considerable agreement no·w that it is in the nature of many 
schemas to exercise themselves repeatedly, especially when 
first acquired. Such exercise is self rewarding and such 
schemas operate spontaneously (see Flavell 1977; Hunt 1969; 
Furth 1969; Piaget 1972). Piaget employs the phrase 
"spontaneous activity" to refer to an organism's tendency to 
luxuriate in the structure and potential of its being. It 
is the expression of life. The spontaneous activity of the 
newborn reveals itself in rythmic, global movements. These 
serve through contact with the envirorunent and through the 
internal cues they occasion, to provide the infant with a 
steady stream of information. 
Though, as will be indicated, the learning __ of~neoi:!:Cl.te s 
and infants is responsive to external stimulation and is 
highly structured, it is important not to overlook the 
"structured randomness" which results from some spontaneot.:s 
activity. Suet structured randomness constit.utes for the 
infant a faculty for making happy dis~?-yerie s by acci_dcnt. 
It is its serendipity system. There is obviously a clear 
connection between spontaneous activity,· structured random-




Play is generally a self-initiated and self-sustained 
activity wbich combines.elements of exploration, exercise 
and practice. It not only generates information of a 
predictable sort but, because of its characteristic element 
of randomness, it also serves the purpose of serendipity. 
~--=-~~ ~=="""= .......-::~~-·"""--==-
This serendipity may occasionally lead to uniqae discoveries. 
More commonly, however, because of the structured nature of 
much of the randomness generated by play together with the 
structured nature of the innate learning schema and the 
shared features of most human enviroruncnts, it leads in one 
way or another to most children -~chi~_~}-ng -~pe ~~~-nd~_of 
universal knowledge discussed in Piaget's works. Infants and 
children cannot help but discover such things as the perma-
nence of objects, number, reversibility, basic rules of 
logic, and so forth, in the course of normal living and play. 
Writing specifically about the acquisition of the knowledge 
of objects, Bower (197~:238) states, "••• the ini'ant can 
hardly help discovering the problems posed by objects in the 
course of· his everyday activities •••• In any normal environ-
mcnt, there are moving objects; objects do disappear 
incomprehensibly; things are placed in containers, and the 
containers are moved away." He proceeds to make the import-
ant observation that it is the vicarious nature of cognitive 
development .-- the fact that the same kno~'iJ.edge may be 
achieved in different ways -- which argues most forcibly 
against a behavioural approach to such developmento 
The import·ance _of play as_a_roEl::~__!~-~-~~'vledge has been 
commented on by many writers, though it remains true as 
Bower (1974:238) observed that it has been little systemati-
cally studied for the light it can shed on cognitive 
development. Shotter (1973:49), for example, sees the 
intellectual growth of the child taking place, " ••• ess~-~-: 
tial_.:I:y_i_~_~p~~·-realm of play. For the essence of play is 
that it is apparently unnecessary activity ••• (which is) 
appropriate for later use in the conscious and deliberate 
pursuit of serious ends." 
Besides the "accidental" acquisition of knowledge 
through play, young infants seem also to -be inw'.3-:r.c_ilY __ motiy-
ated and capable o_~.1!1-~=~-~r_~ternatic approaches to learning. 
I 
They seem o:ften to explore their own bodies "purpose:fully". 
~ ~--=-- -· - --·--~-. ~ '-·~ --· ·-·-·--- ---,-.. ~-~-· -~-
They seem also to "experiment" and to :formulate "hypotheses" • 
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Some o:f this bebaviou_r may be viewed as blind trial and 
error learning but o:ften it seems more like conjecture and 
re:futation because the infant seems to be varying its beha-
viour systematically and to anticipate particular results. 
Bower (1974) reports the outcome o:f a series o:f infant 
learning experiments which though undertaken on the assump-
tion that infants commence li:fe with :few intellectual 
capacities led in :fact to the converse conclusion. Gne 
series o:f such experiments revealed that the nature o:f the 
rein:forcement used in the experiments was o:f little import-
u.nce to the in:fant. What was important was the reinforcement 
schedule. It seems that lt is this that o:ften intrigues 
infants. As Dower (1974:8) writes, "••• the ~;chedule can 
pose problems to the in:fant, and the problem solving is the 
true motivation for human infants in a le2.rr..ing situation." 
He 2.dds that though problem soJ_ving seems a most unlikely 
:form o:f motivation to attribute to infants, there is evidence 
that makes this conclusion inescapable. 
Eower refers, as an example, to the ilJ.uminating experi-
ment car.ducted b)~ Papousek (1969). In the experiment inSants 
of tKo to three months of age were found to be motivated to 
discover what seq_ucnces o:f left-right head turns would switch 
on a light. These infants seemed to be testing hypotheses to 
determine what sequences would work. When the appropriate 
sequence :for a Farticular trial was discovered, it was 
repeated a :few times and then dropped. If, before it was 
dropped, it was discovered to no longer work, the infants 
again tried various combinations of t,ead turns to discover 
the correct sequence. It seems that the light is not the 
motivating factor, it is"••• the pleasures o:f problem 
soJ_ving" (Bower 1974: 9). (See also the experiments of 
Lipsitt and Siqueland (1966).) 
Why problem solving PER SE should be rew~rding poses an 
interesting question for genetic epistemology. Part of the 
probable answer to this question has already been toucbed on 
in the p~evious chapter. That is; species with a large 
capacity :for learning appear to create problems for 
themselves even in the absence of any "real" problems such 
as hunger:· danger or th~ need for shelter. Speculating on 
the evoluti·onary emergence of "non-essentiali' problem 
solving and the apparent intrinsically rewarding nature of 
this behaviour, it would seem that it is linl(.ed to the 
innately unspecifiable forms of kli.o;wledge which certain 
animals have evolved to utilize in adapta·tion. Creatures 
which make the unproblematic problematic obv;iously expand 
the range of information available to them and thus expand 
their stocks of knowledge. In addition, by iuore actively 
and self-motivatedly seeking lrn.m'iledge, they learn more 
about the me·thods of acquiring kr_owledge. ·Thus, they ~ 
themselves more kr:~owledgeable ~~more intelliger~t. Further-· 
more (a nod_ to the behaviourists) some "unnecessary"· learning 
may lead directly to material rewards thus further stimu-
lating and ·channeling the drive to 2.cquire "knowledge for its 
o,...-n sake"• 
~The innate attention schema 
Evidence regarding the many .features of: humankind ts 
im1ate learning scbema has been accumulating rapidly over the 
past two decades. There is now so much information available 
in this regard that it is impossible to sunmiarize it all 
I 
here. One feature of this schema for which there is much 
evidence is its role in strU.cturing the i·n.fant ts perceptions. 
It seems that neonates have some inborn knm...-ledge as regards 
what to look at. and what to listen to in their environment. 
They have some notion of where to start learning, what to 
learn and how to learn it.· The studies now to be referred 
to reveal th.at hun1an infants are born with and rapidly 
elaborate zn "attention schema" -- a sub-scqema of the en-
' compassing learning schema. The attention schema serves to 
systematize the n.eonatets learning. Certain·fairly predict-
able things are looked for and attended to first, certain 
· "problems" are attended t·o before others, iJ $hort, bµ.mans 
seem to be born with a kind 01~ relevance hierarchy. 
A truly archetypal tendency among·many'forms of life is 
' '. ,,:.,,."'' : 
the tendency to 2.ttend to novel stimuli at the expense of 
I . 
othel:'. availabl,e stimuli. This tendency .obviously has great.· 
does not take place. On the contrary, the persistence o:f 
the stimulation leads to greater and greater attention being 
paid to it. For example, very loud sounds are not habituated 
but lead instead to discomfort while sounds of more moderate 
volume are habituated. Many parents have probably wished 
they could habituate to their child's crying, but :find this 
impossible to do. The biological categorization o:f stimuli 
into those that are habituated and those that are extremely 
and increasingly arousing is a :further indication o:f the 
highly structured nature of the human neonate ts innate 
learning schema. The stimuli '\vhicl1 cannot be habituated are 
a compelling variety of information·, ensuring that all 
infants will learn something about how to get :food, water, 
comfort and so :forth. In habituation, the stimuli is not · 
changed, only the infantts attention to it. For stimuli that 
cannot be habituated, the stimuli itself must be changed 
through some action on the infant's part. 
In its phenotypic :form and operation the innate learning 
schema reveals considerable va:rj_e1.,,,t~on-- Such variation is 
noticeable, for example, among infants in the differences 
they reveal as regards attending to.novel information and 
assimilating it to the point o:f habituation.. Some infants 
I 
seem to have trouble becoming habituated, too.much is novel 
and demanding. Their attention is continually being dis-
tracted so that the process of habituation cannot proceed 
normally. This condition is termed 'hyperactivity' in 
children and it seriously affects learning capacity since 
few things are attended to long enough or sufficiently 
directly :for learning to be 'completed'. At the other ex-
treme is the apathetic, severely retarded or unresponsive 
child in whom the tendency to be attracted by novelty is 
weakly manifest or perhaps totally absent. Some retarded 
children seem unable to habituate because they find one thing 
novel all the time. Such children will do the same thing 
day after day seeming never to grow tired of .the activity. 
Their minds are imprisoned by the hold one learning situation 
,. 
has on them. Too rapid and superficial habituation is also 
a problem. For as Pribram ( 1976: 71) states, 11 If we habi tu-
ated .in every recurring situation we would never be able to 
------- --~--·-
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horizontal rhythmical eye movement. A further rule instructs 
it in- cases where there is light to search in the light 
horizontally and rhythmically for edges or contrasts. Such 
built-in "rules" might help to explain why, for example, 
movement, colour, contrast and complexity should have such 
power over an infantis visual behaviour. In place of Haith's 
"rules", Hebb (1972) speaks of "reflexes". For example, the 
baby's eyes shortly after birth tend to follow a bright light 
"reflexively" Hebb (1972:222). Whatever terms one chooses, 
what seems undeniable is the unlearnt nature of many learning 
"strategies",. "reflexes", "rules", "programmes" or 11 schemas". 
Fagan et al. (1971) have analysed this issue comparing 
premature with full term babies. They found that the struc-
turation of learning activities is due more to maturation 
than to experience. In the same vein, Bower's studies have 
led him to the conclusion that, "Learning seems to depend on 
very elaborate mechanisms that are not themselves the result 
of leariiing11 (Bmver 1974: 14). 
"Complexity" is one of the characteristics of objects 
which seem to attract an infant's attention. It has been 
found that babies only one day old will look longer at a 
patterned surface than a plain one. Fantz (1965) performed 
some of the first experiments on babies regarding visual 
attention to. different forms. One thing he discovered was 
that newborns attended more to patterned than to homogeneous 
grey stimuli. In a study that suggests that newborns look 
for the densest· information nodes in the objects they attend 
---~~---·~-~---~-- ·--~----------·-··--~-~ ~--·- . 
to, Salapeti::~- ~J. _K~_ss_~~-_(_:!_26_§) found that newborn s ___ so~ught 
and pai<!~~t~e!_l~:i:()E-_~ t_'? __ c()~~-~?-sts and. C()~!?~~!X __ ~s- :xpr~~-~ed, 
for example, in the corners of a triangle. 
Though complexity has an attracting effect, the degree 
of complexity that infants attend to most strongly varies as 
they develop. Hershenson (1964) found that two to three day 
old babies look longer at objects of moderate brightness or 
complexity than at those too bright or comple'.l(. or those too 
dull or simple. In a later study, Hershenson et al. (1965) 
found neonate's to have a preference for shapes of inter-
mediate variability. These· findings taken together with 
such findings as that of Brennan et al. (1966) that the 
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preferen~~ for m~r~ -~0_1!!12!~ st;i,n!ul,i_ seems to inQL.e...Q,,S_e_J\~Ltll 
age is consi~~ent with what Piagetian theory leads us to 
anticipate. That is, the newborn is attracted most by 
objects that are easily, but not too easily, assimilable. 
The infant is structurally prompted to tackle manageable 
tasks as stepping stones to more complex tasks. This is a 
further example of the uncanny pedagogic wisdom of the human 
baby. 
Neonates and infants attend closely to moving objects. 
A moving object has a greater attraction for them than does 
an identical stationary object or most other stationary 
objects (McCall 1975). A five day old infant wbo is sucking 
a pacifier has been found by Haith (1966) to stop its 
rhythmical sucking if a light moves across its visual field. 
Kagan ( 1972) r1-?ports that a two day old baby is more atten-
tive to a moving light than to a stationary light. f 
Studies have shown a high degree of selectivit#in 
neonatal and infantile attention to aural stimuli. As an 
analytic point, it is impossible for the ear not to be 
selective to some degree; structure of necessity implies 
selectivity. The more complex the finer the selectivity. 
It is obvious that the human ear and nervous system even in 
the newborn is no simple structure and we can thus expect to 
find a high .degree ~f~_~Jec~ivity in its functioningo (This 
observation applies, obviously, to all the senses.) Accord-
ing to Eisenberg (1970) there is evidence which indicates 
that the newborn is selectively most responsive to sounds in 
the frequency range of the human voice (200 - 500 cycles per 
second) and to sounds of moderate length (±5 - 15 seconds in 
duration). Spezzano and Waterman (1977) report findings 
which suggest further that the n~?.nat~_pa~ a preference for 
high-pitched female voices rather tb.9JJ._mgle_v.:.o.i..ce s. In an 
experiment in which newborns were able to control aural 
stimuli through sucking, Butterfield (1968) found them to 
behave so as to produce and vary the aural stimuli. 
As regards the sense of smell, __ taste and touch! there 
too we find fine degrees of innate discrimination and prefer-
ence. Learning in terms of these senses·is thus also 
initially highly i~~t-~_!x.:_str~ct~~ed.. Infants find certain 
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tastes and smells pleasant and others unpleasant. Sensations 
from its skin, muscles, bones and internal organs are inter-
preted by the neonate in an intelligent fashion and it adapts 
in terms of this information. This is accomplished through 
movements on its part, for example, or via the mediation of 
another person with whom the infant communicates using its 
own unlearnt sig~ system. 
i,r 
·innate learning coordinations 
Piaget's psychology stresses the importance of learr_ing 
through doing. The bands are hrnnanki!;-d' s cl1ief.~ .. L..I!~EEWnenb: 
of acting on its world and of coming to know it. This is 
equally true of infants; they discover the nature of' the 
--~--~ ·-~--~--- ~~~- __.-.o~.-~--· 
world to 2_ large extent through the use of' their hands. 
Hands are themselves objects of learning as well as instru-
ments of learning. As an object, the cbild learns about its 
hand by looking at it·' by exploring it orally and by using 
it. As an instrument of learning the hand is used to do 
many tt.ir..gs rich in information. It is used to feed, reach, 
touch, hoJ.d, release, explore, hit, signal, stack, empty, 
rearrc.·nge, hide, break, bang, lift, push, n:easure, count 
punch, :prod, scratch, tear, insert, extrc:.ct, find, etc. etc., 
the objectE; which corJ.pose tl::e infant's world. The learning 
experiments conducted by Piaget and tt.ose inspired by his 
work emphasize the tremendous importance of the hands as 
learning and teaching instrwnents. 
,...-.-,,.--=-===--=~-
Ant hr op o lag is ts and psychologists seem agreed that 
because tt.e hand is both a sense organ and a motor organ of 
the most delicate and flexible sort, it has played and con-
tinues to play a cruci_al~~~ole ig_ tl],~~volq,_t;_i_Qu_._o~~!:dge 
at all levels: phylogenetic, sociogenetic and ontogenetic. 
An equally crucial factor has been the re;fineraent in hwnans 
of the close hand-eye-br2.in coordination found more generally 
in the animal kingdom. This refinement has been achieved in 
particular by the evolution of the hm:.1an hand., the freeing 
of the hands through the evolution tm\·ards bipedalism and 
the evolution of the human brain. The close adaptive inter-
relationships between hand, eye, brain, tool, knowledge and 
environment are obviously important in accounting ±~or the 
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path wbich human evolution has followed and still follows. 
Closely associated with the hand-eye-brain coordination 
is tbe coordination beb\·een ear and eye and, in noisy manual 
activity, between hand, eye, ear, and brain. In a simple 
activity like cookir:g, sensations from the hand, mouth, ear, 
nose, eyes and interr:.al organs might all be mentally co-
ordinated. It seems most accurate therefore to regard the 
coordinations found between tl:.e variou.s senses and the brain 
as expressions of the bodyts overall coordinations. Though 
it is _tEy~e ttat ma!ly coordinations are lee:.rnt, these co-
ordinations are superimposed upon tte presuppose coordin-
ations which were discovered by the genome and which have 
evolved to make the human organism an. effective actor in its 
environment and an efficient and highly competent learner. 
The c~?E~:l}._nation of motor and sensory organ~ in tte newl>orn 
greatly advances its rate of learning. hare inforr.1ation is 
available per Wlit time because of coordin~tion and, becauE-e 
of tte unity of time 2nd place of the actions and sensations, 
the newborn cannot help but learn <.1bout various associated 
aspects of the things it attends to. These coortlinations 
provide, fror.1 tbe start, a mul tidimen!:'ional rather than a 
or..e-dimensional knowledge of ol::~ects and events. Infant::: do . 
r.ot have to put many of the pieces of their ·world together 
because ttey assimilate them together. The cooordinations 
of the body are thus reflected in the rapidly achieved order 
and acc11.racy which characterises the knm·Tledge of the young 
infant. Because ge_neticall_y derived cooordinations play);:,,. 
such a vit~1-.._.roJ:e in the acquisition cnd genesis of knowl-
edge, they must be seen as an irr.portant feature of the innate 
learning schema. 
Human inf'ants exhibit a number of coordinated s~n~~ry­
motor behaviours which can be ir:terpreted as accelerating 
and structuring learning. Gne such coordination is seen in 
the visual attention behaviour of babies which enables them 
to sorr.e extent to move their eyes and heads in ur:ison uith a 
moving object. Another simple coordination is the touch-
grc=-s:p~:r;efle~. (I have seen &.n infant grasp a thorny rose 
stem and rather than release it because of the pain, she 
grasped it all the tighter -- screaming 101.1der and louder as 
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she did so.) An obviously important learning coordination 
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of the hand-eye-brain type i~ the see-reach-grasp coordin-
ation. Bovrer ( 1874: 154-157). has found that newborn infants 
will reach out and grasp objects under specific conditions 
(they must be supported so that their arms are free to move). 
When these conditions are met, Bower found that newborns 
will reach out and grasp visually presented objects. 
Furthermore, he found that their reaching bad a hit rate of 
about 40 percent 1vith more than half their misses landing 
within a hand's width of the targ·et objects. His obser-
vatior..s seem· to indicate that in reaching tl:e infants some-
times anticipated grasping as their hands opened before 
contact and then closed on contact, but too quickly for the 
contact to have caused tr~e hand closure. An. interesting 
observation made by Bower is that the young infants do 
anticipate the tactile consequehces of reaching as is 
evidenced by the upset they reveal when reaching for illusory 
objects. 
The hearing and seeing of neonates seems also to be 
initially innately cooordin2..ted. Kertheimer (1961) reports 
that neonates are not simpJ.y attracted by sound, they 
cbarc::cteristically search for tl::.e source of sol.Uld with their 
eyes and by turning their heads. Bmrnr ( 1974:1 69) reports 
the case of a blind baby girl who Kas observed to "look" ·for 
the sources of sounds she heard. In an experiment cor:ductcd 
by Bower and Wishart (1973) results were obtained which 
suggest that hwnan infants have innate auditory-motor and 
visual-motor coordinations. That is, young babies will turn 
to look at visible objects or, if they are in the dark, Kill 
turn towards the position of a noise-making object. The 
experimer:t showed that visual localizations were more 
accurate than auditory ones. (See, also, Bower 1974:20-33.) 
Bower (1974:164) refers to the work of Freedman (1964) 
and Urwin (1973) as providing evidence that initial aspects 
of the hand-eye-brain coordinations of the neonate are 
innate. All infants apparently go through a stage of looking 
at their hands as they wave them about or move them in front 
of themselves. Freedman and Urwin report that blind infants 
also track their hands with their unseeing eyes• Such 
175 
evidence seems to rule out a lea.rning explanation. As Bower 
(1974:165) concludes, this type of coordination "must be 
built in" for it to have occurred at all in a blind baby. 
The fact that this coordination degenerated and disappeared 
in time seems to support this conclusion further. 
The ear and the hands are also coordinated to some 
extent in infants and Bower refers to llrwin (1973) who 
observed the behaviour of an infant born without eyeballs. 
At 16 weeks of age this infant could reach out and grasp 
noise-making· objects. This ability disappeared by the age 
of six months, writes Bower, despite cor_siderable reinforce-
ments and practice and did not reappear even by the age of 
ten months. Finally, research also reveals that infants can 
localize olfactory stimuli. Inf'ants turn away from 
unpleasant odours. This coordination of smelling and turning 
has been observed even in the first hours of life leaving 
little doubt that it is inr~ate (Bower 1974: 19). 
In summing up, it seems that hLUnans are born with __ t~.:i.T3:Y: 
complex sen~?.!.::l~-::~~.!.~~~-~~~03~-:!:_E-~tior..s. While, as has been 
f'olll1.d, rr.any of these disappear in the '~eeks and months after 
birth or become incorporated in learnt coordinations, it 
seems inescapable that the innate CO££~~n~t~p]].s play an 
important part in structuring __ a_:q.Q. LC!-.G.i) .. J. .. t.<a:.t_:i,,ng_J~):i._:rl.Y- learning 
and adaptation. 
Tbe innate learning schema and social knowledge 
Up to this point the focus has been primarily on innate 
characteristics and tendencies in the newborn human which t 1,.ff1\ 
lead it to a primordial knowledge of its physical worldftf";.· 
What is considered next are innate factors which help the " 
newborn discover its social and cultural worlds and acquire 
the knowledge necessary to enter thos.e worlds as a partici-
pating member. 
As a social creature, the human infant needs not only to 
learn from its own acti~ities but it also has. to learn from 
its conspecifics. Its ability to do this is obviously aided 
if it has some innate knov.-ledge of what its conspecifics are 
and if it finds learning from them rewarding. Fulliam and 
Dunford (1980:6-7) suggest that it would be useful for a 
yowig learning machine to be built with the instruction: 
"Imitate thqse older than yourself". 
In the case of humans and some other social animals, 
there is no exact genetic instruction as regards who or what 
to learn from but there are a range of minor "instructions" 
which, under normal circumstances, cause the newborn to pay 
particular attention to its mother and others of its own 
kind. It is not simply, as will be indicated, that the 
mother and its own kind are near that leads the newborn to 
learn from them (though this is obviously a necessary con-
dition), it is also because it is genetically structured_ to 
learn from the kind of teaching objects they are. 
As partly noted above, infants are strongly attracted 
by objects that are novel, that move, that are complex, that 
have colour, form and three dimensionality, that stimulate 
more than one sense organ, that smell good, that feel warm 
and soft, that are comforting and reassuring, and so on. It 
takes little imagination to realize that in terms of what 
turns little babies on, its mother (or her surrogate) 
occupies the prime position. Furthermore, there can be 
little doubt that as far as initial social and cultural 
learning is concerned, the mother represents probably the 
most important teaching object in the neonate's immediate 
environment •. 
Empirical support for these ideas can be found in 1rnrks 
already cited and in others. There is evidence that a human 
face is more interesting to a newborn infant than is an 
inanimate object. Brazelton (1974) has argued that infants 
are genetically programmed to attend to the human face. He 
has also established that as early as one week of age, new-
borns will react to certain "mothering cues'', thus indicating 
a readiness for reciprocal interaction. Is it just acciden-
tal that though newborns have a limited ability to focus 
their eyes, their eyes are fixed to see objects most clearly 
that are within 9 - 12 inches of their faces?. This is the 
distance, strangely enough, which mothers tend to keep 
between their faces and those of their babies when they look 
·at them intensely. Also, it is roughly the distance between 
the mother's face and the baby's when the baby is at the 
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breast (see Spezzano and Waterman 1977; Bowlby 1976). It 
has been suggested by Fantz (1961) that the neonate's 
apparent innate preference for pattern as compared with 
colour is probably related to the greater survival value of 
pattern recogni·tion over colour recognition. This suggestion 
has been taken further in the work of Richards ( 1974a; 1974b). 
His investigations led to the discovery that the human 
infant's biological structure ensures that it focuses not 
only on the adult, but on those adult anatomical features 
most heavily involved in the process of communication. He 
found that infants tended generally to attend selectively to 
the adult face 1 paying most attentior., probably for reasons 
cited aboye, to the mouth, lips and eyes, and also the hands. 
The child is clearly biologically biased so as to home-in 
quickly on the components which operate to constitute human 
speech and non-verbal communication. Richards regards this 
infantile characteristic as a biological pre-adaptation for 
socialization since the adult face and voice are such rich 
sources of information. 
Apart from having some knowledge of who and what to 
imitate, the newborn also appears to have some knowledge as 
regards how to imitate. Lorenz (1977:203) is among those 
who feel that humans have an "inborn capacity for imitation"o 
In a carefully controlled experiment it has been found that 
infants from 20 days of age will not only look carefully at 
their mother's face or that of another adult, but will 
imitate such facial actions as pouting the lips, opening 
the mouth and putting out the tongue (see Meltzoff and Moore 
1977). This discovery of imitation in the very young pro-
vides strong evidence that the innate learning schema serves 
to encourage and facilitate primary imitative learning. The 
importance of imitation in its many forms to human learning 
need hardly be stressed but what is often overlooked is the 
complexity of the process. An infant putting out its tongue 
in response to a similar action by an adult must somehow 
have an internal schema which corresponds to the visual 
input. Since, as a rule, an infant does not close its eyes 
when an adult puts out t.is or her tongue; it seems that the 
basic correspondences and actions involved in imitation are 
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not learnt but innate. This internal structuration is also 
expressed in the observation that certain things are imitated 
more readily than others. The motivations and satisfactions 
involved in imitation seem also to be, initially, internally 
generated. The genetic nature of imitative behaviour is 
further suggested by the fact that such behaviour appears to 
develop as much as a result of maturation as it does through 
learning and exercise. No sooner does an in£ant gain control 
over a particular part of its anatomy than that part .comes 
into play in imitation. The complexity of this later 
behaviour is·again apparent. The child may see its parent 
clap hands, the imitation. clapping hands is the motor equiv-
alent of the visual impression. To imitate, the child has 
to 'translate' what it sees or hears into what it does. 
That this is accomplished so seemingly easily Wlderlines the 
possibility of the operation of complex non-learnt struc-
tures. (See, also, Popper 1974:161; Lorenz 1966:47). 
Though Piaget seems not to have noticed any imitative 
behaviour in the very yoWlg baby, he has made an important 
contribution to our Wlderstanding of the development of 
imitative behaviour, showing in particular the importance of 
internal structuration, maturation and learning. What his 
observations make clear is that though in£ants are exposed 
to different environments, their imitative skills go through 
specific stages and reveal similar characteristicso Fiaget 
(1954, 1952) has recorded how imitation begins with a form 
of "pseudo-imit.ation" some time between the first and the 
fourth month after birth. An example of this early imitation 
is an infant copying someone else's copy of one of its 
actions. It may put its hand in front of its mouth and then 
take it away. If an observer then does the same, the in£ant 
may "imitate" this imitation. From such simple beginnings 
the in£ant progresses step-by-step to the complex imitative 
skills of older children (for a good summary see Flavell 
1977). The richness and the diversity of the. knowledge 
involved in acts of imitation is apparent when one observes 
the play of children which involves them pretending to be 
persons or things they have seen, heard of, read about, or 
imagined. Appreciating the part played by innate factors in 
imitation provides further insight into the contribution 
made by the innate learning schema to the acquisition and 
development of social and cultural knowledge. 
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It was noted in a previous chapter that values can be 
regarded as a form of knowledge and that humans and other 
organisms have complex innate value structures. Babies have 
obvious likings and dislikings that are not learnt. The 
structures which these represent can naturally be considered 
as part of the innate learning schema since by establishing 
the baby's initial system of positive and negative re-
inforcers, they play a vital role in determining the content 
and direction of cognitive and social developmento "Learning 
seems to require reinforcement", writes Fuller (1978:111), 
"and we must ask why soft words, a smile, or a touch of the 
hand are reinforcing." By referring to an experiment he had 
conducted with young puppies, Fuller argues that it seems to 
be the case that humans and other animals have a genetically 
inherited value system which encompasses more than values 
related simply to the most basic physiological needs. He 
writes (p 111), "I am convinced that these reinforcers (soft 
words, gentle contact) are as primary -- as genetic, if you 
will as hunger and thirst, even though we cannot define 
them in terms of the reduction of peripheral physiological 
imbalances.". 
If it is indeed the case, as it appears it is, that 
human infants are genetically disposed to respond positively 
to the human voice, soft words, a smile, human contact, 
human warmth, the human face, and so on, then this too car: 
be regarded as an expression of the human innate learning 
schema. The infant's mother and other humans are ·thus for 
it more than the major objects of learning. They are also 
major objects of reinforcement. An infant's innate learning 
schema thus endows the humans it is in contact with with a 
special power to determine the nature and direction of its 
intellectual development. For this reason, infants under 
normal circumstances are inexorably bound to acquire some of 
the social and cultural knowledge made available to them by 
their fellow humans. Some forms of such·knowledge are by 
the nature of things inevitably assimilated •. 
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Language and the innate learning schema 
Language, implying as it does symbolically objectivated, 
communicated and acquired knowledge, is generally regarded 
as humankind's most important distinguishing feature. The 
emergence and development of language in children, as many 
agree, presupposes a particularly genetically evolved 
capacity for language. This being the case, it may be 
claimed that humans are human because they:have the kind of 
innate learning schema which makes language possible. 
Cassirer (1970), Chomsky (1957, 1966, 1968, 1972) and 
Lenneberg (1964) are among those who have argued that the 
uniquely human capacity for grammatical speech is innate and 
that this capacity develops according to envirorunental 
influences and innately structured stages of unfolding. 
"Whatever evidence we do have," writes Chomsky ( 1972: 102 )., 
"seems to support the view that the ability to acquire and 
use language is a species-specific human capacity, that 
there are very deep and restrictive principles that determine 
the nature of human language and are rooted in the specific 
character of the human mind." So strongly are bumans 
genetically disposed to culture and to language that Fox 
( 1973: 251) bas gor.e so far as to hypo the size that an 
unspealcing couple living in total isolation and capable of 
reproducing physically normal offspring would be the founders 
of a human society which would come to possess all the things 
now characteristic of societies in general. Among these 
things would be language and tt:is language would be familiar · 
in its structure to all presently known languages. Rose 
(1976:175) has summed up this type of argument by saying, 
"We are committed to speaking because we are human." 
The idea of bumans having the capacity to re-create 
language and culture because of their genetic dispositions 
for these, suggested by Fox, is an idea more fuJ.ly developed 
later. But it is worth noting at this point, as McNeill 
(1966:34) writes, that, "On the basis of fund,amental bio-
logical characteristics {of which only slight understanding 
is presently available), each generation creates language 
anew." Too little is conveyed through what passes as the 
learning process to account for the acquisition of language. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that language is as much 
an invention of the language learner as it is something 
learnt from language acts and objects. That at least a 
small part of language is spontaneous and innate is suggested 
by the babbling behaviour of babies and the "proto-languages" 
developed by twins and children who have been exposed to 
little or no spoken language. Some indication of what human 
infants contribute to language learning is provided by the 
attempts which have been made to teach apes to speak. (For 
a recent overview and evaluatior.. of this ·work, see savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1980.) The gre2.t disparity betweer.. the 
linguistic performance of apes and yot.:.n.g children suggests 
that there are major differences in the learning schemas 
which each species applies to the linguistic information 
provided. The comparative ease with which most children 
learn language irrespective of whether or not they are 
"formally" taught is further evidence of the important con-
tribution they make to such learning. Our limited knowledc-c 
of how language is learnt by children partly demor..strates 
the ,extent to which language is a creation of the child and 
society, rather tban being primarily something society 
imposes on the child. 
Babbling, it can be argued, seems logically connected 
with the development of speech. Minimally it represents· the 
exercise of the organs J.ater to be employed in speech. More 
importantly, it can be seen as a self generated exercise to 
discover the correspondence between specific sounds and 
specific vocal actions. Even more importantly, it may lead 
to early self-discovered associations between specific 
sounds, specific vocal actions and specific effects on adults 
and the environment. That is, it might lead to the discovery 
of the signalling effect and meaning of specific sounds and 
vocal acts. That babbling is innate and emerges as a result 
of maturation is demonstrated by the observation that deaf 
and normal infants begin to babble around the. age of five 
months (Bower 1974: 144). This primary babbling of deaf and 
normal infants is initially indistinguishable and continues 
for about ten months when it starts to disintegrate and dis-
appear in the deaf infants while it gradually metamorphoses 
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into speech in the normal infants. "This evidence would 
seem to show conclusively," writes Bower (1944:144), "that 
audition is not necessary for the establishment of this 
phase of babbling and that auditory feedback is not necessary 
for its maintenance." According to Bower the secondary 
babbling phase leads on in the normal infant to speech and 
it requires auditory input for its initiation and maintenance. 
An earlier study by Lenneberg et al. (1965) found that 
infants of both dee.f and hearing parents produce similar 
early vocalizations. They concluded from this that cryin~, 
babbling and·cooin.g in infants up to four months of age is 
independent of environmental stimulation. 
Attention was· de·voted earlier to th.at category of knowl-
edge which is not learnt in any simple or direct fashion but 
is abstracted from such learning. This abstraction is 
something the learner does and yet it is not something that 
is itself learnt in any obvious ·way. What of the very early 
acts of abstraction and construction? Though.ascribing these 
to innate factors might appear to be avoiding the issue, 
ascribing them to learning without accounting for how they 
are learnt could equally easily be said to be avoiding the 
issue. The unproblematic, stage-like and universal fashion 
in which infants and young children abstract similar knowl-
edge from specific items of socially transmitted knowledge 
suggests that the growth of knowledge through abstraction 
and construction involves genetically inherited capacities. 
Capacities which lead the young learner to readily associate 
certain items of knowledge and to abstract from these or, 
using these, to construct the rules, grammars, logics, 
generalizations, meanings and categories which form part of 
the human stock of knowledge but which are not generally 
directly taught. Indeed, some of these things cannot be 
directly taught but only disco~ered. 
The work of Chomsky provides grounds for the asswnption 
of the existence of the innate lea.rning schema. His work 
also sheds light on how this schema operates to permit and 
facilitate the human childYs acquisition of language. 
According to Chomsky, empiricist theories of language 
learning do not adequately explain how it is possible for a 
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child to unconsciously construct for itself out of the 
relatively small number of utterances it hears the grammati-
cal rules of its language. "It is the child's inborn knowl-
edge of the universal principles governing the structure of 
human language that supplies the deficiency in the empiricist 
account of language acquisition" is how Lyons (1970:106) 
summarizes Chomsky's counter to the failings of empiricist 
language acquisition theories. Chomsky (1972:192) says 
himself that in the light of the evidence currently avail-
able, "••• there is no reason why we should not suppose that 
the child is· born wi t.h a perfect knowledge of illli versal 
grammar, that is, with a fixed schematism that he uses in 
acquiring language." Humans are born with an innate know-how 
for the acquisition of language. It is this inborn knowl-
edge, according to Chomsky, which makes the rapid acquisition 
of language among children possible even though they are 
socially provided with a selective, inadequate and often 
degenerate sample of language from which to construct tLc 
rules which structure language. Chomsky (19?2:J7) speaks of' 
the "innate human FACULTE DE LAl'JGAGE" and also o:f tbe innate 
language acquisition system. This faculty or system is one 
of the faculties of the mind. "On the basis of the best 
information now available," writes Chomsky (1972:59), "it 
seems reason.able to suppose that a child cannot help con.:.. 
structing a particular sort of transformational grammar to 
account for the data presented to him, any more than he can 
control his perception of solid objects or his attention to 
line and angle." 
An important operation of the innate learning schema as 
this applies to language acquisition is that it directs the 
human infant to pay close attention to the human face and 
the human voice. The strong innate bias human infants have 
in favour of looking at the human face has already been 
noted. In addition to this, infants seem also biased to 
attend closely to the human voice (Eisenberg 1967, 1970; 
McCall 1975; Menyuk 1971). Condon and Sander (1974) con-
firmed that babies are especially responsive to the human 
voice. They found that babies as young as 12 hours old move 
their bodies in rhythm with human speech. They did this to 
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the sound of either English or Chinese but did not do so to 
discordant vowel sounds or to tapping. The investigators 
suggest that from the first day of life the newborn may be 
preparing for speech. Eimas (1975) provides evidence which 
suggests that human infants come into the world with the 
ability to make the kinds of perceptual discriminations 
necessary for the acquisition of language~ Eimas found that 
infants from about one month of age categorize consonatal 
sounds. This behaviour and other related behaviours reveal 
that young infants perceive speech categor.ically. That is, 
as discrete sound unit!:. rather than as a "bloom.int;, buzzing 
confusion". It seems, further, from Eimas's work that 
infants are borrt with a perceptual bias in :favour of specific 
linguistic features just as they have a bias towards specific 
visual features. Finally, Eimas is of the opinion that 
without these innate structureE and biases, the acquisition 
of language would be difficult if not impossible (see, also, 
Flavell 1977:164-167). 
Richards (1974a; 1974b) has drmvn attention to the 
functionality of the infant's apparently biologically rooted 
preference for attending to speech-like sounds. Like 
Eimas, Richards feels that infants seem to possess a rudi-
mentary knowledge at birth regarding what sounds are import-
ant and which are unimportant. Richards argues that this 
biological pre-adaptation implies that the infant does not 
have to begin from scratch when cJ_assifying the sounds around 
it, nor (it may. be added) does the infant have to develop 
the classificatory schema from scratche Instead of pro-
ceeding entirely randomly or haphazardly, b.UL1an infants seem 
to have an inborn inkling regarding the teleonomic value of 
particular sounds. Richards also suggests that human infants 
seem to be biologically endowed with a rud.:Lmentary sense of 
timing wbich is a pre-requisite for speech development. He 
states~ in response to those who opt for the view of the 
infant as a TABULA RAZA cre2ture witb a few reflexes and 
otbe:rwise random movements,' 11 Observation of the er.vironment s 
of ir.Sa.nts provide no evidence that parents systematically 
respond ~o their children in the ways that are required by 
learning theory. No, the infant must play a major roJ.e in 
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structuring and organizing his own environment and learning 
particular things about it, and clearly he is endowed ·with a 
biological nature that makes this possible." (Richards 
1974:237). Gardner and Gardner (1975) have noted in connec-
tion with the pre-adaption of infants to acquire speech, 
that recently developed techniques for recording the beha-
viour of neonates have revealed that the human infant is 
responsive to characteristics of adult speecb, such as 
segmentation and the distinction between phonemes, within a 
month of birth. 
The inri_ate learr_ing schema is it self" sor.1ething that 
develops ttrough maturation. The inborr learning capabili-
ties of the foetus are different from tLose of the newborn 
whose capabilities are again different from the one-year 
old. The unfolding of the innate learr.ing schema has 
implications for the development and content of tbe indivi-
dual stock of knouledge, playing a decisive role in deter-
mining 1vhat inf'ormation is assimilable at any moment of 
development. Fer.field (1969:141) has drawn attention to the 
fact that the developing human brain appears to have in it a 
"bioJ.ogical clock of learning aptitude". He :i;::oints out that 
while a mechanical computer c2..n be programmed to a new task 
at virtually any time and any existence programme extensively 
modified wit):l.in the limits of its 'meta-programme', this·is 
not the case 'fith the human brain. Fer.£ield, along with such 
writers as Piaget, Bm·rer, and Chomsky, views all human 
learning as ine·xtricably linked to physical maturatior..al 
factorse The human brain seems, says Pen.field, to be pro-
grammed to be optimally programmable for a specific range of 
learr:ing activities at a given point in its temporal develop-
ment. Imprinting Provides the classic example of learning 
under the control of an innate schema with a strong temporal 
developmental factor. l:iuman language acquisition appears 
also to provide a further though more complex example. 
According to Pen.field (1969:141) the human br~in appears to 
be optimally linguistically programmable at a certain point 
in time. ~~any linguistic studies confirm that the tremendous 
facility which young children have for acquiring language 
seems to be genetically and maturationally determined to a 
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large extent. Language learnt at an early age is learnt 
differently from la..--iguage learnt later and these two 
varieties of language reveal important differences in terms 
of how they are stored and function. Lenneberg (1967) 
points out that children in different cultures not only 
start developing language at roughly the same age but they 
go through very similar stages in their learning of language. 
He are;ues that this observation provides evidence for an 
innately determined sequence of language development. There 
is a critical period for language learning just as there is 
for Kalking. 
The existence of uniquely human genetic structures in 
the b.wnan ability to acquire langua.ge is demonstrated by the 
general failure to teach higher primates to use language. 
Lennebergis (1964) argwnents imply that attempts to teach 
animals language 2.re doomed to failure. He has even gone so 
far as to demonstrate that the ability to acquire and use 
language does not depend on being intelligent or having a 
large brain, it depends on being hwnan. Though these obser-
vations were made before the explosion of efforts to teach 
language to apes, Lenneberg's main thesis seems to have been 
confirmed by these efforts. While apes appear capable of 
acquiring and using certain items of protolinguistic knowl-
edge, such as is represented in asking for certain things or 
in "naming" certain objects, they do not seem to be able to 
acquire or use linguistic k.r_owledge proper. In concluding 
th~ir carefully reasoned answer to the question, "Do apes 
use language?", savage-Rwnbaugb. et al. (1980:60) state, 
Apes, then, like children, learn to use 
symbols as part of social-interaction 
routines. They are able to discern various 
sets of circumstances in which the production 
of particular symbols is deemed appropriate 
and results in obtaining a goal. They, like 
children, also learn to initiate these social 
interaction routines by producing symbols. 
Unlike children, however, apes do not seem to 
have moved beyond this point. To date, there 
.is no evidence that Washoe, Saraµ, Lana, 
Koko, or Nim achieved symbolization proper. 
They concJ.ude, 
Tbus, it appears that chimpanzees, even with 
intensive linguistic training, have remained 
at the level of communication they are endowed 
with naturally -- the ability to indicate, in 
general fashion; that they desire another to 
perform an action upon them or for them when 
there exists a single unambiguous referent. 
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As the evidence stands at present, it seems possible to say 
that if very p~rticular biological and, hence, genetic, 
factors did not play a part in language acquisition, then 
apes should be able to. be taught language. Their failure to 
learn language, even specially devised and adapted languages, 
is a partial vindication of the innatist thesis. As Pribram 
(1969:2) has.pointed out, we seem to''••• inherit something 
that structures our corrununication and that other creatures 
do not share". 
The careful studies of Lenneberg (1964) indicate that 
the ability to learn language is so deeply rooted in hwnans 
that children learn it even in the face of drn.matic handi-
caps. It is so difficult to suppress language that handi-
caps such as blindness· and dea.fne ss do e,·enerally not preclude 
its acquisition. The case of Helen Keller, born blind and 
deaf, provides powerful evidence for the idea of an innate 
schema serving to facilitate language learning. Lorenz 
(1977:189) states that the manifest impossibility of such an 
achievement as that of Helen Keller when viewed from the 
perspective of conventional learning theory is for him 
unshakable proof of the correctness of the innatist thesis. 
Knowing how to .learn 
This discussion of the innate learning schema would be 
incomplete '"ithout some attention being given to the learning 
process itself. That is, to those operations which produce 
knowledge out of the information available. Obviously, 
because this is a vast and multi-disciplinary topic, it is 
only possible to make a few cursory observations here. 
While human adults may be considered, to some extent, 
to teach children such things as language and social beha-
viour, it must nevertheless be admitted that they do not 
teach children in any appreciable fashion hb"\v to learn these 
thingso As a logical point, even to teach someone how to 
learn presupposes that the person already knows how to learn 
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how to learn; at every instance of learning an A PRIORI 
learning structure and _learning ability must be assumed. 
Human infants in every instance of learning are partly 
responsible for what is learnt (and what is not) and the 
earliest acts of learning are largely a consequence of the 
functioning of the innate learning schema. As Piaget (1971: 
150) states, "o•• there is no cognitive impression without 
the intervention of some organizing function, conserved from 
previous situations, w·fiich can be traced back to innate re-
actions." Even in adults, since they know how to learn and 
this knowledge is similar in terms of its representations to 
that of children, it can be assumed that much learning is 
still largely acquired as a result of innate factors. 
Though certain functions and routines of the innate 
learning schema are more open to modification through 
experience than others, some are not. Thus, even the learn-
ing schema of an adult will have many relatively unmodified 
iru1ate elements. The role of the sense receptors in 
selecting and translating stimuli into information provides 
an example of such a relatively fixed element. The way in 
which the physiology of an organism serves to constitute the 
information available to it has been described by Lettvin et 
al. (1972) in the case of the frog. In their work on the 
vision of th,e frog, these investigators discovered that the 
eye serves not simply as a T V camera, relaying impressions 
of all the light rays which enter it and to which it is 
sensitive, but·also acts as a device for selecting specific 
visual stimuli out of the range available and transmitting 
these to a higher information processing level. As they 
phrase it, "••• the eye speaks to the brain in a language 
already highly organised and -~nterpreted, instead of trans-
mitting some more or less accurate copy of the distribution 
of light on the receptors" (Lettvin et al. 1972: 135). 
Evidence such as this suggests via extrapolation that human 
senses operate to constitute to some extent t.he content of 
consciousness and the material of thought. White (1972:xi) 
has pointed out that humans are biologically placed in a 
state of sensory repression and that this is functional 
because sensory processing is the initial stage in the 
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biological construction o:f reality. 
Because o:f the built-in nature o:f sensory selection, it 
seems that one o:f the e:f:fects o:f the newbornts learning 
schema is to simplify the informational environment and make 
it more manageable. In the light o:f this observation and 
the :foregoing discussion, it seems thus that William James 
was mistaken when he wrote that the newbornts world was a 
"blooming, buzzing conf'usion". It is adults, projecting 
their world on the newborn who make the mistake o:f supposing 
the ignorant little baby must be overwhelmed and confused by 
the world. But there is no the world in any perception. We 
tend not to project such conf'usion on young animals, nor, 
:for that matter, on grown animals living in the human habitat. 
The available evidence suggests that because o:f the structure 
o:f its sensations, perceptions and coE,nitions, the newborn's 
"doors o:f perception" are only slightly ajar and this is 
highly :functional. It has :fe'\rnr things demanding its 
attention and these, as has been noted, are ranl~ed in some 
way. There is much that is "invisible" to the infant. Much 
that is too :far away, moves too slowly, is too small; is too 
dull, is too quiet, etc., is, :for example, not seen. Just 
as obviously, the problems that occupy adult minds are not 
the ones with which infants concern themselves. Each organ-
ism not only lives in its own world, each age o:f organism 
and each organism with a different stock o:f knowledge has its 
own world. An infant's world gradually expands as its 
knowledge develops and is :from start to :finish seldom i:f 
ever unmanageably incoherent or cacophonous. The world o:f 
the teenager is, existentially speaking, no more confusing 
or disorderly than that o:f the university professor. This 
approximate equilibrium between information and knowledge is 
a result o:f the :fact that knowledge plays a role in deter-
mining information. Infants see less because they know less. 
The blooming, buzzing confusion is only visible in the 
imagination o:f adults, even to them it is invisible in 
reality. Evolutionary theory suggests that this equilibrium 
between information and knowledge is a necessary phylogenetic 
achievement. An orgartism that is ordinarily overwhelmed by 
stimuli would have great di:f:ficulty ... in learning and adapting. 
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It is highly lllllikely that such a hypothetical sensitive and 
vulnerable organism could exist or continue to exist. 
Besides the filtering, selecting, interpreting and 
information constituting activities just referred to, the 
innate learning schema also fllllctions to store, integrate 
and maintain knowledge in memory. Perception and cognition 
involve the fusion of previously acquired knowledge with the 
stimuli of the moment. Though these activities develop, 
they are not learnt in any obvious way. They are expressions 
of the fllllctioning of the nervous system as much as the ex-
pression of particular stimuli. Dreaming and imagining are 
also activities which, while they contribute to the assimi-
lation and development of knowledge, are not learnt. The 
emergence of the various kinds of "abstracted" knowledge 
indicates one way in which the developing mind appears to 
work on the knowledge at its disposal. It abstracts from 
specific items of knowledge general principles and axioms 
which are not given to consciousness in any direct fashion. 
It was Heraclitus who claimed lorrg ago that "strife 
f'athers all things" (Stikkers 1980:10). Knowledge is a 
child of strife. As was pointed out when the ec;.uilibriwn 
process was discussed, Piaget's theory of cognitive develop-
ment is basically a conflict theory and is corr..patible with 
various other cognitive dissonance theories. C or..f li ct , non-
balance, dissonance, contradiction, disequilibriwn, dis-
harmony, incompatibility, are all words describing the 
condition which serves to propel cognitive development. But 
what is it in the young infant or in the adult that makes 
cognitive dissonance disequilibrating? Why should logical 
inconsistencies or incol-;.erences bother us? Why should we 
we seek to resolve these? The answer seems to lie in the 
fact that the motivation to equilibrate dissonant ideas, 
thoughts and feelings is an expression of a more general 
tendency fundamental to life. This is illustrated, for 
example, in PiagetYs cor..sideration of the genesis of logico-
mathematical and scientific. knowledge. He argues that these 
are outgrowths and expressions of the self-regulatory and 
adaptive character of life. The thrust of life is always 
towards better adaptation. The equi.libration of the conflict 
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between two scientific theories which is generally achieved 
by judging one superior to the other marks an advance in 
adaptation. If the one theory is indeed empirically superior 
to the other it should extend not only humankind's theoreti-
cal knowledge but also its power over its environment. 
Though there seems little biological need to equilibrate 
religious, literary, musical or artistic knowledge, it seems 
that the habits, tendencies a,nd structures expressed in 
equilibration are generalized to these "non-vital" fields of 
life and knowledge. 
What this boils down to is the idea that we have, as 
part of our innate learning schema, a ter.dency to recognize 
and to be disturbed by perceptual and cognitive dissonances, 
and, furthermore, to be inwardly propelled to seek their 
resolution. As this can usually only be accomplished through 
the rearrangement of existing knowledge, the acquisitior... of 
further knowledge or the abstraction of higher forms of 
k.nowled5·e, it is easy to appreciate Khy theorists like Piaget, 
see cognitive tensions as the motor of cognitive development 
and epistemic evolution. 
Before concluding this chapter it shot.:ld be pointed out 
that the innate learning schema, though it serves to struc-
ture the development of knowledge, does not do so as rigidly 
as some interpretations of the word "innate" might lead one 
to suppose. Epistemogenesis involves much more than simply 
the operation of the innate schema. In addition, it has been 
found that this schema is extremely flexible. Flavell (1977: 
237) interprets Piaget (wrongly, I submit) as having argued 
that relatively specific, usually manual, sensory-motor 
manipulations of concre.te objects are .necessary for normal 
cognitive development in infancy. Flavei·ll (1977:237) and 
Boden (1979:48) both point out that if this is indeed 
Piaget's argument then he is mistalcen. Flavell and Boden 
refer to the work of Jordan (1972) and Kapp and Shaperman 
(1973) which provi.des evidence indicating tha.t the more 
orthodox types of sensory-motor manipulations are not the 
only avenues to the attainment of Piagetia.n and other types 
of knowledge. Jordan's work discusses the case of a middle-
aged woman who had never had any functional use of her limbs 
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but who nevertheless developed a stock of knowledge normal 
enough to allow her to pass as a lively and intelligent 
person and one able to help others complete their income tax 
forms. Kopp and Shaperman (1973) report the case of a baby 
born without limbs and fingers but whose acquisition and 
development of sensory-motor knowledge kept pace Kith other 
infants of the same age. Bower (1974:237) provides ad-
ditional evidence on this point through referring to the 
work of Gouin-Decarie (1965) who had studied the cognitive 
development of limbless thalidomide infants. These studies 
revealed that tte sensory-motor intelligence of these 
severely physically handicapped infants at two years of age 
was more or less normal. Unlike Flavell, Boden sees such 
cases as confirming rather than contradicting Piaget's ideas. 
(l'he versatility of the human learning schema is expressed by 
the fact that not a specific sort but some sort of sensory-
motor experience is necessary for the growth of knowledge. 
Whether a child is forced to use its head and moi;.th to 
achieve the kinds of manipulations and discov-eries that are 
more usually achieved using the hands and feet seems to make 
little difference as regards the knoi.vlcdge finally abstracted 
from such acts. The relative immateriality of exactly how 
the information is provided wtierlines both the structuring 
power and flexibility of the innate learning schema. Boden 
(1979:48) sums up this matter by concluding, "Our biological 
endowment of intellectually relevant structures is apparently 
rich and flexib·le enough to enable human intelligence to 
mature even without the manipulative experiences that are so 
important to the normal baby. 11 We achieve the same knowledge 
via a million different paths. 
Besides being versatile, the human learning schema is 
also resilient (Flavell 1977:2J8). Imprinting is an example 
of a non-resilient feature of an animal's learning schema. 
Studies reveal that if the critical period of imprinting 
passes without imprinting having taken place,. such learning 
cannot be later acquired. The animal's stock of knowledge 
remains permanently impa'ired. Following Flavell, and in the 
light of what is known about the acquisition of.different 
types of knowledge, it seems that the human learning schema 
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is resilient in some cases and vulnerable in others to the 
effects of a negative learning situation or a physical 
handicap. Knowing how to read and write and knowing how to 
speak and understand a spoken language are both important 
epistemic achievements. Studies indicate, however, that the 
acquisition of language can be environmentally more perma-
nently disturbed than can the learning of reading and '\vri ting. 
The latter can be learnt at almost any age, but there is a 
critical period for the learning of language itself. Though 
the human innate learning schema is in some respects both 
versatile and resilient, as has been noted, it is structured 
to be so and its structured nature is, once a.gain, reflected 
by the fact, as Flavell (1977:239) notes, that, "Some forms 
of cognitive developmer-t clearly exhibit much more versa-
tility and resiliency than others". 
Conclusion 
It has often been claimed that humanity's propensity 
for culture is due to the "bursting of instinct". In a 
typical statement in this vein, Pulliam and Dunfort (1980:51) 
write, "The evolution of the vertebrates appears to be 
characterized by progressively less genetic determination of 
behaviour". The sociologists, Berger and Luckman (1967:66) 
are in agreement with Pulliam and Dunfort and provide an· 
example of an oversocialized conception when they speak of 
humankind's instinctual organization as "underdeveloped" 
compared with that of the higher mammals. Harala.mbos (1980: 
2), echoing the conventional sociological view, states, "·•• 
man's genetic code does not contain specific instructio~s to 
behave in a particular way". Though statements such as 
these convey some truth they are also misleading and partly 
erroneous. If such statements are interpreted to imply that 
humans have less innate knowledge than other more instinc-
tively directed organisms, then they are mistaken, I would 
submit. If the term "behaviour" is interpret~d, as I think 
it should be, to cover learning behaviour as well as otl-ler 
forms of behaviour, then it becomes obvious, in the light of 
the contents of this chapter, that a vital aspect of human 
behaviour, and one that influences all other aspects, is 
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indeed strongly genetically coded. Thus to state as does 
Haralambos (on behalf of sociology) that hwnankind's genetic 
code does not contain specific instructions to behave in 
particular ways, is patently wrong. Berger and Luckmann's 
claim that hlimankindis instinctual organization is "under-
developed" is misleading. The result of any genetic under-
development or aberration is generally disastrous for life. 
Hwnankind's genetic organization is highly developed. 
Certainly, much hinges on such terms as "instincts", "innate", 
"genetic" and "behaviour" as used by these and other writers, 
but I nevertheless feel that what is now known about hwnan-
kind' s genetic make-up does not warrant statements, of which 
the above are a sampling, which imply the absurd conclusion 
that the creature supposedly at the top of the phylogenetic 
scale has somehow lost great 1v;ads of genetic information. 
Such factors as the conserving nature of DNA, the 
partial recapitulation of phylogenesis by ontogenesis, the 
fact that the human brain is stratified -- the younger 
phylogenetic structures imposed on the older, the many cases 
of reflexive behaviours becoming incorporated into open 
flexible schemas under volitional control, the selective 
power of language, tools and culture in forcing hwnan evo-
lution into a biologically unique dire ctLon and the many 
observable manifestations of the innate learning schema --
such as the examples already given, strongly suggest that 
hwnankindts tremendous plasticity is the result of the 
genetic acquisition of ~innate knowledge. The genome 
has had to acquire the ability to learn and this ability is 
now programmed into the human genes. Thus, it seems that 
Lorenz (1977:65) is correct when he writes, "All learning 
ability is based on open programmes which presuppose the 
presence, not of less but of more, information in the genome 
than do so-called innate behaviour patterns". 
Though newborn babies appear helpless and ignorant, it 
is only a superficial appearance. An appearance that has 
beguiled nwnerous scholars into attributing too much of the 
r:ewbornts later achievements to the environment a.nd society. 
I-~aralambos ( 1980: 2), again echoing the con.·ventional socio-
logical view, st2~tes, "To all in.tents and purposes a newborn 
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baby is helpless. Not only is it physically dependent on 
older members of the species but it also lacks the behaviour 
patterns necessary for living in hunan society." Far i'rom 
being helpless or ignorant -- or living outside of society 
-- the newborn is massively helpful and knowledgeable -- and 
a participating member of society -- only not in very obvious 
ways. In its OKn way, it r ... elps itself to learn and instru.cts 
others how, when and what to teach it and how to behave 
towards it. The newborn is helpless in some obvious ways 
because its parents are so intelligent and helpful with 
regard to these. Similarly, its ignorance of so many things 
is counterbalanced by its innate kno·Kledge about hm·r to 1.earn 
these things and the existence of the necessary informatioE 
in the environme:r:.t and in the stocks of k.r:.01dedge of its 
parents and otl:..er humans. In t.•hort, the •:he1.plessness" and 
"ignorance" of the neKborn represents its accurate fore-
knoKledge of its world and its kind. To take away society 
from the newborn as a demonstration of its. weak ir..stincts, 
is like taking a tadpole out of water; both will die. The 
help and knowledge which the newborn brings into society are 
forms of help and knuwlcdge 1vbich society car.not offer <:ind 
does not have to offer. Society itself would not be possible 
without these forms of help and knowled.ge. 
The tadpole in water and the newborn in ~ociety; 
neither can help but develop. In the case of the newborn, 
Flavell (1977:232) conm1ents, "Cog;nitive development has a 
sturdy, relentless, inexorable quality to it ••• a sense of 
this intrinsic momentum towards growth becomes especially 
strong if we try to imagine what we would have to do to 
prevent a child making any cognitive progress between the 
ages of 0 and 15 ye~rs." He adds that during the period of 
childhood, b.wuan beings are best cor..strued as devices pro-
grammed to develop and develop they will given any reasonable 
opportunity to do so. This point echoes the work of Wohlwill 
-(1973) who feels that early cognitive development is, under 
normal circumstances, inevitable. From a psychological 
point of view it should be taken as given rather than as 
something to be explained. Its explanation lies more in the 
fields of neurophysiology, genetics and biology. It has been 
the mistake of much sociology and psychology to devalue that 
which is taken for granted. The child's capacity to learn 
is just as important and as much a part of socialization as 
is the information society makes available to the child. 
An adequate understanding of socialization or learning must 
encompass both. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
BIOLOGY AND CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 
It is the capacity for returning 
reductively to the use of universals, 
to the "materials" that furnish human 
beings with the power to create 
imagery, that inspires adult creati-
vity. In childhood this behaviour is 
innate and spontaneous, the normal 
process a child employs when fulfil-
ling his basic appetite for knowledgea 
Edith Cobb (1977:95) 
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In this chapter and the one to follow attention is 
devoted to topics of direct and indirect relevance to the 
sociology of knowledge and to sociology in general in order 
to indicate some of the value which the kind of genetic 
epistemology developed ha~ for these disciplines. It should 
be apparent from the earlier chapters that genetic (evol-
utionary) epistemology, because it combines biological and 
psychological epistemologies, offers the sociology of knowl-
edge powerful theoretical tools and insights for a fuller 
comprehension of its subject matter. Genetic epistemology 
and the sociology of knowledge together seem to offer as 
complete an understanding of how knowledge evolves from 
"brutes to man, from child to adult, from primitive to 
civilized man, from stage to stage within mature cultures" 
as is currently available (quote from Scheler 1980:JJ). 
Some indication of how genetic epistemology can combine with 
the sociology of knowledge to form a comprehensive theory of 
knowledge is provided below when such things as biology and 
culture, socialization, cultural creation and universal 
knowledge are discussed. In the light of such discussions 
it should be clear why Scheler urged the-sociology of 
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knowledge to develop and maintain close links with develop-
mental psychology and biology and why genetic epistemology 
can make a contribution to this field. 
One factor which has kept the sociological approach to 
knowledge apart from biological and psychological approaches 
is, as was noted, the peculiar conception of knowledge most 
generally adopted. It is a conception derived from the over-
philosophized conception used in philosophy. As a con-
sequence of this, the sociology of knowledge has tended to 
concentrate upon the social determinants of the reality 
status of knowledge rather than being also concerned with the 
equally important question of the social origin and evolution 
of knowledge. A static rather than a dynamic approach and 
one which severely circumscribes the nature of knowledge 
characterizes the sociology of knowledge. It is difficult in 
conventional sociology to reconcile the macroscopic and the 
microscopic viewpoints. The messy nature of individual 
stocks of knowledge seems always to contradict the neat 
formulae which arrange knowledge and interests, for example, 
at tbe macro level. Forms of knowledge for which the truth/ 
false distinction is of little or no relevance (e.g., skills) 
are neglected. These factors combine to contribute to the 
sterility which characterizes much of the sociology of 
knowledge today. 
It is a contention of this study that the sociology of 
knowledge can benefit by adopting the kind of conception of 
knowledge proposed here. By defining knowledge as assimi-
lated information, the sociology of knowledge will be in a 
position to continue its traditional concerns while at the 
same time taking into its ambit additional matters which are 
of sociological importance in themselves and which ·shed ne'i 
light on the traditional concerns. Probably most importantly, 
the conception of knowledge proposed here facilitates the 
fusion of ideas from many disciplines and encourages an 
integrated and comprehensive approach to knowledge. It shows 
the way for the sociology of knowledge itself to become a 
genetic epistemology. That is, a sociological discipline 
concerned with tbe origin and evolution of social and cul-
tural knowledge. By developing in this way tb.e sociology of 
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knowle.dge can serve to complete the genetic epistemology of 
Piaget, which, as was noted, paid little attention to the 
social dimensions of knowledge. 
Biology and cultural knowledge 
Though it receives little direct attention and its 
implications are seldom explored, there is nevertheless a 
general recognition in sociology that human sociality and 
culture are the product of humankind's biological nature. 
The production, transmission and assimilation of cultural 
knowledge is; as Berger and Luck.mann ( 1967: 70) write, "an 
anthropological necessity". Evolutionary reasoning suggests 
that culture originated as a response to problems of adap-
tation. Because of its adaptational advantages, humankind 
has gradually evolved from a pre-cultural to a cultural stage 
of evolution. Evolutionary reasoning also suggests that as 
the advantageE of culture made themEelves felt, culture 
itself served to select elements in the genome responsible 
for culture. Thus, in a curious and as yet poorly understood 
way, the human genome spawned culture while culture effected 
culturally advantageous changes in the genome. Gecrtz (197J) 
has correctly argued that by saying that a given disposition 
is ilUlate, one is not necessarily denying that it was also 
culturally produced. Archaeological evidence reveals that 
culture predates the appearance of Homosapiens. It is there-
fore logically consistent to suppose that Homosapiens 
reflects, as least to some extent, the effect which its 
proto-cu.l ture and early culture had on its genetic material. 
The socio-cultural environment is obviously as important an 
environment as regards evolutionary forces as is the natural 
or physical environment. Though this circulatory is 
accepted, this study focuses primarily on the movement from 
genome to culture. Seen in evolutionary time, nevertheless, 
there was for the homonid line a time before culture and a 
time when the ear lie st manifestations of cu.l tµre would have 
been more innately determined than is the case with present 
day culture. In this sense, genes are sociogenetically prior 
just as they are ontogenetically. 
The genomeis spawning of culture and cultureis effects 
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on the genome has led gradually to what Piaget (1971:366) 
terms the "bursting of instinct". Culture is consequently 
an adaptational imperative for humans. Humans cannot survive 
without it and, some argue, cannot live without producing it. 
"Man builds cultures," writes Wissler (1923:252), "because 
he cannot help it; there is a drive in his protoplasm that 
carries him forward even against his will. So it f'ollov.-s 
that, if at any time the continuity of' culture were broken, 
the human group would begin to construct culture anew 
according to tee old pattern." Wissler was one of' the e2.rly 
writers to point out that the antithesis between what is 
innate and what is culturally learnt breaks down when it is 
recognized (as it must be for 105·ical and empirical reasons) 
that humankind's "equipment for culture" is itself' innate 
(see, also, Bidney ~970:64-65). Thus, strangely, even though 
culture probably shaped the human propensity for culture, 
this propensity is genetically transmitted and not culturally. 
Apropos Wisslerts hypothesis tt~at if' the continuity of' 
culture were broken, it would be constructed a.now according 
to the old pattern, a few remarks arc in order. (A similar 
hypothesis, as noted previously, was recently formulated by 
Fox 19/'5:251:25J.) If', as has been acknowledged, culture has 
itself' influenced the hwnan genome then it may be that a 
hypothesis such as Wissler•s would turn out, if it could· be 
tested, to be incorrect. What such a hypothesis drawn 
attention to is the human propensity to produce culture while 
it neglects the propensity to acquire it. It may be that 
tcese two aspects have evolved to be self-reinforcing and 
interdependent. If there is no culture to acquire then the 
capacity to produce it might not develop significantly, if 
at all. The kind of homonid responsible for the origin of 
culture was not genetically the same as the present day 
Homosapiens that continue its elaboration and development. 
The one may have had a greater innate power to g·et culture 
going while the other has evolved a greater p-0wer for its 
continuance. Humankind's ancestors can, at least, be 
supposed to have bad a greater resilience to cultural dis-
continuity than do contemporary humans. ·Wissler•s (and 
Fox's). hypotb,esis overlooks the probable impossibility of 
201 
humans -- even very young ones -- existing without the 
imprint of culture. Regenerating culture from scratch would 
• I 
require many human generations but such an experiment, as 
the one implied by Wissler, would probably never get going. 
Though innate drives and tendencies play a part, culture is 
also required to direct human copulation, reproduction and 
infant care. It is required to specify diet and adaptive 
behaviour. It is required to specify social relationships 
and social behaviour. In opposition to Wissler and Fox, I 
would submit that though what they say may have been applic-
able to some·of humankind's distant relations, humankind is 
today an innate cultural animal, one that cannot survive 
without culture and, hence, a species that would probably 
become extinct if the continuity of culture were ever totally 
extinguished. History reveals that cultures do develop and 
disintegrate, but what is not found is the total loss o:f 
culture while its earlier carriers continue living. The 
living in historical times have always had a rich culture, 
sufficient in opportune times to generate tl1e massive cul-
tural edifices o:f the great civilizations of the world. 
Though culture is an expression of a biological 
imperative as just noted, it is itself part of an older and 
more pervasive biological imperative. That is the one which 
constitutes .the structure of human sociality. This deeper 
biological imperative is also recognized in sociology. Mead 
(1972:203), for example, writes, 
All social interrelations and interactions 
are rooted in a certain conunon socio-
physiological endm,'ment o:f every individual 
••• These physiological bases of social 
behaviour ••• are the bases of such beha-. 
viour precisely because they themselves are 
also social; that is1 because they consist 
in drives or instincts or behaviour tenden-
cies, on the part of the given individual, 
which he cannot carry out .... without the 
co-operative aid of one or more other indi-
viduals. 
The minimal cases of sexual reproduction and parenting spring 
most inunediately to mind but the biological structuring of 
sociality goes far beyond this. Humans actively seek to 
interact with others of their kind and to learn from them, 
they are, as already noted, biologically disposed to do so. 
'.') 
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It is through·human sociality that cultural knowledge 
gradually emerged and accumulated. Because human sociality 
endures it provides the vehicle whereby the miniscule cul-
tural creations of millions of individuals could be preserved, 
elaborated and compounded into the massive stocks of cultural 
knowledge of contemporary societies. Humankind's enduring 
sociality and cultural existence is a correlate of its 
biological continuum and the way in which the genome has ex-
pressed itself through the millenia. "There is cultural 
continuity," writes Bidney (1970:65) "because man is by 
nature equipped for and impelled to culture building and 
cannot help inventing culture forms according to predetermined 
patterns; cultural continuity is not an accident of history, 
but a direct consequence of the psychobiological nature of 
man." 
The, the sis that hmnan sociality precedes cultural 
knowledge and provides the grounds for its emergence and 
evolution supports the arguments put forward by such early 
sociologists as Comte, Durkheim, Sper.cer and Tylor that such 
knowledge is essentially social in origin. The fact tl:.at 
cultural knowledge is a social objectivation, a facticity, 
which transcends individuals and constitutes a new phenomenal 
order has led sociologists and anthropologists to regard it 
as super-organic. Popper's ( 1973) "World J" , the world of 
intelligibles, or ideas in the objective sense, provides an 
example of cultural knowledge seen as super-organic. So too 
does Durkheim's (1976) "collective consciousness". For 
Durkheim this referred to the body of beliefs and sentiments 
common to the average members of a society. He rightly 
pointed out that these beliefs and sentiments have a life of 
their own -- as Popper also argued in the case of his World J. 
It is the fact identified by "cultural super-organicists" 
that cultural knowledge constitutes, to some extent, a 
separate realm that provides the RAISON D'ETRE for sociology 
and anthropology. But where many sociolo5·ists and anthrop-
ologists go astray is in exaggerating the separateness and 
autohomy of culture and even inverting the actual relation-
ships which exist between human biology, ·psychology and 
sociology. 
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It might be useful for analytic purposes to regard 
culture as a reality SUI-GENERIS and something to be explained 
in purely socio-cultural t~rms (as did Durkheim) but to mis-
take this for a description of reality is to seriously 
distort reality. Super....:organicists maintain that culture is 
an autonomous realm, that humans are its carriers, that 
culture is independent of the psychic and biological nature 
of humankind, that culture determines psychic life and the 
expression of biological drives, and that culture is a closed 
system which can be explained adequately in terms of other 
cultural phenomena. But these are only partial truths. They 
obscure as much as they illuminate. One of the things that 
such "truths" render problematic is the origin of culture. 
As Bidney (1970:65) writes, "To insist upon the self-
suf'ficiency and autonomy of culture ••o is not to explain 
culture, but to leave its origin a mystery or an accident of 
time." Another question not satisfactorily answerable in 
terms of such 11 truths'' is how it is that culture develops. 
For if' humans are simply the carriers of culture, having 
only buckets for minds, then the whole matter of cult~ral 
creativity and production remains as a mystery. The univer-
sal and enduring nature of many cultural features is a 
further problem left unresolved. So too is the matter of 
the discrepancies between culture as energy, as stimuli,·as 
information and as knowledge. It is only by incorporating 
biological and psychological explanations that sociologists 
and anthropologists can provide a proper account of how it is 
that culture as an object in the world, that is as pure 
organized energy, can ever be assimilated as knowledge and 
so, structure the thoughts and actions of the millions of 
minds that constitute human societies. It is worth noting, 
as the many views on culture demonstrate, that this reality 
is sufficiently rich and complex to sustain many points of 
view. The fact that each can be empirically validated to 
some extent is obviously not a sign that they. are all correct, 
but a sign that the phenomenon studied has not yet been 
adequately grasped. 
A fault of many discussions of the relationship between 
biology and culture is that they proceed at too general and 
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abstract a level. Furthermore, many such discussions rest 
their entire argument on one or two empirical cases. While 
sucb cases often do validate an argument about one or a few 
aspects of the relationship between biology and culture they 
cannot validate, or even illustrate, all the aspects of this 
relationship. Biology and culture refer to too many things 
and relationships. For this reason, the investigation of 
the connection between biology and culture is no simple 
matter. 
Consider, for example, the relationship between the 
genome and dietary knowledge versus religious knowledge. 
Both are culturally transmitted and have been culturally 
developed. Nevertheless, it seems to me, they stand in a 
different relationship to the genome. Though it does not 
determine exactly what humans eat and what meanings tbey 
attach to what substances, the genome plays an easily 
demonstrable role in dividing the edible from tbe non-edible 
and the good tasting from the bad tasting. Rituals of eating 
too must obviously include a point at which the food is 
consumed. How does the genome determine religious knowledge? 
The bioepistemologist is obviously faced here with a more 
difficult, if not a different, question. It is, I submit, 
partly by recon'sidering socialization theory and the problem 
of cultural .creation that I think a more accurate under-· 
standing of the relationship between biology and cultural 
knowledge can be achieved. 
Socialization and humankind's constitutional creativeness 
Many of the ideas dealt with in this dissertation make 
it necessary to reconsider socialization theory and the kinds 
of learning theory it presupposes. The distinction drawn 
between information and knowledge implies that society, 
parents, peers, etc., are, in their relation to the person 
being socialized, the transmitters of information not knowl-
edge. This distinction is crucial for it immediately draws 
the activities of the person being socialized into the 
socialization process. It is the person being socialized, 
and only that person, who can transform the information 
available into elements of his or her own stock of knowledge. 
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A person's stock of' knowledge is thus always idiosyncratic, 
their own creation to some extent. The idea of' socialization 
as a process f'or the production of' cultural clones has no 
basis in f'act. 
Until f'airly recently, as Scbaf'f'er (1975:165) points 
out, the notion of' primary socialization was understood as 
essentially a one-way process -- f'rom socialization agent to 
the child as the object of' socialization. The child was 
"moulded" and "shaped" to f'it society. The child had a 
bucket for a mind, or a TABULA HASA, which society filled and 
in this way programmed the child. Such a view is unsatis-
factory because, as the pre~.ent study tries to show, the 
child is partly responsible for his/her own socialization. 
The child is both an agent and the object of' socialization. 
He/she is co-responsible with society for making himself'/her-
self' a member of society. As discussed earlier, babies and 
children modify and co~trol the behaviour of socializing 
agents. They thus exert some control over the information 
available to them. Babies and children are guided as to the 
kinds of in.formation they seek by the relevance hierarchies 
which dev-elop out .of their innate learning schemas and their 
various cognitive and physiological needs. Thus, while it is 
true to some extent that children learn what their parents 
and others w.ant them to learn, it is equally true, though 
often overlooked, that they also learn to some extent what 
they want to learn. Because of the reciprocity which often 
exists between ·child and parent, the child ofte:q wants to 
learn and is ready to learn what the parent wishes to teach 
it. On the other hand, as every parent and teacher will 
attest, there are also many occasions when the child does not 
wish, or is not ready, to assimilate what is being off'ered. 
Similarly, there are many instances in which the child is 
~eeking knowledge but is frustrated in this search by its 
parents and teachers. The reciprocity between agent and 
pupil is not perfect. It is for this reason that the child 
has little alternative but to fill in the many gaps in its 
stock of knowledge by its own activities; through searching 
for knowledge or by creating it out of the resources avail-
able. Children invent 'culture' as they go .along just as 
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much as they have it imposed on them. An essential part of 
socialization consists of the child equilibrating his/her own 
inventions with the existing culture. Culture, it is obvious, 
cannot prescribe for every contingency, even as a blue-print 
it often has pages missing. No parent can prepare a child 
for ,every life situation. Life involves many ad hoc solu-
tions. Human life is essentially creative. It is the 
construction of an adequately functioning stock of knowledge 
out of the information available. 
The idea that socialization -- indeed all learning --
involves the.creation of knowledge out of the information 
available, opens a way for dealing with a topic avoided by 
sociologists and anthropologists. That is the topic of the 
creation of cultural knowledge (see Langton 1979:292; Kunkel 
1970:257). Sociologists and cultural anthropologists make a 
great deal of the fact that humankind is a cultural animal 
and that it is culture above all else which most clearly 
distinguishes humankind from the other animals. Dut though 
they devote a lot of attention to the study of c~lture, both 
sociologists and anthropologists have displayed only a 
partial and selective interest in cultural creation. The 
neglect of this topic in sociology and anthropology is 
paradoxical because social existence as we know it is most 
directly the result not simply of culture (as is too ofton 
simplistically argued) but of cultural creation and re-
creation. By seeing culture rather than cultural creation 
as central to social life, sociologists and anthropologists 
are biased towards seeing culture as a fixed entity (which 
it is not) and have difficulty in dealing with internally 
generated cultural change. In addition, the notion of 
culture in contrast to cultural creation leads easily to 
such dualisms as nature/culture, innate/learned, culture/ 
society and individual/culture. Approaching culture from a 
concern with cultural creation soon reveals teat it is 
artificial and misleading to oppose nature and culture, 
innate and learned, culture and society and individual and 
culture. It is the genetic approach to culture which I feel 
can best improve our current understanding of culture and 
correct some of the errors that result from.thinking of 
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culture as something "out there" which, by being put "in 
here" (our heads), makes us social beings. In the genetic 
approach to culture, the topic of cultural creation is 
obviously paramount as such creation is the fundamental 
process by which culture develops. 
Various reasons can be advanced as to why the topic of 
cultural creation is largely neglected in sociology and 
anthropology. The stability of culture and the "traditional" 
character of social life in, especially tribal societies of 
yore, is obviously a factor which bas encouraged anthropolo-
gists particularly to view culture as relatively stable and 
cause them not to pay too much attention to cultural creation. 
In the main they seem to see (erroneously as genetic epis-
temology suggests) the duplication through imposition of 
cultural items in generation after generation of the peoples 
they study. 
Another probable reason why cultural creation has not 
received the attention it merits in sociology and anthropology 
stems from the complexity of the creative act itself. 
Thought and consciousness are large enougb puzzles for the 
human mind and cultural creation, since it involves both 
these processes in an original form, is probably the most 
mysterious and awe-inspiring of all cognitive and social 
processes. There is much that is' involved in the creative 
process that is hidden not only to our eyes but to our con-
sciousness as well. Tchaikowsky writes of"••• that super-
natural and inexplicable force we call inspiration •o•" in 
describing his YmethodY of composing music (Tchaikowsky 1878; 
quoted in Vernon 1978:55)0 Mozart is even more explicit 
about the mysteriousness of the creative capacity.· He 
writes: 
When I am, as it were, completely myself, 
entirely alone and of good cheer -- say, 
travelling in a carriage, or walking after 
a good meal, or during the night when I 
cannot sleep; it is on such occasions that 
my ideas flow best and most abundantly. 
Whence and how they come, I know not; nor 
can I force them. 
(Mozart c 1789; quoted in Vernon 1978:55.) 
Though the matter of human creativity is neglected in 
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sociology and anthropology, it is not neglected in genetic 
epistemology. The idea that humankind is constitutionally 
creative is a central thesis of genetic epistemology. 
(1971:203) writes in this connection: 
To identify the two most essential character-
istics of life, one can say, with all other 
writers, that life is "the creator of forms" 
or that it is "invention", which incorporates, 
as a necessary condition the idea that it is 
always extending its conquest over environ-
ment ••• these are also the two most central 
characteristics of every kind of cognition 
and ••• they epitomize the mechanisms common 
to life and knowledge ••• 
Piaget 
Humankind's constitutioP-al creativene~s is intimately 
linked to its "world openness" (Berger and Luck.mann 1967). 
Humankind's survival hinges on its great creative capacity. 
Humans have evolved to be the Earth's most creative inhabi-
tants. Humankind's innate learning schema, as has been 
discussed, leads to curiosity and playfulness and to a strong 
drive to explore and to know. Curiosity and play in kaleido-
scopic fashion generate information which ensures that 
individual stocks of knowledge are never mere impositions or 
replicas of existing knowledge. But, as already noted, 
humankind's constitutional creativeness is even more deep 
seated than this. The assimilation process itself is a 
source of originality because it is a creative act. Cultural 
creations, rather than being special phenomena, are, it 
seems, more accura_tely seen as the products of a general 
human capacity.. Every person creates his or her own stock 
of knowledge, there is no way this can be injected fully 
formed. Every person is potentially a source for the items 
of knowledge which society recognizes as significant and 
which become incorporated into its culture. 
The will to know, to understand, to organize, to over-
come, to survive, are all motivators which stand both before 
knowledge and after it. In standing after it they produce 
the spiral of cultural creation. 
states: 
Man, as Lor~nz (1977:222) 
does not lose his urge to explore and play 
when he attains sexual maturity. This, in 
conjunction with his predilection for self-
exploration, makes man constitutionally 
incapable of ever submitting entirely to 
the force of tradition. 
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What is for Lorenz the power of tradition is for other 
writers t.be power of socialization or the power of ideology. 
By recognizing humankind's inherent creative capacity many 
of the shortcomings of ideas on tradition, socialization and 
ideology can be overcome. Genetic epistemology reveals that 
a great deal stands between tradition, culture and ideology 
as information and the knowledge which individuals derive 
from these. As regards certain problems raised by the 
conventional.approaches to ideology, for example, Perkins 
(1979:136-137) has argued that by recognizing humankind's 
inherent creative capacity, sociologists will be better able 
to deal with the problem of the emergence of counter-
ideologies. In illuminating this problem, Perkins (p 136) 
asks, "How can we explain protest groups such as women and 
gays, if the only way they can understand the world is 
through ideology?" The answer, obviously, is that all 
individuals have much knowledge, including non-social 
knowledge, beside ideology for understanding the world and 
even the "ideology" they have is their own version of 
official ideology. Appreciation that every individualts 
stock of cultural knowledge is essentially open and partly 
unique because· it is to some extent a self-construction ~d 
that it consists of items which are difficult, if not 
impossible, to equilibrate, leads to the important insight 
explored by Co~b (1977). She saw"••• each individual as 
becoming, in a metaphoric sense, a species in him or herself, 
the source of new evolutionary changes in human conscious-
ness, creators of essential discontinuities" (Mead, in Cobb 
1977:11). According to Poly~i, language and writing have 
vastly expanded humankind's creative capacity and thus 
increased its range of potential thought. Of this he writes 
(Polanyi 1967:91): 
It is the image of humanity immersed in 
potential thought that I find revealirig for 
the problems of our day. It rids us of the 
absurdity of absolute self-determination, 
yet offers each of us the chance of crea-
tive originality, within the fragmentary 
area which circumscribes our calling. It 
provides us with the metaphysical grounds 
and the organizing principle of a Society 
of Explorers. 
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If we grant, as I think we must, that humans are con-
stitutionally creative, it is necessary to say something 
about why this creativity, though it is a source of cultural 
change, paradoxically, like DNA, operates primarily 
conservatively, leading generally to the same ends. A state 
of affairs that obscures the complexity of human learning 
and encourages empiricist theories of learning and sociali-
zation. The reason for the conservative performance of human 
creativity, as has been repeatedly noted, is that humans 
everywhere have similar innate learning schemas and thus tend 
to solve problems in similar ways and to assimilate the same 
kinds of knowledge out .of comparable information. Thus, 
though humans are creative, they tend to be creative in the 
same way because of their shared biological nature and 
informational environments. Thus, too, despite being con-
stitutionally creative, t.rue cultural advances arc few and 
atypical of the species. Human creativity is primariJ_y 
employed in re-creating what has already been created. Tbis 
incredible redundancy is necessary because it is the only 
way each generation can reach the point of development 
attained by the previous generation. However, since each 
original cultural creation can add to the social stock of 
information and such information can provide the clues 
necessary for the re-creation of cultural items as part of 
any individual's stock of knowledge, re-creation is "easier" 
than original creation, despite being a similar process. 
Hence, the accumulation and transmission of cultural infor-
mation does allow succeeding generations to transcend 
-
preceding ones. Some cultural progress is possible and does 
occur. 
Cognitive universals and universal knowledge 
It is a basic thesis of genetic epistemo'logy that all 
humans, because they are members of the same specj_e s, have 
more or less the same innate capacity for acquiring knowledge 
ontogenetically. A corollary of this thesis is that to the 
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extent that human environments are similar, experiences will 
be similar and similar individual stocks of knowledge will 
be developed. Now it is obvious that human environments 
differ enormously and that such differences do have an effect 
on culture, cognition and knowledge. They might even have a 
slight cumulative effect on innate co5"11itive structures. 
What is, however, often overlooked is that despite mankind's 
apparent conquest of environment, every human environment, 
especially those in which the reproduction of the species 
takes place, is, and must be, similar in many ways. Biologi-
cal constraints and the bondedness of human life to certain 
fairly uniquitous physical and natural clements implies that 
all human environments and experiences must be similar in 
certain fundamental ways. As Fontana and De Water ( 1978: 102) 
point out, "The human body, with its many basic needs and 
desires, and the world in which the body must exist are 
basically the same the world over." In the same vein, 
Bronowski (1976:157) has drawn attention to the universality 
of the "cross-wires" of the visual field; II . . . gravity is 
vertical and the horizon stands at right angles to it". The 
universality of gravity, for one thing, and its structuring 
influence on so much cognitive and somatic knowledge is often 
ovcrlookedo Gesell (1945:46) is among the few scholars who 
have paid some attention to this basic and universal struc-
ture of the life world. He writes, "The foetus is a growing 
acti.on system ••• Its first and foremost function is to 
adjust to the ceaseless pull of gravity." The experience of 
gravity permeates a great deal of behaviour and knowledge, 
though its presence may be difficult to detect because it is 
so mu.ch part of that knowledg·e and behaviour (see; also, 
Cobb 1977:41-44). 
All human environments are filled with physical and 
natural objects leading to such universal concepts as 
"object", "life", "living", "dead", etc. All human environ-
ments have objects which move leading to such. concepts as 
"movement", "speed", "distance", "causation11 , etc. All hwnan 
environments have objects which can be counted, moved, lifted, 
dropped, weighed, compared, arranged, categorized, seriated, 
piled-up, etc. Such actions and. objects give rise naturally 
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to a large range of universal concepts and other forms of 
knowledge. All environments have materials which change or 
can be changed in one or more ways: materials that can be 
moulded, poured, sharpened, broken, bent, twisted, stretched, 
etc. All objects everywhere are arranged spatially and some 
can be spatially rearranged by hwnans. The passage of time 
is signalled in every environment by numerous changes. All 
environments have liquids and solids, temperature differ-
ences, light contrasts, colours, smells, sounds, and a myriad 
of other common ingredients all giving rise in members of the 
same species to similar experiences and items of knowledge. 
The social environment too has its universal features. 
Piaget points to a few when he writes (1972:35), 
Whether we study children in Geneva, Paris, 
New York or Moscow, in the mountains of Iran 
or the heart of Africa, or on an island in 
the Pacific, we obserV"e ever)'1vhere certain 
ways of conducting social exchanges between 
children, or between children and adults, 
which act through their functioning alone, 
regardless of the context of information 
handed down thro~gh education. In all 
environments, individuals ask questions, 
work together, discuss, oppose things, and 
so on; and this constant exchange between 
individuals takes place throughout the whole 
of development according to a process of 
socialization which involves the social life 
of children among themselves as much as 
their relationship with older children or 
adults of all ages. 
Knowing what we do about the human innate learning schema 
and the importance of "others" in cognitive development, i .. t 
is not surprising to note, for example, as Piaget (1972:12) 
points out, that object permanence, which includes the 
knowledge of the permanence of one's O'\\·n body, is partly 
achieved through the observation of the bodies of others and 
the latter are among the first, if not the first, objects to 
be known as permanent. Not only are people universal 
features of the social environment but so too are many of the 
things they do. People ever)'1vhere are born, grow up, grow 
old and die. They eat, sleep, drink, work, rest, excrete, 
copulate, give birth, etc. They experience pain and pleasure, 
joy and sorrow. They speak. The existence of other people 
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leads everywhere and inevitably to the discovery by each 
person that they are a "self" and that others are not self. 
Certain movements, gestures, expressions, behaviours 
and actions seem to be universal and these are assimilated 
into individual stocks of knowledge as llll.iversally shared 
images. It would be hard to deny that humans everywhere 
deeply assimilate the human image even though it is known 
that certain people do not acknowledge strangers as "people". 
Every social environment is characterized by a stock of 
cultural knowledge which includes, what we call, language, 
religion, art, science, practical skills, domestic science, 
and so forth. The ub.iquity of much of cultural knowledge 
ensures that individuals everywhere come to think symbolically 
and thus develop a form of consciousness shared by all normal 
human adults. The presence in all human settlements of tools, 
utensils, vessels, fire, language and other common cultural 
objects, leads people everywhere to certain shared ideas. 
The ~ of fire, the ~ of tools, utensils, vessels, 
shelter, language, morality and so on. Thus, despite cul-
tural differences, when we see someone making or using a 
tool, for example, we can at least be assured that we and 
they have an idea of tools and toolmaking. Such shared 
knowledge can and does serve as a point of entry on the part 
of one person into the culture of another. 
If we bear in mind the fact stressed by Piaget that 
knowledge is a construction and that certain of these con-
structions have little direct relationship with the exact 
nature of the objects and activities from which they arise, 
it is easy to appreciate why apparently diyerse environments 
may be functionally equivalent as far as the acquisition of 
certain forms and items of kn-0wledge are concerned. (Recall 
Piaget's distinction between empirical and logico-mathemati-
cal knowledge. Empirical knowledge is bom1d to specific 
objects and their nature; 
yield logico-mathematical 
In this connection Opper 
that: 
many objects can be acted upon to 
knowledge (Piaget 1.972: 50-51).) 
(1977:120) makes the valid point 
Intellectual development does not depend upon 
a specific type of object with which to 
interact. What is required is an environment 
containing a variety of objects upon which 
the internal processes can act. Environments 
with a degree of diversity are a universal 
feature, which would explain the apparent 
universality of certain types of mental oper-
ations desc.ribed in the present research. 
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The many commonalities of the human environment and 
humankind's common innate learning schema suggest the hypo-
thesis that people everywhere will acquire many similar 
items of knowledge and that the stages of cognitive develop-
ment will be similar in all societies. Because of the 
contingent, arbitrary and unique elements in all cultures, 
it ca.n be further hypothesized that the more fundamental 
items of knowledge and the earlier stages of cognitive 
development will be the most universal. Aspects of these 
hypotheses have been investigated in numerous studies over 
the past fifteen years and the evidence supports them. (For 
summaries of this research see Lloyd 1972; Dasen 1977; Derry 
and Dasen 1974; Warren 1980.) 
Though society and culture are implicated in ontogenesis 
from conception, their influences on cognitive development 
are not the same at every stage. It seems that biology and 
epigenesis, taking in universal aspects of the human environ-
ment, are primarily responsible for the core elements of 
early knowledge and early cognitive development. Scarr-· 
Salaptek (1976) has reasoned that the sensory-motor pattern 
of knowledge acquisition evolved earlier in our primate past 
than the other ·patterns of knowledge acquisition. I have 
argued in this study that all human infants are born with a 
similar learning schema which structures the mode of 
acquisition and content of early learning activities. For 
reasons such as these it is to be expected that earlier 
Piagetian stages and the contents that go with these are 
likely to be more universally att2,ined, more panhuman, than 
later stages or contents (see Flavell 1976:116, 2JJ). 
Because of genetic and environmental commonalities, Scarr-
Salapatek (1976) has argued, normal human beings everywhere 
are virtually certain to complete the sensory-motor stage of 
cognitive development. As she states (p · 186), "For the 
development of sensorimotor skills, nearly any natural, human 
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environment will suffice to produce criterion level perfor-
mance." 
Piaget's studies of the genesis of the categories and 
basic concepts contradict Durkheim's theory of knowledge. 
{Durkheim's theory is considered in the following chapter.) 
Piaget 1 s work implies that cultural knowledge is more ~eeply 
affected by human biology and psychology than most sociolo-
gical theories allow for. Following Piaget it can be argued 
that the concepts of the object, time, space and causality, 
as these are reflected in culture, are related to and 
sustained by·the elementary concepts of time, space, causal-
ity and the permanency and nature of objects as these are 
developed by all normal infants in the ec:.rly years of life. 
The shared nature of the human innate learning schema is 
evidenced by the similarities in infant learning behaviour 
the world over. All infants, it seems, are attracted by the 
human face and pay attention to the human voice. They explore 
objects and do similar things with the same objects. They 
are strongly attracted by novelty, etc. Since the initial 
operations of the innate learning schema are reflex-like, it 
is interesting to record that Kanner (1972) found the reflex 
repertoire of Bushman newborns to correspond precisely with 
that of their European counterparts. Similarly, in a study 
of African and European newborns, Warren and Parkin ( 1 974) 
found both groups to exhibit exactly the same set of 45 test 
responses and reflexes. Dasen(1977b) reports on a longitud-
inal study he c·onducted in rural Baoule (Ivory Coast) using 
Baoulese infants aged 5-33 months. He four..d when using tests 
developed in France that (p 9), 
Almost no adaptation of the test materials 
was found to be neces~ary: whereas most of 
the objects were unknown to the subjects 
(toys such as plastic cars and dolls, 
plastic rakes, etc.), they handled these 
very efficiently. The usual sequential 
order of stages was found. 
Dasen also notes that even at this ea.rly. stage cultural 
influences on learning are already apparent and that the 
often commented on precocity of African babies as regards 
motor development was also found in this·study. An interest-
ing example of infants of different race and. culture applying 
similar learning schemas to the same objects is provided by 
Dasen (1977a). He describes how almost all the African and 
European infants of about a year old he observed would, when 
given a plastic tube and a chain of paper clips, look for 
some way of making the chain of clips pass through the tube. 
The African infants were from a rural area and had never 
seen such things before yet they explored them in the same 
way and made the same errors. It can be inferred that they 
learnt similar things from this small exercise. It is 
Dasents (1977a, 1977b) view that the basic processes of 
cognitive development are universal and his cross-cultural 
studies of sensori-motor development substantiate this view 
to some extent. In a review of cross-cultural studies of 
cognitive development, Warren (1980) notes that such studies 
concerned with sensori-motor development are scarce. He 
concludes from the available evidence, however, that (p 295), 
"••• tte sensorimotor parallels observed are so remarkably 
exact, even with objects totally Llllfamiliar to African 
babies, as to inspire confidence in the necessarily tentative 
conclusion that the same broad sequence is followed every-
where as far as the transition to fully operational thought." 
Warren also notes that Cole and Scribner (1974), in con-
cluding their f;Urvey of culture and cognition, point to the 
unlikeliness. of finding cultural differences in basic com-
ponent cognitive processes. 
In Piagetian psychology, the "sensorimotor" stage of 
cognitive development (0-2 years) is followed by the "pre-
operational" stage (2-7 years), the "concrete operations" 
stage (7-11 years) and the "formal operations" stage (11-15 
years). Cross-cultural studies in the Piagetian and other 
traditions provide much useful data for the validation or 
refutation of PiagetYs ideas and the hypotheses of genetic 
epistemology. One thing that is repeatedly confirmed is that 
cognitive development everywhere follows the stages outlined 
by Piaget, though development within each stage is sometimes 
found not to follow the same sequences as were Llllcovered in 
Piaget's original studies. In addition the rate of cognitive 
development seems to vary from one socio-cultural setting to 
another. The evidence suggests that most or all normal 
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humans in all societies make it at least through the sensory-
motor and preoperational stages. Concrete operational 
reasoning appears to be the form of reasoning upon which 
human. societies and human cultures are constructed. Though 
this form of reasoning is not individually universal it is 
socially universal in that the bulk of individuals in all 
societies studied can reason in the concrete operational 
fashion. Piaget had supposed that all normal humans would 
attain the formal operational stage of cognitive functioning. 
This supposition appears to have been mistaken. The cross-
cul tural studies reviewed by Dasen ( 1977) , Berry and Dasen 
(1974) and Lloyd (1972) reveal that even at the concrete 
operational stage individual reasoning is not consistent to 
this stage nor is such reasoning fully developed in every 
direction within the stage. Even less consistency and 
breadth of development or application is found at the formal 
operational stage. In a study of the genesis of logical 
reasoning, Niemark (1975:570) found that, "Logical reasoning, 
as reflected in consistent performance across a broad class 
of instances, does not appear until adolescence and even at 
t~at age is by no means a universal attainment of all adol-
escent s.11 Flavell (1977), who refers to Niemark's study, 
provides a gene_ralization which seems to sum up the current 
knowledge on this topic. He writes (p 115), 
The generalization is that the higher the 
Piagetian cognitive stage, the less in-
evitable its full attainment by normal 
·individuals across all human environments. 
Full sensory-motor development must be 
universally completed, one would think. 
At lea.st some degree of concrete-oper-
ational ability might also be universal 
or nearly so among normal adults, although 
it is hard to be really certain of even 
this on the basis of existing cross-
cultural evidence~ The universality of 
formal-operational achievements would 
consequently be even less certain. 
The consensus of research findings seems to be that 
formal operational reasoning, if attained at all, is a 
specialized form of reasoning in all societies. It is ap-
plied selectively in specialized areas of thought and even 
in industrialized societies does not characterize all adult 
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thinking all the time. Despite the considerable evidence to 
the contrary, Piaget (1972) continues to maintain that all 
individuals reach the stage of formal operations, if not 
between 11 and 15 years of age, then at least between 15 and 
20. He concedes, .however, that even within industrial 
societies, people reach the formal operational stage, "••• in 
different areas according to their aptitudes and professional 
specializations" (Piaget 1972:10). This concession seems to 
imply a modification of Piaget's earlier conjecture that 
formal operations would be universally attained and that they 
are context independent (see Dasen 1977:6-7). Piagetian 
studies, especially cross-cultural ones, suggest that Piaget 
might have attempted to salvage an untenable conjecture by 
the foregoing type of paradoxical statement. These studies 
indicate that socio-cultural factors play a more crucial 
part in the evolution of the higher thought forms studied by 
Piaget than he originally hypothesized (see Dasen 1974:420-
421 ; Dasen 1 977; Warren 1980). 
Piaget's genetic epistemology is primarily a theory of 
scientific knowledge, his main concern being the dey·elopment 
of scientific reasoning in the individual, hence his emphasis 
on the instruments of science -- logic, mathematics and 
objectivity. This bias, while it is explicable in terms of 
the dominant values of modern industrial society, is partly 
justified by evolutionary reasoning. The science, logic, 
mathematics and objectivity of Western culture are extensions 
of basic adaptational strategies and are rooted in basic 
biological behaviour and structures. Since Piaget uses his 
culture and its standards to construct his "universal" models 
of science, logic, mathematics and objectivity, it is not 
surprising that ct:ildren from-urban industrial societies who 
have been formally schooled and who are literate perform best 
on his tests. Their education directs them towards the kinds 
of cognition and knowledge called for in the tests. Other 
kinds of cognition and knowledge are not test.ad, or tested 
only indirectly. Yet despite the considerable.situationally 
induced differences in cognition and knowledge, the fact that 
people everywhere pass through the same stages of cognitive 
development and to some extent acquire .similar concepts and 
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items of knowledge and can apply concrete operational or even 
formal operational reasoning to issues that really concern 
them, confirms the thesis that basic elements of science, 
logic, mathematics and objectivity are universal elements of 
~hink.ing and culture even though they are not elements as 
cleanly differentiated as .fn Western culture. The univer-
sality of these modes of cognition and items of knowledge is 
further confirmation of the basic sameness of the genetic 
structure of the hwnan mind everywhere. 
Approaching cultural knowledge from the Piagetian angle 
lea.ds to a direct challenge of the conception of culture as 
something essentially arbitrary. It seems that the univer-
sals of human biology -- implying universals in ways of 
assimilating, accommodating and equilibrating knowledge 
and the un.iversals of the human predicament lead not only to 
the 11 common human pattern11 acknowledged by ever.. extreme 
cultural relativists, but also to WLiversal non-arbitrary 
items of cultural knowledge. People everywhere have at least 
some knowledge as regards logic, measurement, causality, 
time, space, speed, distance, classification, seriation, 
weight, mass, volume, and so forth. They share many of the 
items of knowledge acquired during the sensory-motor period 
and at least some of those acquired in other periods of 
cognitive development. These forms of universal knowledge 
are not only used to think with by individuals but they are 
basic to social interaction and to the production of cultural 
knowledge. Tha·t such universals have received scant comment 
from anthropologists and appear invisible in culture is no 
denial of their existence but merely illustrates the selec-
tive perception of students of culture. 
Lukes (1973), in a contribution to the sociology of 
knowledge, has considered the matter of the social dete.rmin-
ation of truth. In this consideration, he weighs up the 
arguments of those who favour the relativistic position and 
those ~ho resist this position. He concludes. that the rela-
tivists (e.g., Winch, Kuhn, Worf, and Mannheim) provide, 
''•••no satisfactory reason••• for supposing that there are 
no invariable and context-independent criteria of truth ;:md 
valid reasoning''. The evidence and arguments provided above 
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scientific mode of thought and to the achievements of the 
biological, psychological and social sciences. For the first 
time in history, it would appear, humankind is itself an 
object of its own consciousness. This is not to imply that 
in the past humankind did not think about itself, but that 
because of religious and magical thought, it was not able to 
see itself clearly. This self-knowledge places humankind on 
the threshold of being able to make itself more fully cul-
tural than was ever possible in the past. This implies that 
humankind is on the threshold too of being freer than was 
ever possible before. Gne illustration: the advent of 
ger ... etic er..gineering is profoundly significant because it 
marks the point in human evolution where the brain that is 
the product of human genes no·K has the power to alter those 
genes. Whereas before we were largely the product of our 
genes, from this moment or..wards we could increasingly be tho 
product of our minds, in the profound sense. that we engineer 
our biological selves. The genes, as sociobiologists argue, 
have shaped tbe values that determine what we do with our now 
knm\ledge. It is justice of a kind that our genes will be 
treated according to the values and knmvledge of the life 
they have created. 
Independent .creations and the recap:i. tulation thesis 
Some indication of the creative capacity of humans, 
their ,tendency to produce similar i terns of knm\ ledge and the 
shortcomings of. conventional ideas about socialization is 
provided by the many examp1:es of individuals in one culture 
producing ideas common to other cultures but not their own or 
achieving knowledge available in their own culture but to 
which they have not been directly exposed. There are many 
examples of independent inventions, both within a single 
society and within societies very different in culture, time, 
or place. 
Anthony (1973:19) notes that it used to be held as a 
general law of psychology th.at children in the stages of 
their mental development followed the developmental stages of 
the huma~ race. This theory of the recapitulation of tti~' 
pbylogenesis of knowledge by ;i_ts ontogenesis is now largely 
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rejected. It is, however, a theory which is di:f:ficult to 
reject totally just as it is a theory di:f:ficult to restate 
in an acceptable :form. Part o:f the intractable problems 
related to this theory stems :from the associations it en-
courages and legitimizes between the thought processes and 
knowledge o:f children and those o:f "primitive" adults. 
Psychologists such as Jung, Freud, Hall and Baldwin have all 
:fowid merit in this theory. More recently, Piaget o:ften 
admitted that one o:f his reasons :for studying the cognitive 
development o:f children wap that he :felt it could provide 
some insight·regarding the road :followed by human epistemo-
genesis (Piaget 1972:11)e 
There is much evidence ·Khich could be cited to support 
the epistemic recapitulation thesis. There is also much 
which could be used to re:fute it. It is not my intention 
here to get em~roiled in this debate. Rather, it seems to 
me that this debate does provide some evidence supporting 
the thesis o:f this dissertation that humankind's biology 
plays an important part not only in making cultural knowledge 
possible but in determining, to some extent, its evolution 
and its :form and content. 
The :fact that human societies everywhere and seemingly 
at all times have produced many similar forms o:f knowledge as 
well as many virtually identical items o:f knowledge -- be 
they religious, artistic, musical, scientific or technical 
provides powerful support for the existence o:f a universally 
shared learning schema •. A schema which is responsible for 
the generation and continuance o:f cultural knowledge. 
Anthony (1973) provides a wealth of information regarding 
ideas about death spontaneously produced by children in 
modern industrial societies. ·-What is particularly revealing 
is that many of these ideas were similar to those recorded 
of members of cultures remote from that of the children's. 
Ideas about which the children were ignorant. Anthony (1973: 
31) shows convincingly what she set out to show, 
••• that the young child, ignorant like early 
man of many facts known to modern adults, 
capable like early mart of' logical reasoning, 
and like him unwilling to accept· separation 
and non-existence, dissolution and decay, is 
led by the same phenomena to similar 
conclusions. 
Anthony omits to comment on what it is that produces 
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for children and people everywhere "the same phenomena" and 
makes them all capable of "logical reasoning" and unwilling 
to accept 11 separation", "non-existence", "dissolution" and 
"decay" and leads them to "similar conclusions". It is 
quite clearly the human mind which does these things. All 
these shared attributes of the child mind and the adult mind, 
the ancestral mind and the contemporary mind, point to- the 
shared nature of the human mind and its predicament. 
It is generally acknowledged that the capacity infants 
and children have for learning is phenomenal. Humanl{.ind rs 
prolonged infancy and childhood imply that a great deal of 
information is assimilated by every individual through 
immature schemas. Not all knowledge so acquired is later 
re-assimilated and equilibrated in terms of mature schemas 
and knowledge. It seems reasonable to assert that adult 
stocks of kr.owledge are composed of i terns assimilated at 
various stages of cognitive development and that some items 
remain to some extent in th~ state in which they were 
assimilated. The knowledge acquired in childhood strongly 
shapes every individual's stock of knowledge and much of it 
remains central to adult thinking and action, as psychol~gy 
reveals~ If we add to these observations the idea that 
infants and children, though to some extent socialized, are 
not yet fully ~ocialized; that, as Cobb (1977:29) says, 
human childhood is a highly creative, perhaps the most 
creative phase of every individualis life, a phase shaped 
and framed by characteristics shared by all peopl~; that 
childhood is a combination of __ the uniquely cultural, and 
therefore human, and the wholly natural, and therefore 
biological; then the link between biology and cultural 
knowledge is closer than is generally supposed in sociology 
and anthropology. Cobb (1977:101) expresses this insight 
well: 
If we ••• observe the growth and learning in 
childhood as a period of gradual transcen-
dence from level to level, out of biological 
nature into culturally created worlds, we 
• • • 
become more conscious of the contributions, 
in the shape of values and even skills, 
which these earlier phases of personal his-
tory and biocultural development make to 
the fully adult personality. We then find 
ourselves in possession of the connection 
between biological history and cultural 
history, with individual childhood as the 
link in the series in time. 
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In similar vein, Anthony (1973:18) states, "Children 
are nowhere fully acculturated, or perhaps it would be 
as correct to say that there is everywhere a subculture o:f 
childhood." This subculture o:f childhood bears a greater 
biological imprint than does the adult culture, so much is 
clear from the universal contents o:f much o:f the subculture 
o:f childhood. Adult culture can never escape the in:fluence 
of child culture though it can distance itsel:f :from it more 
and more through the growth of cultural in:formation, made 
possible largely through writing. The traces of the child 
cultures o:f millions of generations is embedded in contem-
porary cultures and these cultures arc forever confronted by 
the subculture of childhood. In:fants and children bring 
into culture the demands which the genome mal<:es on culture. 
It demands, for example, that culture makes sense to the 
child's fundamental ways of making sense o:f the world and 
that it doe.s. not do violence to the bio-psycho nature of the 
child. I:f adult culture does do these things it will either 
be rejected by the young and more harmonious alternatives 
proposed or, i:f this is not possible, the society and its 
culture will cease to exist. De.scribing the child archetype, 
JLIDg (1975:162) has written, 
The child motif represents not only something 
that existed in the distant past but also 
something that exists __ now; that is to say, 
it is not a vestige but a system functioning 
in the present whose purpose is to compensate 
or correct, in a meaningful manner, the 
inevitable one-sidednesses and extravagances 
o:f the conscious mind. 
Cultural knowledge has, after all, to fulfill. certain fLUlda-
mental biological and psychological requirements if it is to 
form part of humankindts living stock of knowledge. This is 
one of the ways in which cultural development is constrained 
-- at least to some extent -- by its biological ballasta 
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The fact that most learning is acquired in childhood, 
that humankind's ancest.ors did not have as long an adult life 
as is now the case in many societies, that children made up 
the largest part of the social group and that the cultural 
knowledge that could be transmitted from generation to 
generation was limited before the invention of writing are 
among factors which suggest that children have played an 
important part in shaping culture and, possibly, keeping it 
somewhat "childlike". "Childlike" elements abound in all 
cultures, even those of modern industrial societies. It is 
not surprising, in terms of the above argwnents and the main 
thrust of this study, that Piaget, for example, has found 
reflected in the knowledge and reasoning of children the 
knowledge and reasoning found in the science, art, religion 
and philosophy of many ancient and modern (industrial and 
non-industrial) societies. Such modes of thought as "doe--
matic", "egocentric", "animistic", "realistic" and "arti-
ficialistic" are encountered in children and arc embedded in 
cultural patterns everywhere. Nwnerous parallels are found 
between children's spor..tancously developed accounts for 
phenomena and those offered in cultures different from their 
own. For example, Piaget (197J:20J), after noting that 
children generally hold that a wall cannot be knocked down 
without feeling it, a stone cannot be broken without knowing 
it, a boat cannot carry a cargo without effort, etc., goes 
on to cite the case of an Indian chief who explained why his 
men could not succeed in throwing a stone across a ravine by 
saying that the stone was attracted by the ravine, just as 
we ourselves might be when suffering from giddiness, and thus 
lost the strength necessary to reach the other side. 
Cobb (1977:8.5) notes that the ideas and experiences of 
childhood often herald or echo many great cultural ideas. 
S4e notes the case of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin who at six 
or seven years of age felt himself drawn by matter; by 
something that 'shone' at the heart of matter. He was led 
to worship little pieces of metal. This early passion for 
matter as "itness" started him on his journey into knowledge 
and remained with him through life as a symbol of his life's 
search and accomplishments. Human biogr<;i.phies are full of 
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examples of the significant ways in which childhood thoughts 
and memories have shaped the cultural productions of adults. 
The child, it would seem, is, in many ways, the father of 
culture rather than its child. If this is the case, as I 
have been arguing it is, then we have one more argument 
favouring the thesis of the biological construction of cul-
ture being advanced in this study. 
Empathic knowledge 
The universally shared items of sensory-motor and concrete 
operational knowledge, referred to earlier, constitute a type 
of common-sense knowledge basic to all people and all cul-
tures. Eut this is not the only universally shared form of 
cultural knowledge. From the evidence available it seems 
that people everywhere share a. basic knowledge of the meaning 
of various facial expressions and that this knowledge is a 
universal content of culture. Lloyd (1972:88-93) provides a 
good sUnunary of the cross-cultural research on facial ex-
I 
pressions. She notes that there does seem to be an innate 
link between primary emotions and facial expressions and that 
the emotional meaning of particular facial expressions is 
recognized in all human cultures. Kevertheless, learnt dis-
play rules do serve to modify the innate connections between 
emotions and their facial representations. While the 
evidence can be used, as Lloyd (p 90) notes, to support 
either a relativistic or a universalistic position, it cannot 
support an extreme learning position which makes emotional 
expression unique to every culture and the meaning of parti-
cular expressions entirely arbitrary. 
Darwin (1872) was one of the earliest writers to note 
that at least some bodily sta-tes are cormected with states of 
mind and have a phylogenetic origin. Human's appear to ex-
press grief, happiness, amusement, anger, fear, and so on, in 
response to particular complex sets of stimuli in fairly 
predictable ways. These expressed emotions a..re not solely 
the result of learning or cultural factors, but are to some 
extent due to the operation of schemas which appear to have 
innate components. We do not, in the final analysis, laugh 
when we should cry, nor do we cry when we should laugh. The 
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stimulus-response connections seem fairly rigid and learning 
theory provides no satisfactory account for these tbings. 
We may be able to suppress certain emotional responses, be 
able to weaken or control them as an act of will, but 
generally it is difficult if not impossible to control our 
grosser emotions. Through all our emotions, especially the 
most moving, there appear to run certain innately given 
patterns. Evidence for this claim comes from the discovery 
that particular emotions are expressed throughout the world 
with a remarkable uniformity. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (19?0) has 
recorded and· empirically substantiated the widespread agree-
ment in the international language of facial expressions by 
photographing people in Europe, Japan, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, India, Siam, Hong-Kong, New Guinea, Samoa, USA, 
Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. Ekman and Friesen (1971) in their 
cross-cultural study of facial expressions and emotions found 
that particular facial behaviours are universally associated 
with particular emotions. A finding consistent with that of 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt. It is also consistent with tho earlier 
studies of blind and sighted children which discovered many 
similarities between the facial expressions of blind and 
sighted children (Fulcher 1942; Goodenough 1932; Emde and 
Harrison 1972; MacFarlane 1977; Freedman 1964). 
Findings such as the foregoing may be explained from a 
number of non-exclusive viewpoints as being due to evolution, 
innate neural programmes, or learning experiences common to 
human development regardless of culture (see, for example, 
Huber 1931; Darwin 1872; Izard 1969; Tomkins 1962, 1963; 
Needham 1972; Ekman 1973; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1970). Brown and 
Stevens (1975:38) have attacked the argument that.if a 
phenomenon is universal among-the human population it 
points invariably to some innately shared characteristic. 
They argue that the latter conclusion does not necessarily 
follow from the prior discovery of universality. They argue 
that certain evident c~ltural universals may be the result 
of experiences which are common to all people in all places. 
But this argument is only a deflection, rather than a 
refutation, of the innatist argument. Even if there were 
such things as universal experiences -- and it has been 
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argued that in a broad sense there are such things -- which 
do indeed result in cultural universals, the researcher 
would still have to deal with the problem why diverse and 
geographically (and even temporally) separated populations 
respond to similar experiences in the same way. Beside 
resorting to the argument of "accident", it seems that this 
line of reasoning returns to the invocation of some notion 
of basic biological similarity and the operation of such a 
factor in the account of observed cultural universals. A 
further point relates to the logical and theoretical problems 
associated with speaking of universal experiences without 
assuming the universal nature of the experiencing being. It 
seems to me, to speak of the former is to assume the latter. 
One cannot explain cultural universals by referring to 
similar situations or experiences unless one postulates a 
common organism in or as an essential part of such a cor!Ullon 
situation or experience. 
According to Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970:416), "Some of the 
more complex human expressions can be traced back to the 
superposition of a few fixed action patterns which do not 
seem to be culturally determined." He regards as erroneous 
the view that there are no culturally independent facial 
expressions and that everything is learnt (p 420). It seems 
that certain. elementary acts of emotional communication ean. 
be both executed and understood largely as a result of an 
innately given "expressive behaviour repertoire" -- or 
schema -- (Eibl:-Eibesfeldt 1970:462). To support his argu-
ment even further, Eibl-Eibesfeldt has also dra:wn attention 
to the many similarities in emotive expression between humans 
and animals. Clynes (1974) has developed an entire sub-
discipline based on the scientific study of the communication 
of emotion. He calls this sub-discipline 11 Sentics". His 
studies indicate that our emotions are expressed in typical 
and predictable ways and that these typical expressions 
reflect part of our genetic inheritance. Lik.e Eibl-Eibe s-
feld t (1970), Clynes conducted cross-cultural re~earch. 
His experiments in a number of different societies revealed 
that people generally expressed many emotions in similar ways 
and that these forms of expression were of a.different kind 
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to culturally developed signs, symbols, and conventions. 
Basic :forms o:f emotional expression "are biologically deter-
mined expressions that are programmed into us. When we :feel 
anger, we tend to express it in de:finite tangry' ways and 
not in other ways" (Clynes 1974:51). Obviously, as Thouless 
(1963:43) :for one has reminded us, while there seems to be 
some undeniably innate elements in our emotional responses 
and expressions, it is particular experiences which determine 
to a great extent which situational, environmental, and 
cultural :factors come to constitute the things of which we 
are afraid, to which we react angrily, which make us sad or 
which make us happy. 
The case of infants being successfully reared by members 
of a different racial and ethnic identity to their parents, 
provides compelling evidence of the shared nature of the 
human genetic capacity for acquiring cultural knowledge. 
Conversely, the relative ease with which strangers to a 
particular society are able to make sense of.its culture 
provides further evidence for the existence of similar or 
identical items of knowledge in the cultures of different 
societies. Strangers, such as anthropologists, tourists, 
travellers, re:fugees, slaves, migrants, colonists, etc., are 
generally able, if they wish to do so, to rapidly develop an 
approximation to an insider's W1derstanding of the strange 
culture confronting them. That such understandings are 
never per:fect is probably due to the early impact of culture 
on: ontoge:nesis ·and the inter:ference in the stranger's under-
standing by his own culture. 
Strangers, though they have seldom remarked on it, can 
be logically supposed to initially use their own cultural 
knowledge to unlock the culture o:f the people who confront 
them. It seems logical too that i:f people o:f different 
cultures did not share at least some cultural knowledg·e, an 
insider's view o:f a :foreign culture could never be attained. 
Where would such an W1derstanding begin? It is cultural 
knowledge that is universally shared that makes entry into 
strange cultures possible. It seems that, because people do 
in fact make sense of cuJ_tures other than their own and often 
.. do so with relative ease, people probably share a great deal 
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more cultural knowledge than has been spelt out in this 
study. Like the water that surrounds the fish, this univer-
sal knowledge is probably difficult to articulate and hard 
to recognize, but its existence cannot be doubted. 
In anthropology, following Pike (1954) and French 
(1963), a distinction is made between an Ernie approach and 
an Etic approach to culture. These approaches differ in a 
number of ways. One of the significant ways in which 
they differ is that the Ernie approach describes culture as 
the insider sees it while the Etic approach describes it in 
the "scientific" terms of the anthropologist. The very 
existence of this dichotomy can be interpreted as a recog-
nition by anthropologists that cultural univer~als exist. 
If they did not it would be impossible for an anthropologist 
to adopt anemic approach or make senEe of the "native's" 
sense of his or her own culture. Thus, no "pure" etic or 
emic approaches are possible. To some extent, the outsider's 
view is also, because of shared knowledge, an insider's view. 
Conversely, an insider's view is always partly an outsider's 
view, and partly the view of all outsiders. This inescapable 
interpenetration and overlapping of all cultural stocks of 
knowledge is implicit in Berry's (1969) methodological dis-
cussion. Re recognizes that in the study of certain cultural 
items within. a strange culture elements of the etic point of 
departure may remain even when the approach has become con-
sistently emic. These remaining etic elements, which are 
thus also emic ·elements, can be employed as derived etics to 
study other cultures and in this way cultural universals can 
be uncovered. 
Specific sociological approaches, such as the existential 
and the phenomenological, maintain that, "••• all human beings 
seem to share some common, general perspective in their under-
standings of the Korld -- some common, general forms of sub-
jective experience" (Fontana and De Water 1978:102). It is 
obvious, claim Fontana and De Water, that humans have a 
common "horizon of experience" which is wide enough to enable 
all human beings to understand each other sufficiently to 
translate many of each ott:.erts experiences into their own 
language., Trade, the exchange of women, diplomacy and other· 
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tr.ans-societal relationships and interactions may be cited 
as compelling evidence of the extent of shared cultural 
knowledge present in all human cultures. Because of the 
multiplicity of shared intra- and inter-cultural meanings, 
even the outcome of deeply introspective and subjective 
thoaght, of creative and original thought, is generally 
shareable. The science, art, religion, philosophy and music 
of one culture is, it seems, never totally foreign to the 
minds of strangers despite many views to the contrn.ry. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
BIOLOGY AND LINGUISTIC, MYTHOLOGICAL 
AND A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE 
Children spontaneously interpret in 
yarious ways the objective sources 
of phenomena••• They offer, in 
every culture and every generation, 
a variety of potential foundations 
for religion, philosophy and myth, 
relatively independent of the selec-
tion made by their own society. 
Sylvia Anthony (1973:239) 
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In the previous chapter the relationship between biology 
and cultural knowledge was considered in terms of' such 
general topics as socialization, creativity, cultural uni-
versals, etc. The present chapter is essentially a 
continuation of the previous one and explores the relation-
ship between biology and cultural }-..now ledge further by 
focusing on specific forms of cultural knowledge; namely, 
linguistic knowledge and mythological kno,,·ledge. Finally, 
be.cause it dra,~s togetJ:::.er many of the points made throughout 
this work, A PRIORI knowledge is discussed. The over-
socialized view of A PRIORI knowledge as formulated by 
Durkheim is criticized in terms of the view drawn from 
genetic epistemology. The se_~mingly greater validity of the 
latter over the former provides some indication of the way 
in which biological and psychological ideas can help the 
sociology of knowledge towards more &ccurate theorizing and 
thus make possible a more satisfactory general theory of 
knowledge a 
Biology and linguistic knowledge 
To be human is to k.noK and use language. Many of those 
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who have studied language have pointed out its vital role in 
making hwnans human. This is not at issue here. A few 
language scholars have pointed out the equally significant 
role which human biology plays in the acquisition of language 
and the role it has probably played in the origin, evolution 
and structure of language. Humankind's biological propensity 
to acquire language has already been conunented on, what is 
now to be considered are some ideas regarding biology and the 
structure of language. 
Von. Humboldt (1963 ,(i8J~) and Jakobson (1971 [19JS7) 
were among the early linguistic scholars to suggest that 
underlying all human langu2.ges was a basic structure express-
ive of hwuank.ind' s common intellectual attributes. Hwnboldt 
( 1963) believed that if language ,.;ere analysed in depth, a 
common form of language would be discovered embedded in all 
national and individual languages (see Chomsky 1968:71). 
Humboldt's ideas inspired Chomsky's investigations and have, 
to some extent, beer.. confirmed by these (see Chomsky 1957; 
1966; 1968; 1972). Proceeding in the ratio~alist tradition, 
Chomsky maintainf; that linguistic universals, if sucb exist, 
can be logically supposed to provide some indication of the 
psycho-linguistic and the psycho-biological nature of hwnan-
kind. As he writes, "••o the general features of language 
structure reflect, not so much the course of one's experience, 
but rather the general character of oneYs capacity to acquire 
knowledge -- in the traditional sense, one's innate ideas 
and innate principles" (Chomsky 1972:59). 
Chomsky (1957), Greenberg (1963) and Hopp (1970) are 
among those who have claimed to have discovered linguistic 
universals. .Following Jakobson' s lead regarding phonetic 
universals, it has been found-that there does appear to be a 
universal phonetics. The evidence suggests that all known 
languages compose their vocabulary out of some twenty dis-
tinctive phonetic features. In terms of logical possibili-
ties, a relatively few phonetic features suffice, given the 
various combinations into which they are formed, to account 
for most of the phonetic segments, and in particular those 
that carry the heaviest information load; in the spoken 
languages of the world. Another example cited by Chomsky 
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(1965:28-29) is the corrunon granunatical structures found in 
all languages. All languages have rules for structuring 
sentences and recognize subject and predicate and the 
relationship between these. All languages also seem to have 
principles that distinguish the deep or logical structure of 
ari utterance from its surface forms and to have principles 
that constrain the class of grammatical transformations that 
relate deep and surface structures (for details of such 
technical matters see Chomsky 1972). Chomsky admits that the 
evidence regarding linguistic universals is not that impress-
ive. It is difficult to uncover these and most investigators 
have been content to concern themselves with aspects of the 
diversity of the surface structures of languages. Insofar as 
attention is restricted to surface structures, notes Chomsky 
(1972:118), the most that can be expected is the Lliscovery 
of statistical tendencies, such as those presented by Green-
berg (1963). A further problem relates to the possibility 
that languages are not only structured by nuniversal grarrunar 11 
but also by other aspects of the human mind and by historical 
surface factors. The FACULTE DE Ltil'{GAGE is but one of the 
faculties of the mind (Chomsky 1972:37). Despite the 
obstacles in the path of speaking about and discovering 
linguistic universals, Chomsky nevertheless feels that such 
an approach as his promises a better understanding of 
language than the more conventional empiricist approaches. 
ChomskyWs view that universal grarrunar is a manifestation 
of the htirnan mi-nd and that it constitutes the essence of 
human language is echoed in the work of other writers such as 
Saussure and Greimas. Greimas argues that the "elementary 
structures" of human perception and cognition are ·11 so deep 
and formative that they ultimately shape the elements of our 
language, its syntax, and the experiences which these 
articulate in the form of narrative" (Hawkes 1977:89). Hawkes 
points out too that Greimasts idea parallels Saussure's 
notion of the LANGl.TE which underlies PAROLE and Chomsky's 
notion of the competence which precedes performance. 
Couched in the idiom of this study, Chomsky and the 
other linguists and semiologists referred to provide further 
grounds for the thesis that cultural knowledge is genetically 
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structured. While the earliest languages can be supposed to 
have been fairly direct genetic expressions, even contempor-
ary languages are constrained to be so and remain so, at 
least to some extent. The ease with which children the world 
over acquire the many languages of the world may be viewed as 
proof of the existence of a close correspondence between 
their innately directed conjectures about their language and 
the structure of the language itself. It may also be viewed 
as proof that the phonetics of all languages correspond with 
the kinds of sounds humans are comfortably and easily capable 
of making. The fact that language evolution has not, except 
in a few minor recent instances, been "artifically" directed 
offers further support for the argument that language remains 
articulated with humankind's innate disposition for language. 
Since language evolves "naturally" it is to be expected that 
the homologies between universal structures and surface 
structures would continue to be maintained and that any 
genetic change relevant to language would come to express 
itself as a change in the surface structure of language. 
Diology and mythology 
Chomsky contended not only that humans have an innate 
competence to acquire language but they also have such a com-
petence to acquire other forms of cultural knowledge. By 
the same token, the innate structure of the human mind leaves 
its imprint not only on language but on all cultural 
creations. Thi:s latter point forms a kernel of, and is cor-
roborated by, the work of Levi-Strauss ( 1972; 1976). 
Naming and classifying are essentially arbitrary 
processes and so too is mythologizing. But this arbitrari-
ness, as anthropological data-demonstrate, is belied by 
astounding similarity. The question therefore, as Levi-
Strauss (1972:208), formulates it is, "If the content of 
myth is contingent, how are we going to explain the fact 
that myths throughout the world are so similar?" The answer 
he provides is that these similarities are representations 
of innate and universal characteristics of the human mindg 
Myths reveal the primary and universal modes of experiencing 
the world. They point to the universal hmnan compulsion and 
., .... 
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capacity to express and account for experiences in an 
imaginative and creative fashion. For Levi-Strauss the study 
of myths and mythologizing is important because in the 
genesis of myths the mind is reasonably free from empirical 
constraints. Myths may thus reveal the untrammelled mode of 
operation and structure of the human mind (see Gardner 1976: 
158, 144). Barbu (1976:50) interprets Levi-Strauss as 
arguing that, "••• myths contain the A PRIORI structure, the 
chromosomes regulating and controlling the process by which 
man moves from a natural to an artificial, symbolic, or 
conceived thought-of order in his existence". Myths span 
the step from nature to culture, they are nature represented 
and embodied in culture. rhey are an example of the 
cul turalization of nature. (This idea is from Sahlins 1976: 
105.) 
The arguments in favour of innate schemas structuring 
and being reflected in cultural knowledge receive added con-
firmation when it is remembered that (as Leach 1970:120 
observes), working independently of Chomsky, Levi-Strauss 
has developed a theory of generative and transformational 
rules for the analysis of myth which closely parallels 
Chomsky's linguistic theory. Both scholars argue in favour 
of certain built-in features of the human mind which deter-
mine the way in which humans view and classify the world~ 
For Levi-Strauss the human mind has an objective 
existence and leaves its imprint on everything humans accom-
plish. It is also the force and instrument which makes 
these accomplishments possible. His travels as part of 
scientific expeditions into the Brazilian jungle in the 
years 1935-1939 brought him to the realization that, "••• 
notwithstanding the cultural differences between the several 
parts of mankind, the human mind is everywhere one and the 
same and that it has the same capacities" (Levi-Strauss 
1978:19). The fundamental nature of the human mind is, for 
Levi-Strauss, reflected in the universal tender:.cy for 
people to think and organize their world in binary fashion 
-- they look for and construct contraditions, contrasts, 
oppositions, relations and associations.· People everywhere 
break the world into "thinkable" pieces and arrange these 
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according to certain discernible patterns. Humankind is a 
rule-making, exchanging, exogamous species. Myths every-
where, though their contents are relatively arbitrary, are 
coded messages with the same basic form hinging on the 
nature/culture distinction and woven about the eternal prob-
lems of mankind. By way of example, Levi-Strauss (1964:60) 
says of customs, 
The ensemble of a people's customs has 
always its particular style; they form 
into systems. I am convinced that the 
number of these systems is not unlimited 
and that human societies, like individual 
human beings (at play, in their dreams, 
or in moments of delirium), never create 
absolutely; all they can do is to choose 
certain combinations from a repertoire of 
ideas which it should be possible to re-
constitute. 
Granting the psychic unity of humankind and its limited 
scope of cultural creation, it should then occasionally 
happen that very similar, if not identical, cultural items 
recur transtemporally and transculturally. As noted in the 
previous chapter, this does in fact often happen. Cne such 
example provided by Levi-Strauss concerns a theory in a 
South American myth that is similar to an idea expressed by 
Rousseau. The recurrent idea is that it was the development 
of a neolithic economy, leading as this did to problems 
stemming from population growth and very large family groups, 
that defiled the human spirit. Levi-Strauss observes, "••• 
the diversity ~f the approaches which led Rousseau con-
sciously, and the South American Indians unconsciously, to 
make the same speculations on a very distant past without a 
doubt proves nothing about this past, but it proves a great 
deal about man" (quote from Bpon 1972:7). Wallace (1967:172; 
also, Boon 1972:7) provides another example of a complex set 
of ideas recurring in two societies. He found that the 
Iroquois used a type of psychoanalytic theory of mind two 
centuries before a similar theory was developed by Freud and 
other Europeans. Since it does not seem possible that the 
European theory was influenced by the Iroquean, Wallace 
regards this as a clear and interesting example of indepen-
dent cultural invention. 
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Because he seeks to illwninate the deep structures of 
the mind through a structural analysis of its surface 
manifestations, Leach (1970:51) says of Levi-Strauss that he 
is not so much concerned with the collective consciousness 
of the hwnan mind as he is concerned to discover its collec-
tive unconscious. An indication of the importance and 
neglect of the collective unconscious is conveyed by Levi-
Strauss (1972:71) when he asks, 
•Is it language which influences culture? 
Is it culture which influences language?' 
But we have not been sufficiently aware of 
the fact that both language and culture 
are the products of activities which are 
basically similar. I am now referring to 
this uninvited guest which has been seated 
during this conference beside us and which 
is the human mind. 
For Levi-Strauss, as Leach notes, there is a major element 
of mind with an autonomy of its own, operating independently 
of individual experience and socio-cultural situation. As 
shall be indicate<:! further on,. this is an idea also 
encountered in the thought of Jung. I interpret this auton-
omous element of mind (or the collective unconscious) to be 
synonymous with operating innate cognitive schemas. Levi-
Strauss • s work thus supports the thesis being advanced that 
humankind's genetically derived powers and modes of cognition 
are expressed in cultural knowledge. The way in which such 
modes of cognition might affect cultural knowledge without 
our being aware of it is captured by Levi-Strauss when he 
'.5ays, "We are riot, therefore, claiming to show how men think 
the myths, but rather how the myths think themselves out in 
men without men's knowledge" (quoted in Ehrmann 1966:56; 
see also Leach 1970:51; and Levi-Strauss 1978:3-4). 
A final contribution Khicb Levi-Strauss can make to a 
study like the present one is his inclusive and generous 
conception of knowledge. This is consistent with the genetic 
conception adopted here. He has argued that poems, paintings 
and musical compositions as well as the myths and symbols of 
tribal societies should be regarded as expressions of a 
fundamental form of knowledge, one that all hwnans have in 
common. Scientific knowledge is merely the sharpened edge 
of this knowledge form. (See Staude 1976:JOJ.) Levi-Strauss 
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also applauds the trend in science to integrate the quali-
tative and the quantitative, a trend which he believes will 
lead to the acceptance that, "•••between life and thought, 
there is not the absolute gap which was accepted as a matter 
of fact by the 17th Century philosophical dualism" (Levi-
Strauss 1978:24). Like Piaget, Popper, Lorenz and others 
referr~d to in this study, Levi-Strauss feels that the human 
mind, "••• is not something substantially or fundamentally 
different from the basic phenomena of life itself". 
Biology and the collective unconscious 
The work of Levi-Strauss resonates in IP-any places with 
that of Jung. JungVs (1975:6) statement,"••• myths are 
first and foremost psychic phenomena that reveal the nature 
of the soul •••" is echoed many times by Levi-Strauss. So . 
too is Jung's (1975:6) observation, "Primitive man impresses 
us so strongly with his subjectivity that we should really 
have guessed long ago that myths refer to something psychic. 
His knowledge of nature is essentially the language and 
outer dress of an unconscious psychic process. But the very 
fact that this process is unconscious gives us the reason 
why man has thought of everything except the psyche in his 
attempts to explain myths." 
Jung provides an important contribution to genetic epis-
temology. Through his detailed discussions of the "collec-
tive unconscious" and the "archetypes" he offers significant 
insights into the ways in which the hurran genome might affect 
and have affected culture. Through his varied, ingenious 
and imaginative investigations Jung was led to the realis-
ation that humankind's unique psychic qualities are not 
solely the product of individual experience or learning. He 
came to argue that just as each newborn animal does not 
create its own behavioural repertoire from scratch but con-
structs it on the basis of its inherited instinctual 
patterns, so the human psyche is constructed .along the path-
ways of the collective patterns evolved by the human genome. 
Jung coined the term "collective LUlconscious" to designate 
these irl:nate collective thought patterns. 
The collective unconscious is part of humankindWs 
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genetic inheritance. Everypersonts unconscious rests, says 
Jung (1975:3-4), upon a deeper layer, the collective uncon-
scious, "•••which does not derive from personal experience 
and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn". The 
collective consciousness is impersonal, universal, genetic-
ally inherited and has contents and modes of operation that 
are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals 
(Jung 1975:3-4, 43). 
The contents of the collective unconscious are referred 
to by Jung as "archetypes". They are "archaic", "primordial", 
"universal" types or images that have been assimilated into 
the human genome since remotest times. Jung regards the 
archetypes as a form of innate knowledge analogous to 
instincts. So close is this analogy, writes Jung (1975:43), 
"••• that there is good reason for supposing that the arche-
types are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, 
in other words, that they are patterns of instinctual beha-
viour". Just as instincts compel humans to a specifically 
hurr2an mode of existence, \vri te s Jung, so the archetypes .force 
their ways of perception and apprehension in ~;pecific b.um<:?.n 
patterns (Fordham 1973:24). Furthermore, as A PRIORI forms 
of intuition, perception c;:nd apprehension, the archetypes do 
aore than inform, enrich and direct cognition, they also 
play a part .in everyper~;ont s emotional life, structuring· 
their emotions according to a recurring and enduring univer-
sal pattern. The universal pattern of human emotions 
reflects and is causally related to the recurring pattern of 
huuan life. This complementarity,' for example, helps explain 
the observed similarities in the structures of joy and sorrow 
and the causes of such emotions the world over. 
A particularly cor..trover-sial aspect of Jung's theory is 
the seemingly Lamarckian explanatior. he advances for the 
genesis of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. 
JLmg is in agreement with those geneticists who hold that 
individual experiences modify the genome. He does not intend 
us, though, to understand "experience" in the narroK ser.se 
of brute physical experience. Ko, humankind's psychic ex-
periences are an integral part of the totality of its 
experiences. Iience psychic experiences also modi.:fy the 
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genome. This implies that contemporary human nature, human-
kindt s genetic inheritance, is the result of all the 
experier..ce s of the human race throughout its evolutionary 
history. Lest Jung be regarded as a crude Lamarckian, it 
must be added that it is the physiological correlates and 
sedimentations of actually lived experiences which are 
genetically transmitted and not the experiences themselves. 
A great deal is lost from generation to generation but some-
thing is retained and genetically transmitted from the 
experiences of' each passing generation (see Fordham 1973:24). 
What Jung is· proposing seems to be a compromise between 
Lamarckism and Darwinism. Life involves all the faculties 
and levels of' being of' every creature. To say that a 
particular physical attribute was phylogenetically selected 
is the same as saying that the experiences and behaviours 
conunon to that attribute in a given environment were selected. 
It was the things that Homosapiens's ancestors did, 
experienced and felt with their nervous systems that shaped 
the evolution of-the human nervous system. Doth the positive 
and the negative experiences of countless ancestors left 
some residual mark on the t.nman genome. As a rule, we do not 
experience or act in the world in ways that proved too 
detrimental to some of our ancestors. Conversely, we do 
experience a,nd act in the worJ.d in ways that proved fairly 
adaptive. Jung seems to have sound reason therefore for 
saying of the evolution of the collective consciousness, 
"Although our inheritance cor..sists in physiological paths, 
it was nevertheless mental processes in our ancestors that 
traced these paths." (Quoted in Fordham 1973:24.) 
The issue of the transmittability of' experience is 
related to Jung's claim that -the collective unconscious has 
contents which are genetically transmitted and alterable 
through experience. This claim is also responsible for 
controversy and has been a source of confusion. Part of this 
coP...fusior.. stems from Jung's ambiguous use of .the words images 
and contents. He claims, for example, that the archetypes 
are a content of the coJ.lective unconscious. But he also 
says that the archetypes are 11 images". The way in ·which he 
explains the term suggests that he means images of images; 
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images are the forms of images rather than their contents. 
"The term 'imaget is intended to express not only the form 
of the activity taking place, but the typical situation in 
which the activity is released"(Jung 1975:78). There is 
obviously a dialectical relationship between content and 
form. Contents are not conceivable without forms and forms 
are shaped by contents. Every form has a content, even if 
it is the negative one of being without content. The dark-
ness of the unseeing eye is part of the ey~'s range· of 
contents. Notwithstanding this grey area of comprehension, 
JWLg is insistent that the actual content of thoughts, 
feelings and actions is not what is genetically inherited 
nor can it be so inherited. What is inherited are the pre-
dispositions and structures (schemas) responsible for such 
phenomena. The universal nature of these predispositions 
and structures result, given the necessary similarities in 
environment and experience, in shared and recurring thoughts, 
feelings, actions, art forms and so forth. As he states, 
"The representations are not inherited, only the forms, and 
in th.at respect they correspond in every way to the 
instincts, which are also determined in form only." To 
clarify this, he refers to the axial system of a crystal 
which preforms the crystalline structure in the mother 
liquid (Jung 1975:79). What the collective unconscious and 
the archetypes are then, in the idiom of this study, are 
I varieties of innate somatic knowledge not innate cognitive 
knowledge. 
Jur.gt s importance to genetic epistemology should be 
apparent from the above comments. He has also addressed the 
matter of the categories of mind directly and, like Kant, 
argues that, "••• there can he no empirical knowledge that 
is not already caught and limited by the A PRIORI structure 
of cognition" (Jung 1975:76). There is, he says, an A 
K PRIORI factor in all human activities, namely the inborn, 
preconscious and unconscious structure of the psyche. He 
recognizes that the genetic predispositions and structures 
of the human psyche exert a decisive influence on the choice 
of material, the method of investigation·, the nature of con-
clusions, and the formulation of hypotheses_and theories in 
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human thinking (p 77). He accepts that human cognition and 
hence cultural creativity is circumscribed, humans only 
think and do and say as they themselves are {p 77). Like 
Popper, Jung views the newborn infant not as an empty vessel 
but as a"••• tremendously complicated, sharply defined 
individual entity which appears indeterminate to us only 
because we cannot see it directly" {p 77). Those who argue 
that experience and learning are primarily responsible for 
the development of the human psyche are lik.ened by Jung to 
those who believe that the sllll which rises in the morning is 
I . 
a different sun from that which set the evening before 
(p 78). 
Just as the members of each plant species becomes and 
is a plant of its kind, or each insect represents its kind, 
so too does each human. Despite the diversity of human 
lives and human cultures, the human pattern is everywhere 
and every time repeated. The repeated pattern leads scholars 
to assume that each human life and each culture is shaped by 
similar genetic forces. This assumption in turn leads to the 
search within the diversity of biography and culture for the 
necessary repeated pattern. Jung, Chomsky and Levi-Strauss 
all exhibit this circularity of inspiration, assumption and 
justification. As is the case with other innatists, Jung 
substantiate.s many of his conceptual and theoretical formu-
lations by using the cultural universals argument. He was 
particularly impressed by alchemic and mythological univer-
sals and, like ·Levi-Strauss, regarded myths as especially 
direct expression of the collective unconscious. Besides 
these sources of validation, Jung also maintained that the 
existence and nature of the archetypes as intrinsic elements 
of the human psyche could be ·inferred from the traces of 
mythological imagery which appear in dreams and madness. 
The most compelling evidence in favour of the postulated 
collective unconscious and, the archetypes is provided by 
those mythological themes and images which oc.cur in dreams 
and madness but which cannot be accounted for in terms of 
the chronicle of an individual's actual lived experiences 
{see Fordham 1973:25-27). 
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Some other cultural 11 innatists 11 
Numerous other scholars have investigated, described, 
or theorized about biological aspects of the hwnan mind and 
culture. A few more of these can be briefly referred to; 
it is not possible to embark on an encyclopaedic discussion. 
The resurgence of certain innatist themes and prop-
ositions in contemporary social scier..ce is partly witnessed 
by the fact that a writer like Levy-Bruhl, who emphasized 
innate human qualities, is again becoming academically 
respectable. A number of his original works have recently 
become available to the English-speaJcing world and Needham 
(1972), for one, emphasizes this change of climate by dedi-
cating his book, "Belief, language and experience", to this 
misunderstood and misrepresented scholar. Tbe considerable 
and protracted investigations of Levy-Bruhl (1931, 1949) led 
him to conclude that the fundamental structure of the b.wnan 
mind was everywhere the same. He succeeded in isolating 
what he regarded as a fixed element, fundamental and indes-
tructible, in the nature of hwnank.ind, which he called 
"primitive mentality" (1949:187). He writes, "in every 
hwnan mind, whatever intellectual development, there sub-
sists an ineradicable fw:d of primitive mentality" (Levy-
Bruhl 1931:26-27). This primitive mentality provides hwnans 
with an innately structured pre-logical mode of social par-
ticipation and intellectual understanding. It is character-
ized by the power it has in allowing individuals to grasp 
the meaning of symbols intuitively and collectivelyo From 
it springs, muqh as Jung has insisted, human modes of 
thought, action and feeling. We ought not to wish for the 
demise of our primitive mentality, argues Levy-Bruhl (1931: 
27), "For with it ·would disappear, perhaps, poetry, art, 
metaphysics, and scientific i~ventions -- almost everything, 
in short, that makes for the bea.uty and grandeur of hwnan 
life" .. 
Despite their considerable merit, the works of Levy-
Brubl have, until recently (as noted above) been neglected 
and he has been unfairly pilloried. The unpopularity of his 
writing seems to spring, as Needham (1972) points out, from 
a misunderstanding of, and fixation on, his earlier works. 
These seemed to convey the impression that modern Western 
persons possessed one sort of mentality while the tribes 
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studied by anthropologists -- the coloI'-ized peoples -- had 
another (see Beattie·' s critic isms 1964: 28, 67). What Levy-
Bruhl was driving at, as emerged more clearly in his later 
'-writing, is that all humans share a primitive mentality, 
which is part of their nature. He took pains to point out 
that though this mentality was common to all humans, certain 
social and cultural arrangements reflect or give expression 
to this mentality more vividly than others. Humans cannot 
think or participate in society without employing their fund 
of primitive mentality. But since the primitive mentality 
is socially overlaid by differing languages, traditions, 
modes of thought, images, symbols and other cultural elements, 
the actual thoughts, actions and feelings of individuals in 
different societies would, in fact, not be the same. Jung 
also emphasizes this point. Needham (1972:167) sums up his 
comments on Levy-Bruhl by noting that his main theoretical 
achievement was to have taken seriously the possibility that 
the fundamental identity of human nature was nevertheless 
compatible with the existence of mentalities differing 
sharply from one another. 
Needham himself confesses to having found inatist con-
cepts similar to Levy-Bruhl's primitive mentality useful and 
justifiable. He coined the term "natural symbols" to refer 
to, " ••• cer.tain phenomenal and conceptual vehicles of 
meaning that seem to exert an intuitive influence on mants 
psyche and the regulation of his thought" (Needham 1972:216). 
In addition he ·speaks of "primary factors of human experi-. 
ence", a phrase denoting compendiously, "capacities, 
concepts, images, concerns, and intuitions that appear to be 
recognised in one way or another in all knm~n cultures" 
(Needham 1972:216). 
Freud's emphasis on the role of the instincts in all 
psychological phenomena can also be regarded· as a contri-
bution, even though indirect, to an understanding of the 
impact which the human genome has on all forms of culture. 
An indication of this contribution is conveyed by Freud's 
(1973: 121-122) definition of an instinct: "An 'instinct' 
appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental 
and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the 
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stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching 
the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for 
work in consequence of its connection with the body." 
According to Freud, hwnankind's shared instincts do not lead 
to the same individual expressions nor can they be regarded 
as resulting in the same cultural productions. Nevertheless, 
due to the instincts and the universality of certain social 
arrangements and relationships, there are recurring though 
not identical experiences. Thus, for example, the Oedipus 
complex is a common psychological configuration resulting 
from the operation of the instincts being channelled by a 
recurring set of human relationships. Relationships which 
are themselves strongly biologically shaped. Freud and 
other psychoanalysts may be interpreted as having discovered 
that hwnans are likely at particular stages in their develop-
ment to assimilate certain events and relationships in 
stereotypical ways. In this way individuals at the same 
stage of development are characterized by similar acquired 
schemas and items of knowledge as part of their individual 
stocks of knowledge. 
Like Jlll1.g and Freud, the Italian sociologist Pareto 
also sees forms of inr.:..ate knowledge underlying mind and 
society. Pareto calls the actual items of cultural knowledge 
of society ".derivatives". These items are derived from,· 
what may be interpreted as, biological "residues". These 
residues, writes Pareto, correspond to certain instincts in 
human beings. ·For this reason, they are usually wanting in 
definiteness or exact delineation. "Actually observable in 
society are certain derivatives, c, that derive from resi-
dues, a, by way of derivatives, b" (Pareto 1965:785). As a 
simple example of the relationship between the residues and 
derivatives, Pareto refers to the exact objectivation and 
delineation of temperature in scientific measurement and in 
scientific theory. This cultural item is derived from the 
biological and physiological residue which enables humans to 
make hot/cold and warm/cool distinctions subjectively and 
makes such distinctions meaningful, in, initially, purely 
biological wa.ys. Cultural items result,· many times, he 
states, from making residues more exact (Pareto 1965:784). 
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The concept "innate knowledge" adopted in this study 
and this discussion of the relationship between the human 
genome and cultural knowledge has an obvious Cartesian 
flavour. The ideas expressed by the above writers hark back 
in one way or another to DescarteVs notion of innate ideas 
as well as to Leibniz's rationalistic premise which held that 
the human mind is everywhere the same. Like Descarte, 
Leibniz advocated a doctrine of innate ideas and helped 
establish a rationalistic psychology. This psychology con-
cerned itsel.f with the :forms, limits, and principles that 
provide (in Leibniz's words), "the sinews and connections" 
for human thought and knowledge. 
220; see also Chomsky 1972:96.) 
(Quoted in Needham 1972: 
In the more recent past rationalistic arguments have 
been proposed by Bastian (1926-1905) in Germany and Frazer 
(1854-1941) in England. Both these thinkers held that 
because all humans belong to one species there must be psy-
chological universals ·which are reflected in the actions and 
thoughts of all humans. Bastian proposed a thorough-eoing 
Lcibnizian theory of i.nnate ideas. For Bastian, the psychic 
unity of mankind ever)'>vherc produced similar "elementary 
ideas" -- as he named them. These elementary ideas were 
innately predetermined and they directed cultural develop-
ment. In addition, Bastian maintained that the elementary 
ideas were not subject to alteration the way that other ideas 
were subject to the forces of cultural evolution. Elementary 
ideas are held ·by him to be the unchanging bedrock of history 
and culture. (See Leach 1970; Bidney 1970.) 
Others, such as James, McDougall, Cassirer and Gurvitch 
could easily be discussed but it seems now appropriate to 
call a halt to this listing. -The scholars listed above have 
all in their own way produced, what Murphy refers to as, 
"dialectical philosophies". A passage from his book, "The 
dialectics of social life", provides an appropriate con-
cluding statement for this section. 
One of the key tenets of all dialectical 
philosophies is that there is a human 
psyche that has certain inherent and 
universal characteristics and that is an 
active element in man's history and not 
a mere passive receptor of an external 
world. 
(Murphy 1972:203.) 
Biology and A PRIORI knowledge 
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Attention was drawn earlier to those forms of cognitive 
knowledge which cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as 
learnt but which nevertheless presuppose learning. One of 
the first scholars to distinguish some such forms of knowl-
edge was Kant (1724-1804). Kant begins his "Critique of 
Pure Reason" . with the statement, "That all our knm.rledge 
begins with experience there can be no doubt". In the next 
paragraph he introduces the wedge which he is to use to 
separate 11 pure" from 11 empirical" knowledge. "But, though 
all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means 
frillows, that all arises out of experience. ·For, on the 
contrary, it is quite possibl.e that our empirical knowledge 
is a compound of that 1vhich we receive through impressions, 
and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself 
(sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an 
addition which we cannot distinguish from the original 
element given by sense, till lor.g practice has made us 
attentive to, and skilful in separating it" (Kant [1787] 
1969:25). 
Kant, by employing his considerable erudition, argued 
that sensations were insufficient in themselves to produce 
knowledge. Wh~t was necessary were A PRIORI coordinations, 
forms and categories which, together with sensations, were 
sufficient to produce knowledge. He writes, "Before objects 
are given me, that is, A PRIORI, I must presuppose in myself 
laws of understanding which a:re expressed in conceptions A 
PRIORI. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of 
experience must necessarily conform" (Kant 1969:12). Since 
genetic epistemology is deeply concerned with the sources of 
knowledge, Kant may be regarded as having made a valuable 
contribution to this study when he argued that human knowl-
edge (as he used the term) has only two sources, namely 
"sense and understanding" (Kant 1969:40). The senses provide 
the objects of thought while understanding is the process 
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and form of thought. For Kant, A PRIORI elements of cog-
nition constitute the objects of perception as well as the 
process and :form of thought. Both A PHIORI elements 'are 
necessary. "Without the sensuous faculty no object would be 
given us, and without the understanding no object would be 
thought" (Kant 1969:62). Kant set himself the daunting task 
to de scribe the A PRIORI elerr.ent s of cognition which made 
empirical and pure knowledge possible. By describing these 
A PRIORis Kant was making empirical, that is, sensible, a 
form of knowledge inherent in all empirical knowledge but of 
which the thinker is generally unaware for it is the very 
thing which makes thought thought. In seeking to uncover 
the A PRIORis of human thought and knowledge, Kant initiated 
nearly two hundred years ago the kinds of searches conducted 
in this century by Chomsky, Levi-Strauss, JLW.g, Piaget and 
others. 
One way of looking at the "Critique" is to see it, as 
Durant ( 1961: 202), doeE, as a 11 ••• detailed biology o:f 
thought, an examination of the origin and evolution of con-
cepts, an analysis of the inherited structure of the mind". 
For example, in addition to his wellknown description o:f the 
basic categories of perception and thought, Kant (1969:36), 
like his distant disciples Jung and Levi-Strauss, finds the 
human mind everywhere 11 .... urged on by its own :feeJ.ing of 
need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any 
empirical application of reason or principles derived there-
from; and so there has ever really existed in every man 
some system of metaphysics". The human mind has, for Kant, 
a natural disposition to metaphy~ics. 
Viewed as a biology of thought or knowledge, 'the 
"Critique" has a number of weaknessesQ Chief amongst these 
is the fact that though he describes the nature of human 
reason he does not provide a natural account of this nature. 
This judgement is, obviously, a bit unfair for as Bronowski 
(1979:22) reminds us, the idea of evolution was an idea 
barely in the head of Darivint s grandfather, Erasmus, in 
Kant's lifetime. Kant died in 1804 and Darwin was born in 
1809. It is thus easy to appreciate that though he asked 
questions regarding the origin of the mind's A PRIORis he 
c-;5~~) 
nowhere provides satisfactory answers to such questions nor 
does it even half dawn .on him that the relation of man to 
the animals might provide a clue. Related to this weakness 
is his failure to provide a satisfactory reason why empirical 
knowledge should correspond with reality. A further weak-
ness, which actually contradicts the claim that Kant provides 
a biology of knowledge, is Kant's idea that certain forms of 
knowledge are absolutely true. 
Biological epistemology, as should be clear from this 
study, is at odds with Kant ts claim that some forms of 
knowledge are absolutely true. Biology instructs us that 
life is a process of becomj_ng and that knowledge, a life 
process, is also a becoming. Evolutionary reasoning requires 
that Kantts claim for the necessary A PRIOEI validity of the 
categories of thought be rejected. What cannot be denied is 
the A PRIORI necessity of the categories for thought and 
knowledge. Evolutionary epistemology reveals that tho cate-
gories themselves are the products of evolutionary processes. 
They are something which has resulted from tho interplay 
between the genome and environment over millions of genera-
tions. In evolutionary perspective, as Campbell (1974:4li1) 
notes, tho categories can be seen as" .... highly edited, 
much tested presumptions, 'validated' only as scientific 
trt.:.th is validated, synthetic A POSTERIORI from tho point of 
view of species-history, synthetic and in several ways A 
PRIORI (but not in terms of necessary validity) from the 
point of view of the individual organism".. Campbell ack-
nowledges that he owes this insight to Popper (1969:47-48) 
who had argued that though we are born with the knowledge 
which makes thought possible and which structures·thought, 
~ this knowledge, 11 ••• although-not valid A PRIORI, is 
psychologically or genetically A PRIORI, i.e. prior to all 
observational experience". 
Herbert Spencer is one in a long line of scholars who 
have contributed to biological epistemology •. It \vas 
axiomatic for him that ultimately all aspects of the uni-
verse, whether organic or inorganic, social or non-social, 
are subject to the laws of evolution (see Coser 1977:90) • 
. As regards the origin of knowledge, he argued that it was 
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necessary to assume in the case of the individual thinker an 
A PRIORI organization. Where Spencer and biological epis-
temology part company with Kant is in the discovery that, 
"What is A PRIORI for the individual is not so for the race" 
(see Hoffding in Campbell 1974:443). It is a fundamental 
insight of biological epistemology that those conditions 
and forms of knowledge which cannot be ascribed to the 
experiences of the individual can be accour..ted for in terms 
of the experiences of the genome. Hence, as many recognize, 
though the empiricists are generally wrong as regards the 
ontogenetic acquisition of knowledge, their argument is 
valid phylogenetically. "Everything", writes Monod (1974: 
144), "whether it be the stereotyped behaviour of bees or 
the innate framework of human cognition, corr.es from experi-
ence; yet not from actual current experience, reiterated by 
each individual with each new generation, but instead, from 
the experience accumulated by the entire ancestry of the 
species in the course of its evolution." 
Kant maintained that the categories of thought yield. 
empirical knowledge because the mind imposes its own laws 
and forms upon nature. But, as Popper (1969) and others 
have pointed out, such projected knowledge is often found to 
have been mistaken. Even the categories, though sufficient 
in general t.o generate valid knowledge, on occasion produce 
error or irreconcilable contradiction. What is more, as 
Popper (1969:48) wryly notes, if the validity of Newton's 
theory is explained"••• by the fact that our intellect 
imposes its laws upon nature, it follows, I think, that our 
intellect must succeed in this; which makes it hard to 
understand why A PRIORI knowledge such as Newton's should be 
so hard to come by." 
Biological epistemology maintains that the categories 
and other A PRIORis of the human senses and mind yield valid 
knowledge (and nonsense) because they have evolved to do so. 
Campbell provides a long list of scholars who. have in one 
way or another recognized this insight or amplified it in 
some way. The list includes biologists, ethologists, philo-
sophers, psychologists and sociologists.· They are agreed 
that the A PRIORis of tho mind though not the result of 
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individual experience are nonetheless the result of the 
phylogenetic experiences of the genome. They are "working 
hypotheses" (to borrow Lorenz's phrase) evolved to generate 
the simple kinds of knowledge which make the basic form of 
human adaptation possible but from which have gradually 
emerged, accumulated and spiralled forms of knowledge which 
have led the human mind far beyond the problems which shaped 
it in its past. The fact that the A PRIORis are "working 
hypotheses" of the species Homosapiens helps explain, says 
Lorenz, the paradoxical fact that while some of the laws of 
"pure reason" break down at every step in modern theoretical 
science, they nevertheless have stood the test of the prac-
tical biological matter of the struggle for the preservation 
of the human species (quoted by Campbell 1974:446). 
In their thinking, neither animals nor humans can 
afford to make certain kinds of mistakes. The penalty is 
death; is the non-rep~oduction of the tendency to make 
those kinds of mistakes. The high development of the faculty 
for J.ogic in humans is the result, writes Nonod (1974:147), 
"••• of an evolution during which natural selection tested 
the efficacy of the process, its survival value." For this 
reason, he adds, the innate logical instrument we have 
inherited is reliable and it enables us to comprehend events 
in the world. arot.µid us. Tbe problem of the correspondence 
between such "pure" forms of knowledge as logic and math-
ematics -- which appear to owe little to individual experi-
ence _.:... and nat·ure is solved not by asserting, as did Kant, 
that it is the result of nature being shaped by the mind, 
but rather by the discovery that nature has shaped the mind 
that grasps nature as an object. The A PRIORI human mind, 
states Barash (1980:203), is actually nothing more than the 
embodiment of experience itself. "In systematically con-
fronting logic with experience, according to the scientific 
method, we are in fact confroI'-ting all the experience of our 
ancestors with our own" (Monad 1974:148). 
In his book "Biology and Knowledge" (1971) Piaget 
provides a detailed discussion of the genesis of logico-
mathematical knowledge, showing how it is related to innate 
knowledge. By referring to his own studies of the development 
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of logico-mathematical knowledge in children, Piaget 
provides insights into the ways in which the environment and 
the activities of the developing infant are necessary for 
the, so called, A PRIORI mental structures to emerge. While 
his studies do not challenge the argument for the genetic 
evolution of these structures, he does point out the import-
ance of individual experience for their actual operation, 
the unity between organism and environment is again stressed. 
Thus, the basics of logic and mathematics are not inborn, as 
Piaget makes clear, what is inborn are schemas which, given 
the kind of environment in which they have evolved and the 
kinds of experiences common to our species, lead eventually 
-- invariably -- to the attainment of logico-mathematical 
knowledge. For Piaget all knowledge derives from the most 
primitive organismic/environmental matrix. At this level, 
as Furth (1969:6.5) points out, there is no kind of fast line 
between the physical and the biological; "•••hence it 
appears reasonable that the biologically derived construct 
should fit the physical world". 
The fact that humans solve many problems more readily 
than chance allows or more readily than a systematic 
examination of all possible solutions allows, led the British 
philosopher Peirce (19.5,7) more than sixty-five years ago to 
develop his .rationalistic theory of scientific knowledge~ 
In this theory he proposed that humans are born with cog-
nitive structures and processes which facilitate the 
formation and selection of 11 correct" hypotheses in the face 
of infinite numbers of possible hypotb.esesg While such 
inborn structures and processes facilitate various forms of 
valid knowledge, they also, logically, limit the things 
which humans can come to know. Peirce holds th.at we have 
innately grounded intuitions or hunches (even feelings) which 
indicate to us which of a set of hypotheses are correct or 
possibly correct. These intuitions or hunch.es pay off more 
often than can be accounted for by chance. (one has only to 
think of the road of discovery of the young child.) Hence 
it seems that we possess a form of prescience which enables 
us to come to a conscious understanding or knowledge of the 
world sooner than if we relied solely on the empirical and 
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log;i..cal route to knowledge. This innate property, or 
adaptation, as Peirce calls it, means that correct hypoth-
eses appear to us as self-evident, simple and natural. 
Peirce contends that common sense judgements, our everyday 
type discriminations, should have a greater probability of 
being correct than purely random judgements because our 
common sense draws on "quasi-instinctual beliefs" that have 
been built:.-up and tested through centuries of experience and 
which are part of the biological inheritance of all humans. 
Though, as we have seen, the wisdom of such innate beliefs 
or knowledge· is great as regards certain survival 'musts', 
it is not very great as regards more abstract and theoretical 
thought. It seems that in science such innately grounded 
hunches only give us a slight edge over a purely random 
construction of reality because the number of hypotheses and 
theories which appear equally feasible or correct at any 
moment is still fairly large and our testing of these pro-
ceeds generally at a slow and laborious pace. 
Sociology and A PRIORI knowledge 
By maintaining that the categories of thought arc, in a 
fundamental way, genetically inherited, biological epistem-
ology is at odds with Durkheim's sociological account. An 
account whic.h evolutionary reasoning indicates is over-
socialized. In his writing about the categories, Durkheim 
sought to avoid the weaknesses of both the empiricist and 
the A PRIORI approaches by fusing their viable aspects into 
a predominantly sociological theory of cognition and knowl-
edge. His ideas led him to anticipate that the theory of 
knowledge would"••• unite the opposing advantages of the 
two rival theories, without incurring their inconveniences". 
It would"••• keep all the essential principles of the 
apriorists; but at the same time it (would be) inspired by 
that positive spirit which the empiricists have striven to 
satisfy" (Durkheim 1976:19 [191~7). Judged with the wisdom 
of hindsight, Durkheim can be said to have succeeded only 
partially. Nevertheless, his contribution, properly assimi-
lated in a general theory of knowledge, provides elements 
neglected by many of the approaches considered in this 
,, 
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chapter. For Durkheim empiricism could not account for the 
categories of understanding, ideas of time, space, class, 
number, cause, substance, and so on. On the other hand, 
Kantian A PRIORISM provided no satisfactory explanation for 
the origin and contents of the categories. It was no 
explanation, Durkheim argued, to say that these are inherent 
in the nature of the human intellect, as Kant did, they must 
be explained in terms of natural causes (Durkheim 1965; 
1976). 
That Durkheim, like almost all scholars tackling weighty 
matters, is ambiguous and sometimes obscure, is obvious from 
even a brief acquaintance with his work. The charge that his 
arguments are oversocialized can be rebutted. For one 
thing, he is occasionally cautious and modest. He writes of 
his theory of knowledge, for example, "••• in the actual 
condition of our knowledge of these matters one should be 
careful to avoid all radical and exclusive statements 11 
(Durkheim 1976:16). His claims that "society is a reality 
SUI GENERIS" and that knowledge is a social product arc 
counter balanced by the warning that"••• irreducibility must 
not be taken in any absolute sense" (p 16). He did not 
claim, as some suppose he did, that the social realm of being 
was unconnected with the biological and psychological. As 
he states of. thought and society, "If experience were com-
pletely separated from all that is rational, reason could not 
operate upon it; iri the same way, if the psychic nature of 
the individual were absolutely opposed to the social life, 
society would be impossible" (p 16). The antitheses in his 
work are further illustrated when Durkheim (1976:249) con-
cedes to biology and psychology that society exists only in 
and through individuals. He also states that, "A complete 
analysis of the categories should seek those germs of 
rationality even in the individual consciousness", (p 16) and 
that, "••• the relations which they express exist in an 
implicit way in individual consciousness." 
Despite such grounds as the foregoing for rebutting the 
charge that his theor1es result in an oversocialized concep-
tion of humankind, knowledge and society, I feel, an overall 
consideration of Durkheim's work supports the charge. In 
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some instances oversocialized arguments are obviously little 
more than literary devices, but Durkheim•s consistent neglect 
-- or even denial -- of the impact of human biology and 
psychology on knowledge and society -- that is, the other 
half of the dialectic he concentrates on -- provides strong 
grounds for the charge of oversocialization. His influence 
on sociology had been both positive and negative. On the 
negative side, he must be held accountable for at least some 
o:f the dominance which the oversocialized conception of 
knowledge, society and bumankind has in sociology. 
Studies.in epistemology and cognition seem to re:flect 
what may be a characteristic o:f individual minds. That is, 
some seem to :focus almost exclusively on similarities while 
others :focus on di:f:ferences. The texture of reality en-
co_urages both. Durkheim seems to have been biased in this 
way towards differences. In considering, say, Arunta thought 
and European thought, Durkheim saw mostly the differences. 
Since each thought :form came :from members o:f the same 
species, such differences were to be ascribed to the effects 
of society and culture. Durkheim was thus led to argue that 
the categories were social in origin and content. He wrote, 
"The first logical categories were social categories, the 
first classes of things were classes of men into which the 
things were .integrated. It was because men were grouped· and 
thought of themselves in the form o:f groups, that in their 
ideas they grouped other things" (Durkheim and Mauss 1965: 
82). That the ·categories are the product o:f social :factors 
is evidenced by, for example, "•o• societies in Australia 
and North America where space is conceived in the form o:f an 
immense circle, because the camp has a circular :form (Durk-
heim 1976:11). Time can only be grasped, nay only exists, 
through the round o:f social activities. "A calendar 
expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at 
the same time its function is to assure their regularity" 
(p 10). Durkheim sees wholi stic thought as r.ooted in the 
perceived unity of society and he o:f:fers similar "proo:fs" 
:for the origin and content o:f other categories and concepts. 
As his argument runs, the structures o:f human relations and 
society impose themselves on human cognition. They produce 
\_ 
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"collective representations" which lead all society members 
to make sense of their world in the same fashion. These 
shared representations thus result in shared knowledge, 
mutual understanding and cooperation -- all necessary factors 
of social life. Durkheim expresses the functional nature of 
the categories when he writes that if the members of society 
"•••did not have the same conceptions of time, space, cause, 
number etc., all contact between their minds would be 
impossible, and with that, all life together" (in Lt.:kes 
1973:442). (If society presupposes the _categories then how 
can society have originated them?) 
A comprehensive theory of human knowledge would, because 
so much human knowledge is social, be primarily a socio-
logical theory. For this reason, Durkheim, by his evolution-
ary approach and his emphasis on the social aspects of 
knowledge has obviously made a great contribution. He has, 
also, like Popper, provided reasons why his sociological 
theory of knowledge does not imply conventionalism and 
extreme relativism. Like Popper's World J, Durkheim's 
"collective representations" have emerged in an evolutionary 
f'ashion. from a distant past in which the contents of thought 
and the objects of knowledge were r..ot as clearly delineated 
as now. Early man rather than seeing through a glass darkly, 
thought through one in this fashion. The collective represen-
tations evolved to have an objective existence. They are 
objectivated knowledge; they are socially produced, trans-
mitted and preserved. They are outside the time and 
vicissitudes of individual life. They are an object in the 
world and cannot be resisted nor denied. They are more than 
mere epiphenomena of their morphological baseo They are the 
res.ult of a synthesis "SUI GENERIS" of indivi,dual conscious-
ness. Cf this Durkheim writes (1976:424), "Now this synthesis 
has the effect of disengaging a whole world of the senti-
ments, ideas and images which, once born, obey laws of their 
own. They attract each other, repel each 0th.er, t:ni te, 
divide themselves, and multiply, though these combinations 
are not commanded and necessitated by the condition of the 
underlying reality." (Recall Levi-Strauss's remark referred 
to earlier about his thoughts working themselves out in him 
258 
without his knowledge.) 
It is because the collective representations exist as 
independent and timeless objects that they are gradually 
clarified, sifted and tested through succeeding generations 
that they come to have the type of objective validity they 
have in society. Furthermore, a good point for biological 
epistemology, the categories and the other collective 
representations at each stage of their evolution and what-
ever form they take socially, correspond with nature where 
this correspondence is organically, psychologically and 
socially necessary. The reason for this Durkheim (1976:18) 
writes, is that society is a part of nature, it is a natural 
realm which differs from the others only by greater com-
plexity. 11 ••• it is impossible that nature should differ 
radically from itself in the one case and in the other in 
regard to that which is most essential. The fundamental 
relations that exist between things -- just that which it is 
the functions of the categories to express -- cannot be 
essentially dissimilar in the different realms. 11 (Note 
apparent contradiction with quote from p 424 above.) He 
proceeds to note that though the categories are most 
objectively expressed and analyzable in the social world, 
"it is nevertheless impossible that they should not be fowid 
elsewhere, though in less pronounced form11 (Durkheim 1976: 
18). Durkheim seems here to be approaching the view, basic 
to biological epistemology, that if society has shaped the 
categories, it ·has employed elements ma.de available to it by 
nature ar..d according to the laws of nature. Sucb a view 
would, if Durkheim bad pttrsued it far enough, have led him 
to formulate a theory very different from the one he in fact 
formulated. 
Durkheim's theory of knowledge seems to be, on close 
inspection, two theories rather than one. The one, which is 
poorly developed, suggests the kind of theory later developed 
by such scholars as Bald·Kin, Popper, Piaget, .Lorenz, Levi-
Strauss and others considered in this study. The other 
theory, which was more fully developed 2-Ild for which Durkheim 
is primarily remembered, constitutes an exaggerated sociology 
of knowledge. Durkheim did not produce a unified theory of 
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knowledge because, it seems, he was unable to reconcile his 
sociological and his individualistic approaches. He might 
have been able to do this if he had paid more attention to 
the position of the individual as the producer and vehicle 
of the collective representations. But he denied himself 
this possibility by his systematic "derogation of individual 
consciousness" (Schaub 1973:76). As Schaub (p 175) explains, 
individuals, even those customarily regarded as epoch-making, 
are denied any originative activity by Durkheim and he 
regards all psychological explanations of social phenomena 
as false. Rather than seeing the con.tents of individual 
stocks of knowledge as a creative :::ynthesis of individual 
and social elements (as advocated in this study), Durkheim 
regards all mental contents as entirely derived from the 
social mind of the group. Schaub (1973:176) quotes Gehlkc 
(1915:86) who wrote, 11 ••• so far as the individual appears . 
at all in Durkheim's later theory, he has become only a body; 
he is no longer <:L soul (AME). His soul is the mind of 
society incarnated in his body. The social mind is all the 
mind that exists; and in this sense the social is the only 
real". 
The roots of the categories go deeper than culture and 1 
possibly, even deeper than social life. They represent the 
outgrowths of an extremely ancient form of knowledge; an 
organic knowledge possessed by all creatures and used to 
adapt to the environment. Even a starfish knows "up" from 
"dmvn" as is demonstrated by its slow half-somersault 
execv.ted after it is turned on its back. Schaub. (1973:179) 
cites the case of a bird, whose nest is robbed of an egg, 
being aware, at the very least, of some alteration in respect 
of the conter..ts of the nest. -Thus, he suggests, something 
quantitative has found a kind of entrance into the animal's 
mind, in however obscure a form. The hunting behaviour of 
some predators clearly indicates that they have at least 
some notion of "one" , "some" and "many" • Biological epis-
temology leads one to the view, a view endorsed by Schaub 
(1973:180) that the categories as described by Durkheim 
really presuppose the categories. As noted earlier, by 
calling attention to the fact that social life presupposes 
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the categories, Durkheim, rather than strengthening his case, 
was contradicting it. For any individual to be part o:f a 
group and to co-operate and communicate in that group pre-
supposes a great deal o:f non-social knowledge. Any expla-
nation o:f the origin and genesis o:f human socio-cultural 
life would also have to begin with a certain assumed stock 
o:f non-social knowledge. Durkheim's claim that the social 
nature o:f the origin and content o:f the categories is 
demonstrated by those American and Australian societies that 
conceive o:f space as an immense circle because their camps 
are circular in :form begs the question as to how it is 
poEsible :for the members of such societies to know that their 
camps are circular or even wty they should be led to make 
such an observation in the first place. The answer seems to 
be that human beings, as Kant argued, organize and categorize 
experience in spatio-temporal terms because it is in their 
nature to do ::oo. The _circularity (or linearity or ~quarene ss 
or any other shape) of the camp may be seen as a represen-
tation of the way in which humans organize their experiences 
and, through the objectivation of their knowledge, their 
social world. But the camp, as Durkheim and Popper point 
out, becomes an object in the world, a facticity which can 
determine thought and '''hich thought may find good to think 
with. Thus .it is not surprising that, at the level of 
symbolic thought and communication, social arr2.ngements, 
which are obviously very Yvisible• and important, should 
become useful metaphors, vehicles of thought, :for expressing 
complex ideas and for assisting people in making sense of 
their world. Today humans reach for the stars using concepts 
developed in ancient mythologies and derived, no doubt, :from 
then current social arrangements. Durkheim makes the mistake 
of mistaking the clothing of intuitions :for their essences. 
And though these are related, they are not identical as any-
one who has tried to express the ineffable in language will 
attest. 
The fact that certain categories seem not to have 
changed at all in human history while others have been ex-
t.ended only in the direction of greater cla.ri ty and refine-
ment and that to the extent that any of the _categories have 
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undergone change it has been incomparably slower than the 
rate of change in social organization seems to contradict 
Durkheim's arguments (see Schaub 1973: 179). Durkheim has 
also overlooked the fact that the anthropologists who made 
sense of and reported on the categories of the societies to 
which he refers could only have done so if their own category 
systems had found some resonance in the systems of the 
peoples studied. Because of the trees of human differences 
Durkheim could not see the earth, wood and sky of their 
similarities. But this bias is a common one. In the reports 
of explorers; in the studies of anthropologists and in the 
journals of travellers, it is most generally the differences 
between themselves and those that they observe that are 
recorded (see Rosch 1977). In recent years there has been 
something of a shift in emphasis from differences to simi-
larities and there is in fact a new emphasis today on psycho-
logical universals, writes Warren (1980:290). It seems as 
if, ho adds, humans are more alike in certain fundamental 
respects than an earlier generation of social scientists, 
stressing humankind's plasticity, thought. Though it is 
obvious that there are cultural differer:ces between people, 
these differences are, states Warren, to some extent an 
overlay on psychological universals. 
Conclusion 
In this study I have attempted to accomplish two major 
objectives. The first was to define the term "knowledge" in 
such a way as to include the many varieties of knowledge 
currently excluded by the conventional sociology of knowledge 
because of its over-restricted definition. The second 
objective was to develop a "depth sociology" (Staude 1976: 
JOJ) for the sociology of knowledge. 
The first objective of this study arose from the 
intuition that by defining knowledge more broadly, the sub-
ject matter of the sociology of knowledge could be expanded 
to include all that functions as knowledge in society and 
makes each society what it is. This intuition also held out 
the promise that by defining knowledge di.fferently, a way 
could be forged which would facilitate the synthesis of the 
biology of knowledge, the psychology of knowledge and the 
sociology of knowledge into a comprehensive theory of 
knowledge. 
262 
The second objective stemmed from the awareness that 
much sociological theory is oversocialized; that widely 
accepted theories of socialization, learning, culture, 
knowledge, social order, etc., are misleadingly one-sided, 
even erroneous, because they pay too little attention to 
what is known about human biology and psychology. It was by 
developing a depth sociology of knowledge that I felt this 
study could contribute to scholarship in general and to 
sociology in particular. 
It was from Piaget's genetic epistemology and Popper 
and Lorenz's evolutionary epistemology that much of the con-
ceptual framework developed in this study was drawn. They 
also provided many of the important ideas, arguments and 
factual data used to flesh out the conceptual framework into 
the kind of genetic epistemology developed. A genetic epis-
temology that goes beyond Piaget's because it embraces 
social knowledge and is not restricted to scientific and 
logico-mathematical knowledge. It is a genetic epistemology 
which not only urges that the sociology of knowledge itself 
become a genetic epistemology but implies that the sociology 
of knowledge. along with the psychology and biology of 
knowledge constitute genetic epistemology. 
The overarching thesis of this dissertation is that all 
knowledge, even cultural knowledge, is dependent on and 
strongly influenced by humankind's biology. A key argument 
presented was that all humans are born with an essentially 
similar inn.ate learning schema and that this schema has 
played and continues to play a vital role in the origin and 
evolution of cultural knowledge. It is because of the 
existence of this schema and its role in society and culture 
that I feel this dissertation. has a contribution to mal~e. I 
hope it shows, as did Polanyi in a different way, that we 
kn.ow more than we kn.ow we know and that what we do not know 
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